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SUMMARY
Problem. More than ever, some of the biggest challenges to society involve the governance 
of natural resources. From large-scale resource systems, such as the rain forest and oceans, to 
small-scale systems, such as lakes or alpine pastures, cooperative efforts are required to 
ensure sustainable and yet productive use of natural resources. In Switzerland, the 
management of alpine pastures has for centuries been predominantly organized by local 
governance institutions, avoiding an overuse of the scarce resources. During the past decade, 
the use and maintenance of common property pastures (CPPs) is declining, leading to land 
abandonment and forest regrowth. However, CPPs provide significant services to the 
mountain regions, such as additional grazing grounds; assets for the tourism industry; 
protection from soil erosion, water runoff and landslides; and high biodiversity. These 
services are currently threatened by reduced use and maintenance of CPPs. 
Research Aims. The research presented herein aims for a better understanding of social-
ecological interactions driving the use of CPPs to provide policy recommendations for the 
sustainable governance of CPPs.  
Methods. To achieve a holistic understanding of the variables driving CPP use, this research 
used multiple methods to investigate CPP use in Grindelwald, Switzerland as a social-
ecological system (SES). The research was structured in four modules. First, qualitative 
methods were applied to analyze institutional change in the governance of CPP. Second, 
regression models were built from survey data to better understand farmers’ land use 
decisions. Third, an analysis of the ecological system was conducted based on land cover 
statistics. Forth, a systems dynamics model of the local SES was built and combined with a
formative scenario analysis to investigate potential future developments of CPP use.
Results. The outcomes of the different modules suggest the following: First, local governance 
systems originally designed to prevent overuse of CPPs are able to adapt to problems of 
declining use and maintenance of CPPs by altering a set of rules. Second, farmers’ use of 
CPPs depends on personal attributes, including farm size, norms and dependence on the 
resource. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that high local demand and prices for alpine 
cheese are a central factor in the sustainable use of CPPs. Third, the land cover analysis 
showed that afforestation occurs in Grindelwald at a relatively moderate pace and defined the 
area most prone to afforestation and bush encroachment. Fourth, the simulation model allows 
for the display of complex social-ecological interactions, showing that afforestation 
tendencies are likely to continue, although at a different pace depending on the scenario 
setting.  
Conclusion. This research provided a better understanding of CPP use through the analysis of 
the subsystem characterizing the SES. It showed how the general framework for analyzing 
SESs can be operationalized using a broad set of methods. It thereby contributed and 
advanced central themes within the study of the commons, such as institutional analysis, 
users’ behavior in cooperative dilemmas and modeling of SESs. The integration of the 
findings from different modules into a simulation provided insights about the effects of 
different policies on the sustainability of the SES and thereby demonstrated why particular 
policy blueprints will accelerate rather than counteract the problem of CPP abandonment. 

  
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Problem. Die Gesellschaft ist zunehmend herausgefordert, den Umgang mit natürlichen 
Ressourcen nachhaltig zu gestalten. Kooperative Anstrengungen sind nötig, um eine 
nachhaltige und produktive Nutzung groß- und kleinflächiger Ressourcensysteme wie 
Regenwälder, Ozeane und Alpen (Almen) zu gewährleisten. In der Schweiz ist die Alpung
seit Jahrhunderten überwiegend kommunal organisiert, mit dem Ziel, die Übernutzung der 
Weiden zu verhindern. Während der letzten Jahrzehnte ist die Alpung jedoch rückläufig, was 
zur Auflassung von Weiden und Wiederbewaldung führt. Da die kontinuierliche 
Weidenutzung und -pflege bedeutende Leistungen für die Bergregion hervorbringen wie
Offenhaltung der Futterflächen, ein gepflegtes Landschaftsbild für den Tourismus und diverse 
Ökosystemdienstleistungen, ist der Rückgang der Alpwirtschaft ein bedeutendes Problem in 
vielen Bergregionen. 
Forschungsziel. Die vorliegende Arbeit soll zu einem besseren Verständnis der 
Wechselwirkungen zwischen Mensch und Umwelt beitragen, welche die nachhaltige Nutzung 
der Alpen beeinflussen, um daraus Handlungsempfehlungen abzuleiten. 
Methoden. Um ein ganzheitliches Verständnis der Determinanten einer nachhaltigen 
Alpwirtschaft zu generieren, stützt sich diese Arbeit auf verschiedene Methoden. Dabei dient 
die Gemeinde Grindelwald in der Schweiz als Fallbeispiel für die sozial-ökologische Analyse, 
die in 4 Module unterteilt ist: Im ersten Modul wird mittels qualitativer Methoden untersucht, 
ob die lokalen Körperschaften ihre institutionellen Regime anpassen, um dem Problem der 
Unternutzung entgegenzuwirken. Im Zweiten werden die Landnutzungsentscheidungen der 
Landwirte mittels Regressionsmodellen basierend auf Umfragedaten erklärt. Im Dritten wird 
eine räumliche Analyse des ökologischen Teilsystems basierend auf der Arealstatistik
durchgeführt. Im Vierten wird das sozial-ökologische System modelliert und durch Szenario-
Analyse mögliche Entwicklungen der Alpwirtschaft von Grindelwald simuliert.
Resultate. Die Ergebnisse zeigen erstens, dass die lokalen Körperschaften auf die
rückgängige Nutzung reagieren, indem sie diverse Nutzungsregeln anpassen. Zweitens, dass
die Landnutzungsentscheidungen der Landwirte von Betriebsgröße, Normen, und von deren
Abhängigkeit von landwirtschaftlichem Einkommen determiniert sind. Drittens, zeigt die 
Analyse des Ressourcensystems, dass in Grindelwald der Prozess der Wiederbewaldung in 
moderatem Tempo erfolgt und welche Standorte davon betroffen sind. Viertens, zeigt das 
Simulationsmodell die sozial-ökologischen Wechselwirkungen auf, welche zum Rückgang 
der Alpwirtschaft führen. Die Simulation verschiedener Szenarien zeigt zudem, welche 
exogenen Veränderungen die Wiederbewaldung in Zukunft begünstigen respektive 
abschwächen.
Fazit. Durch sozial-ökologische Systemanalyse zeigt diese Forschung auf, welche Mensch-
Umwelt-Interaktionen die nachhaltige Nutzung der Alpen beeinflussen. In den einzelnen 
Modulen werden verschiedene Methoden kombiniert, um das Framework zur Analyse 
sozialökologischer Systeme zu operationalisieren. Damit leistet die Studie Beiträge zu den 
zentralen Themen der Allmend-Forschung wie Institutionenanalyse, Verhaltensökonomie und 
computergestützte Simulation sozial-ökologischer Systeme. Die Integration der Ergebnisse 
aus verschiedenen Modulen bietet schließlich einen Überblick über die Auswirkungen 
politischer Maßnahmen auf die Nachhaltigkeit der Alpwirtschaft und zeigt auf, weshalb 
bestimmte Patentrezepte den Rückgang der Alpwirtschaft eher begünstigen als aufhalten.
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PART ONE: SYNOPSIS
1 Introduction
Promoting a more sustainable use of natural resources like pastures, forests, irrigation 
systems, fisheries, or fresh water and more recently, clean air, global climate, and biodiversity
is a major challenge to societies. Science has undertaken tremendous efforts to investigate the 
social and ecological conditions that facilitate or hinder sustainable governance of natural 
resources. Herein, property rights are considered key. No matter whether a resource is held in 
private, state, or common property, particular forms of ownership alone do not guarantee 
sustainability. Instead different forms of property rights and the characteristics of the resource 
affect the incentive structures for potential resource users. Institutions such as markets, state 
quota, or use rights help balance the levels of exploitation with the resources capacity to 
renew and recover in order to maintain sustainability. This dissertation addresses the current 
challenges and solutions for maintaining balanced resource use for the case of common 
property pastures (CPP) in the Swiss Alps.  
1.1 Common Pool Resource Governance
Common pool resources (CPRs) are jointly managed resources, for which individuals’ 
appropriation diminishes the resource stock and potential beneficiaries of which are difficult 
to exclude (Berkes et al. 1989). CPRs can be natural or man-made resources to which a large 
number of people have access. This situation poses a social dilemma: If one limits his use of 
the resource while others do not, then the resource will degrade and the individual that 
restrained himself has no benefit at all. To avoid being in this position, individuals extract as
much as possible from the resource before there is nothing left. This dilemma was said to be 
impossible to overcome, leading to the “tragedy of the commons”.  
The debate started with the seminal articles of Gordon on fisheries and Hardin on pastures
(Gordon 1954; Hardin 1968). Both pictured resources overexploited by self-seeking 
individuals maximizing their use of the freely available resource that is the property of all, but 
valued by no one. As a consequence, common property was regarded as an inferior stage of 
property rights development that needed to be overcome through privatization or state control 
as the sole means to prevent the tragedy of the commons.  
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Since then, scholars have shown repeatedly that CPR governance is possible through self-
organization of users. Ostrom provided a synthesis of examples for successful community-
based CPR-management efforts ranging from communal tenure of pastures and forests in the 
Swiss Alps, to irrigations systems in the Philippines and Spain, and to fisheries in Turkey 
(Ostrom 1990). There are many more case studies on collectively governed resources of 
fisheries (Acheson 2003), irrigation systems (Wade 1989), alpine pastures (Netting 1981), and 
forests (Agrawal and Chhatre 2006). The main interest of these studies has been to understand 
how cooperation evolves and which factors facilitate collective governance of natural 
resources in order to avoid their over-use. The factors that were found to facilitate or hinder 
sustainable governance, however, vary across space and time, and social and natural sciences 
put different emphasis on the explanatory variables and methodological approaches. In order 
to provide ground for multidisciplinary efforts for the analyses of social-ecological systems
(SES), Ostrom provided a framework that synthesizes all potential relevant social and 
ecological variables that explain success of common pool resource governance (Ostrom 2007;
Ostrom 2009). This thesis applies the framework in order to analyze the sustainability of 
CPPs in the Swiss Alps.  
1.2 Common Property Pastures in the Alps
Since Nettings’ study in Törbel (Netting 1981), common property pastures (CPPs) in the 
European Alps have become a classic example for the study of collectively governed 
resources. Several scholars have described organizational principles and the rules applied to 
govern pasture use in order to avoid overuse (Casari 2007; Ostrom 1990; Stevenson 2005;
Stoeckle 2009).  
However, as a result of social developments in the past decade, many alpine pastures in 
Europe have become less intensely used and maintained. Increasing labor productivity in the 
industrial and service-oriented sectors has steadily moved labor forces away from the 
agricultural sector. In terms of expanding agricultural land use, alpine agriculture appears to 
have reached its peak at the beginning of the 19th century (Stöcklin et al. 2007). Since then,
agriculture has steadily relinquished from using the least productive areas, which has been 
identified as a major driver for forest regrowth (Keenleyside, Tucker, and McConville 2010;
MacDonald et al. 2000).  
In Switzerland, about 12% of the national area consists of alpine pastures (Lauber et al. 2008), 
approximately 80% of which are kept in communal tenure (Baur, Müller, and Herzog 2007). 
As a result, CPPs form an important part of the national surface area and provide various 
social and environmental services and public goods. As these services crucially depend on the 
cultivation of marginal pastures which are often common property, the cultivation of which 
under current conditions often does not cover costs, the sustainable use of CPPs nowadays
does not simply depend on the ability of collective organizations to avoid overuse: more 
importantly, it depends on governance efforts to ensure the continuous use and maintenance 
of CPPs in order to secure the environmental and social services streaming from sustainable
CPP use.
1.3 Services Streaming from Sustainable Common Property Pasture
Management
Research has identified several services that are potentially threatened by the abandonment of 
marginal alpine pastures. Among the ecological services figures are: 
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1.3.1 Ecosystem Services
Provision of high-value grass for livestock feed and thus an additional income source 
for farmers; 
Biodiversity (Burel and Baudry 1995; Giupponi et al. 2006; Stöcklin et al. 2007), such 
as the biological diversity of vascular plant species in alpine pastures, which is twice 
as high as in forests (Korner and Spehn 2002); 
Protection against soil erosion, water run-off, and landslides (Tasser, Mader, and 
Tappeiner 2003); 
Protection from natural hazards (Tasser, Mader, and Tappeiner 2003). 
1.3.2 Cultural Services
Among the social services are: 
Provisioning of specialties and alpine products;  
Landscape beauty and diversity for recreational activities (Hunziker 1995; Hunziker et 
al. 2008); 
Identification with the landscape (Bignal and McCracken 2000; Plieninger, Höchtl, 
and Spek 2006).  
For Switzerland, several researchers have investigated the development of these services in 
the Swiss Alps. The main contribution toward an integrative social and ecological analysis 
was given by the NFP 48, in which the focus was on landscape development and habitat. The 
main results of the NFP 48 are summarized in five synthesis books dealing with (i) processes 
of perception (Backhaus, Reichler, and Stremlow 2008); (ii) processes of change (Stöcklin et 
al. 2007); (iii) designing goals in landscape evolution (Simmen and Walter 2007); (iv) land 
use and adding values (Simmen, Walter, and Marti 2006). Key recommendations relating to 
further research in the Swiss Alps are: 
Alpine research should study development paths of specific regions and compare the 
driving factors affecting different types of developments (Lehmann and Messerli 
2007). 
Grassland and pastures are important elements in the landscape of the Swiss Alps, 
mostly with respect to biodiversity. Land abandonment and alpine fallows are 
important issues to be further analyzed (Lehmann and Messerli 2007). 
Current local institutions governing the commons have been stable and effective in 
dealing with potential resource overuse. However, it was found that these exact 
institutions might hinder innovative and sustainable development paths. Thus, one 
open question is how and whether these institutions will be able to adapt to the new 
demands and support sustainable management in future (Knoepfel and Gerber 2008). 
Participation in research projects in the Alps is recommended given the high diversity 
of stakeholders and interest groups, ranging from tourism to ecologists and farmers 
(Simmen and Walter 2007) and thus requiring inter- and transdisciplinary approaches 
to understand past and future developments of CPP use (Lehmann and Messerli 2007). 
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2 Research Problems and Questions
Given the services and research recommendations associated with the sustainable 
management of CPPs in Switzerland, there is a need for research to provide in-depth 
understanding of the distinctive configurations of variables describing CPP use. As social-
ecological (or human-environmental) systems consist of unique configurations, success 
factors leading to sustainable outcomes in one setting will not necessarily have the same 
effect in other settings. This is holds even more for the analysis of CPP use, as governance
efforts need to deal with the problem of resource underuse, which is usually not considered in 
CPR research.
Therefore integrative research is needed, which acknowledges the complex relationships 
between farmers’ decision-making, institutional structures, and the ecological system to 
diagnose sustainability of CPPs. Accordingly, this research aims at providing the following 
knowledge: 
a. Solid understanding of the role of local governance systems in the context of reducing 
CPP use; 
b. Insights on variables driving farmers’ use of CPPs; 
c. Analysis of the impact of CPP use on land cover; 
d. Integrative model of the local social-ecological systems for policy testing. 
With respect to these research aims, the following chapters (2.1-2.4) will review previous 
research and current methods, and identify the gaps and research questions to be answered.
2.1 Institutions for Common Pool Resources Governance
One of the most central questions in the study of the commons is which local governance 
characteristics allow for the long-term sustainable management of CPR. Several synthesis of 
case studies exist that highlight ecological and social factors that facilitate self-governance 
(Agrawal 2001; Baland and Platteau 1996; Ostrom 1990). Herein, the eight design principles 
of Ostrom have become the most accepted (Cox, Arnold, and Tomás 2010). Accordingly, 
successful local governance builds on:  
1. Clearly defined groups and territorial boundaries;  
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local needs and conditions; 
3. Collective-choice arrangements that guarantee access to rule-making for those most 
affected by the rules; 
4. Monitoring systems; 
5. Graduated sanctions for rule violations; 
6. Availability of low-cost means for dispute resolution; 
7. Minimum recognition of rights to self-organize; 
8. Nested enterprise. 
These design principles illuminate the properties of the governance system that are likely to 
lead to long-term successful self-governance of CPRs by enforcing institutions as mechanisms 
for reducing uncertainty in complex environments as a base for collective action. 
Nevertheless, while design principles may provide a generalized checklist for good-
governance principles, they do not allow for predicting whether a local governance system is 
able to deal with external change such as market developments (Southworth and Tucker 2001;
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Tucker, Randolph, and Castellanos 2007) or whether a governance system enforces 
institutions that fit the changing conditions of the biophysical world (Young 2002). Therefore 
a simple check for design principles or static institutional analysis will not provide insights 
about whether and how local governance systems adapt institutions to cope with external 
change.  
Gap 1: Whilst studies on self-governed CPRs provide useful snapshots about properties and 
rules applied at a particular point in time, no study exists that traces the evolution of the 
governance system over longer periods and its adaptations to internal and external changes 
in the SES.
Doubtlessly, the local governance system in the Swiss Alps has been stable and effective in 
dealing with potential resource overuse. However, it is questionable whether these institutions 
are similarly effective in dealing with resource underuse because the main functions of the 
local governance system (i) excludes outsiders and (ii) limits the extraction levels of users. 
Thus, one open question is how and whether local governance systems in the Swiss Alps 
adapt institutions to the new demands to support the sustainable management of CPPs 
(Kissling-Näf, Volken, and Bisang 2002; Knoepfel and Gerber 2008). Accordingly, the first 
research question aims to clarify the role of local governance in the context of reducing 
resource use: 
Research question 1: Do local governance systems in the Swiss Alps change institutions in 
order to adapt to the socio-economic changes to avoid reduced use and maintenance of 
CPPs?
2.2 Individuals’ Behavior in Common Pool Resources Dilemmas
The use of CPRs involves cooperative dilemmas, which actors need to solve in order to 
manage resources sustainably. The first dilemma results from the fact that CPRs are 
subtractable. That is, appropriation of resources units of one user imposes externalities on 
other resource users as the resource stock diminishes. Therefore, users face incentives to 
maximize appropriation for their own benefit, as the cost of their activities (reduced 
availability of the resource) is turned over onto other resource users (Gardner, Ostrom, and 
Walker 1990). Furthermore, the availability of resource units is dependent on provision 
activities and the upkeep of the resource system as well as the physical infrastructure needed 
to secure and enhance the resource unit flow (Anderies, Janssen, and Ostrom 2004). For 
example, CPPs require maintenance clearance from shrub, bush and rock fall and investments 
into infrastructure such as barns, storage facilities and drinking troughs. Clearly, the 
individual is interested in shifting these burdens for maintaining the resource system to joint-
users. Therefore, appropriation and provision activities involve social dilemmas, as the users’ 
self-interest in maximizing appropriation and free-riding on the provision activities of others
is juxtaposed to the interest of the group in ensuring a fair and equitable distribution of the 
benefits and burdens associated with the use of CPRs (Gardner, Ostrom, and Walker 1990).  
Experimental research has extensively studied individuals’ behavior in these dilemmas using 
game theory. For both appropriation and provision situations, experiments exist that replicate 
appropriation and provision situations through common pool resource and public good games,
thus asking under which conditions sustainable levels of cooperation can be sustained. The 
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focus thereby lies on the effect of rules and institutional constraints, such as payoff functions
(Janssen and Ahn 2006), communication (Ahn, Ostrom, and Walker 2010; Janssen et al. 
2010), or monitoring and sanctioning (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004; Fehr and Gächter 2000) 
mechanisms in ensuring the cooperative behavior of players. While such experiments provide 
important insights into the effect of institutional constraints on overall levels of cooperation,
they do not illuminate motivational or material drivers on an individual level. However, it is 
important to investigate these drivers to explain why some resource users apply cooperative 
behavior while others do not, within a shared institutional setting. For this endeavor 
experiments alone are not sufficient as the material constraints, preferences, and motives as
they appear in the field, might differ substantially from those in the laboratory for the 
following reasons: 
a. Game theory mostly assumes that self-seeking players behave strictly rational in order 
to maximize payoffs. This assumption does not necessarily reflect reality (Smith 
2010);  
b. The behavior of individuals in experimental settings is detached from personal 
characteristics such as economic endowment or opportunity costs (Anderies et al. 
2011; Levitt and List 2007); 
c. Subjects in laboratory experiments are usually western students whose personality 
traits might differ from those of CPR users (Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan 2010).  
With respect to the use of CPP in the Swiss Alps, its sustainable use depends crucially on 
social-ecological interactions, namely appropriation (grazing intensity) and provision 
(maintenance of the ecological system and the respective infrastructure). Since both under- 
and overgrazing have adverse effects on the resource system, for example by reducing 
biodiversity or pasture productivity, total appropriation should remain within a sustainable 
yield. Furthermore, provision activities are needed to maintain or enhance the productivity of 
the resource system. This leads to the second research question: 
Research question 2: Which individual attributes explain differences in the behavior of real 
CPR users in the field with regard to factor endowment, appropriation, and provision 
activities? 
2.3 Resource System Analysis: Land Use and Associated Land-Cover Changes
Research on the use of CPR resources is largely based on social and economic approaches. 
Thus, in the study of the commons the ecological systems is mostly treated marginally with a 
focuses on the ecological properties that facilitate or hinder sustainable governance of the 
natural resources rather than on the concrete ecological interactions and the way they are 
altered through human activities (Epstein et al. 2013; Tucker, Randolph, and Castellanos 
2007) Thus, ecological consequences of human-environmental interactions are not given the
highest priorities in the study of the commons or the SES framework respectively, as 
emphasis is put on social processes instead (Binder et al. 2013). Within the natural sciences,
studies focusing on changes in the ecosystem processes and land cover often do not illuminate 
Gap 2: Although experiments provide important information about the institutional settings 
that facilitate cooperation, they offer only limited explanations for difference in the behavior 
of real common pool resource users. 
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the social drivers such as users’ behavior or the institutional structure. Nevertheless some 
efforts exist that try to link to land use and the resulting land-cover changes to social process 
(Anderies, Janssen, and Walker 2002; Janssen, Anderies, and Walker 2004; Janssen et al. 
2000; Perrings and Walker 2004; Walker and Janssen 2002). Unfortunately, these studies are 
conducted for the analysis of vast rangelands and are thus quite different from the ecosystem 
properties in the Swiss Alps and the way they have been manipulated by land use practices.
For centuries in the Swiss Alps, the main method of increasing the agricultural area for 
grazing, in particular, has been through the deforestation of marginal areas. However, during 
the past decade, an opposing trend has been observed: The abandonment of CPPs has led to 
shrub encroachment and expanding forest areas. Several explanations exist for these trends, 
which have been observed on a national level, such as structural changes and resulting labor 
scarcity leading to the abandonment of marginal areas (Baur et al. 2006) or increasing 
summering costs (Mack, Walter, and Flury 2008). However, the degree to which these 
tendencies were observed varies regionally. In the Southern Alps, an almost complete 
abandonment of remote summer pastures, particularly in the canton of Ticino, has been 
observed (Stöcklin et al. 2007), whereas other regions face moderate to no land use and land-
cover change. Therefore, studies on a regional level are needed, which elucidate the 
development paths of specific regions and compare the driving factors, which account for
different regional developments of the land use and land-cover change (Lehmann and 
Messerli 2007). 
Gap 3: Factors and degree of land-use change and their impact on land cover in CPP areas 
varies regionally. Therefore research needs to identify the spatial patterns of land use and 
land-cover change and link them to social drivers of land use. 
With respect to the study region, the current land-cover status must first be established and 
recent developments identified. Furthermore, the observed land-cover changes must be 
explained in terms of land-use change or other explanatory factors, such as the development 
of provision activities or climate change. In addition, changes in land use practices need to be 
linked to changes in the social system of the SES. Therefore, the third research question is as
follows: 
Research question 3: What land use and land-cover change can be observed in the case 
study region and what are the particular drivers behind these changes? 
2.4 Simulation Models of Social-Ecological System
Recent research is trying to acknowledge the full complexity of social-ecological systems,
which form the basis for all natural resource use. Several frameworks were developed for the 
analysis of social-ecological systems with respect to CPRs (Anderies, Janssen, and Ostrom 
2004; Ostrom 2007, 2009). Most research focuses on the interaction of certain subsystems,
describing only particular aspects of the social-ecological system; fully integrated simulation
models of social-ecological systems are rare. The few models of CPPs are mostly based on 
case studies in developing countries (Castella, Trung, and Boissau 2005; Janssen and Ostrom 
2006; Jin, Xu, and Yang 2009; Stave 2003). Other simulation models, which focus on land 
dynamics, show how changes in socio-economic factors can impact the vegetation quality and 
help to determine an optimal stocking density for sustainable land use (Anderies, Janssen, and 
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Walker 2002; Janssen, Anderies, and Walker 2004; Janssen et al. 2000; Parker et al. 2003;
Walker and Janssen 2002). These simulation models are built to represent very different 
natural environments and social conditions from those in the Swiss Alps. Furthermore, 
institutional change and farmers’ decision-making follow very different paths, which restricts
the application of these models to the case of common property management in the case study 
region. Nevertheless, simulation models are the key for understanding social-ecological 
interactions, the feedbacks governing social-ecological systems, and for testing policy options 
for the sustainable governance of social-ecological systems (Janssen and Ostrom 2006;
Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 2010).  
Gap 4: Simulation models, which acknowledge the interactions between institutional change, 
farmers’ decisions, and the resulting social and ecological impacts, are rare and existing 
models are far from representing the reality of the case study region. In order to better 
understand the complex interactions that characterize the social-ecological system of the 
study region, a simulation model is needed, which allows for policy testing.
With respect to the study region, the findings regarding the function governance system,
farmers behavioral patterns, together with insights on land-use and land-cover change, need to 
be integrated into a simulation model to provide a better understanding of the specific 
feedback mechanisms, non-linear relationships, and thresholds, which characterize the local 
SES and drive the system behavior in response to different policies. This leads to the fourth 
research question:  
Research questions 4: How can the findings from the analysis of the subsystems be 
integrated into a simulation model to represent the specific characteristics of the local SES 
and to test effects of different policy options on the future sustainability of the SES? 
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3 Study Area & Conceptual Framework 
This chapter describes the specific characteristics of the case study region (3.1), why it was 
chosen, and introduces the framework used for this analysis (3.2), and described the way it 
was adapted to the particular case of CPP (3.3).  
3.1 The case study region 
Grindelwald is a municipality located in the heart of the Alps in the canton of Bern in 
Switzerland (E 8°01′48″/ N46°37´30). The municipality covers 171 km2 with the highest peak 
reaching 4,100 meters above sea level and the village located 1,000 meters above sea level 
(Figure 1). Due to its natural beauty and snow-sport facilities, Grindelwald is an 
internationally known tourism resort that attracts visitors year-round. Consequently, tourism 
is the most important source of income and offers diverse employment opportunities. Unlike 
other rural regions, the local population remains stable with about 3,800 inhabitants. 
 
Figure 1. The study region (Source: Own figure, adapted from Swisstopo) 
Agriculture, in particular dairy farming, manages to coexist with tourism, even if the number 
of farmers is steadily diminishing as a result of structural change in the agricultural sector 
towards fewer, but larger-sized farms. Since 1980, the number of farmers in Grindelwald has 
roughly halved from 242 to 123 in 2010. As a consequence, the average farm size has nearly 
doubled in terms of livestock and land holdings from about 5-6 to nearly 12 livestock units 
and hectares per agricultural holding.  
In addition to private land holdings, CPPs provide an important source of animal feed. In the 
summer months, when farmers produce hay on their private lands for wintertime, the 
livestock grazes on CPPs, looked after by herdsmen who produce artisan cheese from the 
milk. The herdsman is either the owner of the alp’s huts himself or a seasonal employee. The 
fees farmers pay to the corporation for the care of the animals provides the herdsman’s 
income. At the end of the season, the cheese stock is redistributed to the cattle owner 
according to the cows’ milk yield. 
- 10 -  pArt one: SynopSiS  
3.1.1 Property arrangements in the study region 
The pastures of Grindelwald became communal tenure at the beginning of the 15th century. 
Before then, the alpine pastures of Grindelwald belonged to the monastery of Interlaken, 
which supported a loose system of use rights that were leased to farmers in the region.  
The first official claim on common property dates back to 1404. In order to prevent the 
pastures from being overused, six of the currently seven corporations agreed on a statutory 
regulation (“Taleinungsbrief”) to govern the use of alpine pastures. The following two 
regulations constituted the main building blocks for the protection of the pastures from 
overuse: 
1. Only animals that were fed from feed grown in the valley during wintertime were 
allowed to be summered on the CPP; 
2. Every parcel in the valley was assigned a certain amount of use rights (“Kuhrecht”), 
according to which the farmer is allowed to subtract his share. 
These regulations were an early attempt to solve the problems of exclusion and subtractability 
associated with CPR management. The statutory regulation was renewed several times (1538, 
1867, 1923, and 2002). Since 1538 – with the entry of the corporation Bussalp – the property 
rights have been stipulated in the law, defining the corporation’s territory as can been seen in 
(Figure 2). In accordance to this, each corporation has its territory separated into private 
parcels inside the red dotted lines, with everything outside the red dotted lines being defined 
as CPP area. 
 
Figure 2. The seven corporations of Grindelwald (Source: Own figure, adapted from Swisstopo) 
About 13% of the area is settlement area or agricultural area held as private property, 25% is 
commonly owned meadows (pastures), and 68% of the area is unused land. Unique to the case 
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of Grindelwald is the fact that seven spatially defined corporations (“Bergschaft”) are 
embedded in a cooperative (“Taleinung”). The cooperative assigns the territory to the 7 
corporations. The small alp “Pfingstegg” is the only alp that is privately owned. The alp 
Holzmatten (HM) is a special case. Since it is common property, it is not connected to the 
private property area in the valley(Naegeli-Oertle 1986; Tiefenbach and Mordasini 2006). 
As mentioned above, the rights to use CPP depended on ownership or leasehold of private 
parcels in the valley. Therefore, the number and size of parcels in the valley grounds allows 
the farmers to use CPPs in the corresponding corporations. The individuals who make use of 
CPP in turn have to contribute to the upkeep of the resource system with 8-10 provision 
activities related to their appropriation levels (Table 1). For a long time, the corporations were 
also the dominant political units in the valley, fulfilling many welfare functions and providing 
public infrastructure such as schools, paths, and roads. Today, the influence of the 
corporations is limited to the agricultural sector and the governance of CPP pastures. Each 
corporation has its unique natural characteristics and different production structures, as
indicated in Table 1. 
Table 1.Characteristics of the 7 corporations
Corporation
Usage 
rights
(LU)
Maximum 
sustainable 
yield 
(NST)
Alp- 
enterprises
Sections of 
Alp- 
enterprises
Common 
property 
pasture 
area
Provision 
hours per 
appropriated 
unit
Grindel 476 251 5 2 790 8
Scheidegg 365 234 7 4 830 8
Wärgistal 193 167 5 4 750 8
Itramen 347 217 8 3 685 8
Bussalp 432 256 7 3 496 10
Bach 263 149 4 2 630 8
Holzmatten 99 74 2 3 154 8
Total 2175 1348 38 21 4335 —
3.1.2 Motivation for choice of study region
With seven corporations self-governing the use of CPPs, Grindelwald offers a natural lab-like 
setting for the study of CPR use for several reasons:
The long endurance of local governance in combination with good documentation of 
regulations applied to govern the use of CPPs provided an ideal setting for studying 
the evolution of the governance system and associated institutional change over longer 
periods of time;  
The fact that the 7 corporations operate under a binding agreement provides a good 
setting for cross-case comparison of the influence of ecological and social variables on 
the sustainable governance of CPPs;
The rules to regulate appropriation and provision activities, which structure the central 
human environmental interaction, are transparent and structured similarly to those
used in laboratory experiments such as CPR games and public good games;  
Work conducted in the early eighties in the regions provided a detailed analysis of the 
agricultural sector (Naegeli-Oertle 1986) , and its interlinks with tourism (Wiesmann 
1983, 2001) which allowed tracking changes of the sector during the past thirty years 
in order to build a well-parameterized and calibrated model of the developments in the 
case study region.
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3.2 The General Framework for Analyzing Social-Ecological Systems
For the analysis of coupled social-ecological (or human-environmental) systems, several 
interdisciplinary frameworks exist that provide different perspectives and emphases on the 
characteristics of the SES, such as: 
- Resilience (Gunderson and Holling 2002; Walker et al. 2004);  
- Transitions (Fischer-Kowalski and Rotmans 2009; Haxeltine et al. 2008; Pahl-Wostl et 
al. 2010); 
- Land-use change (Redman, Grove, and Kuby 2004; Turner and Robbins 2008; Turner, 
Lambin, and Reenberg 2007); 
- Social-ecological feedbacks (Liu et al. 2007); 
- Robustness (Anderies, Janssen, and Ostrom 2004; Janssen and Anderies 2007); 
- Self-organization (Ostrom 2007, 2009). 
The latter SES framework was chosen because of its implicit focus on institutional analysis
(McGinnis and Ostrom 2010), and its proposition of a set of concrete variables. An additional 
advantage for this study was also the fact that Ostrom’s SES framework allows for the 
analysis of different degrees of specificity due to its nested conceptualization in different tiers
(Binder et al. 2013). On the highest level of analysis, any SES consists of 4 subsystems 
embedded in a broader social, economic, and political setting. As displayed in Figure 3, the 
system’s social compartment consists of the Governance System (GS) and the Actors (A). 
The ecological compartment entails the Resource System (RS) and the Resource Units (RU). 
These subsystems interact (I) at various spatial and temporal scales to produce outcomes (O).
The functioning of the SES affects adjacent ecosystems (ECO), for example, through 
externalities or by provision of spatially overlapping ecosystem services. 
Figure 3. Framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological systems on the first tier  
(Adopted from Ostrom 2007)
Each subsystem can be divided into further tiers. The second tier consists of a set of variables 
potentially associated with successful self-organization (Table 2).
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Table 2. Variables describing social-ecological systems in the second tier. 
Social, economic, and political settings (S)
S1 Economic development. S2 Demographic trends. S3 Political stability.
S4 Government resource policies. S5 Market incentives. S6 Media organization.
Resource systems (RS) Governance systems (GS)
RS1 Sector (e.g., water, forests, pasture, fish)
RS2 Clarity of system boundaries
RS3 Size of resource system*
RS4 Human-constructed facilities
RS5 Productivity of  system
RS 6 Equilibrium properties
RS7 Predictability of system dynamics*
RS8 Storage characteristics
RS9 Location
GS1 Government organizations
GS2 Nongovernmental organizations
GS3 Network structure
GS4 Property rights systems
GS5 Operational rules
GS6 Collective choice rules*
GS7 Constitutional rules
GS8 Monitoring and sanctioning processes
Resource units (RU) Users (U)
RU1 Resource unit mobility*
RU2 Growth or replacement rate
RU3 Interaction among resource units
RU4 Economic value*
RU5 Number of units
RU6 Distinctive markings
RU7 Spatial and temporal distribution
U1 Number of users*
U2 Socioeconomic attributes of users
U3 History of use
U4 Location
U5 Leadership/entrepreneurship*
U6 Norms/social capital*
U7 Knowledge of SES/mental models*
U8 Importance of resource*
U9 Technology used
I1 Harvesting levels of diverse users
I2 Information sharing among users
I3 Deliberation processes
I4 Conflicts among users
I5 Investment activities
I6 Lobbying activities
I7 Self-organizing activities
I8 Networking activities
O1 Social performance measures
(e.g., efficiency, equity, accountability, 
sustainability)
O2 Ecological performance measures
(e.g., overharvested, resilience, bio- diversity, 
sustainability)
O3 Externalities to other SESs
Related ecosystems (ECO)
ECO1 Climate patterns. ECO2 Pollution patterns. ECO3 Flows into and out of focal SES.
*Variables found to be positively associated with self-organization (Ostrom 2009)
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Recent framework developments
During this dissertation the original framework as presented in Table 2, has been amended 
with regard several aspects. Users were changed into Actors in order to have a more general 
category including Third parties and stakeholders that do not make direct use of the resource 
(McGinnis and Ostrom 2014). This dissertation refers mostly to actors instead of users except 
where a clear differentiation between direct users of CPP (farmers) and non-farmers with use 
rights was necessary. Other amendments of the framework included renaming or adding of 
variables into the framework (Basurto, Gelcich, and Ostrom 2013; Epstein et al. 2013; Ostrom 
and Cox 2010). These changes could not be considered in the conceptual phases of this 
dissertation but are taken up in the discussion section. Another major step in the development 
of the framework has been the explicit integration of the Institutional analysis and 
development (IAD) into the SES framework (McGinnis and Ostrom 2010) which was 
considered for answering the first research question. For a general overview about 
frameworks evolution see McGinnis and Ostrom (2014).
3.3 Applying the SES Framework to the Case Study Region
The use of the common property pasture (CPP) in Grindelwald is analyzed based on the 
general framework for analyzing social ecological systems. In the framework in Figure 4, that 
characterizes the CPP management system, includes farmers as the main actors, their 
interaction with the resource system and units, and the local governance system. The SES and 
its functioning are influenced by external societal and environmental factors such as 
agricultural policies or climate change. As farmers heavily rely on subsidies paid by the 
federal government, farmers land use decisions are substantially influenced by the policy
setting. Farmers interact with the common property resource system through appropriation 
and provision activities. With regard to appropriation, farmers need to decide on the number 
of livestock they would like to send to the alp. With regard to provision, farmers need to 
decide how many labor and monetary resources they will dedicate to the upkeep of the 
resource system and its ability to provide resource units. 
The local governance system determines the social-ecological interactions through 
appropriation and provision rules. Appropriation rules assign the right of usage (“Kuhrechte”)
to local individuals based on their land holdings. Thus, appropriation rules serve first to limit 
the number of actors using the CPPs, and second to regulate the appropriation level to 
implicitly define a maximum appropriation level. Provision rules aim to ensure the upkeep of 
the resource system. Dependent on the actors’ appropriation level, the governance system 
requires provision activities from the actors (see Table 1) and monitors and sanctions non-
compliance.
The rules of the governance system can be changed by the farmers through collective choice 
processes in order to balance or change the incentive structure for the use and maintenance of 
the CPP. The rule-making process can thus be determined and adapted to the external setting,
which includes agricultural policy incentives, federal legislation, tourism development and
environmental developments such as climate change.
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Figure 4. Conceptual framework for analyzing the use of common property pastures (CPPs) (Source: Own 
figure). 
As mentioned above, the state of the environmental system depends on appropriation and 
provision levels. Furthermore, external societal and environmental factors such as climate 
change could impact the environmental system by altering the timber line or the provision of 
resource units (feedstock). Furthermore, the state of the resource system might also depend on 
the touristic demand for land use and the respective infrastructure, which potentially impacts 
land use and land cover, possibly also through non-agricultural activities.
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4 Procedure & Methods Applied
The research reported herein consists of specific qualitative and quantitative methods tailored 
to the different research questions and goals of the modules as displayed in Table 3. 
Table 3.Overview of procedure & methods applied
Module Goal
Key subsystems 
and interactions 
(in brackets) 
Empirical 
bases
Methods 
applied Output 
Module 1 Analyze 
institutional 
adaptations of the 
local governance 
system
Governance 
System
Statues and 
Interviews
Coding 
through 
“ADICO”
Essay 1
Module 2 Analyze farmers’ 
land-use decisions  
Actor System Survey 
data 
Logit 
regressions 
Essay 2
Module 3 Link farmers’ land-
use decisions to 
changes in the 
resource system
Resource 
System
Land cover 
and land-
use 
statistics
Qualitative 
assessment of 
spatial data
Essay 3
Module 4 Integration of 
knowledge from 
modules 1-3 into a 
simulation model
SES
(social-
ecological 
feedbacks) 
Modules 1-
3
System 
dynamics 
Essay 4
4.1 Module 1: Analysis of the Local Governance System
Module 1 analyzed the rules and their adaptations to external and internal socio-economic 
developments based on qualitative methods such as interviews and the coding statutes using
the “ADICO” syntax-scheme. 
Several volumes of statutes were collected from the cooperative as well as from the 
corporation Scheidegg, covering the period of 1967 to 2003. The statutes provided a detailed 
account of the governance system’s organizational principles and the rules applied for the 
governance of the CPPs. The statutes were then coded for institutional change following the
ADICO syntax. According to Crawford and Ostrom (1995), institutional statements are 
“… shared linguistic constraint or opportunity that prescribes, permits, or advises 
actions or outcomes for actors.”
Furthermore, institutional statements consist of a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 5 of the 
following components:
Attribute (A), which describes for which subject the statement applies; 
Deontic (D) is a verb that describes whether the particular action is required (e.g.,
must), permitted (may), or forbidden (must not); 
aIm (I) describes the action; 
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Condition (C) defines where, when, and possibly to what extent the statements 
applies; 
Or else (O) defines the type of sanction to be applied for non-compliance; 
And can form a shared strategy (ADI), a norm (ADIC), or a rule (ADICO). 
After coding, the resulting institutional framework was validated and contextualized as 
adaptations to socio-economic changes through a series of interviews with farmers, the 
monitors of the corporations, and the president of the cooperative.  
4.2 Module 2: Analysis of the Actors System
Module 2 aimed to assess the explanatory factors for farmers’ land-use decisions within the 
given institutional constraints. Data was collected through a standardized survey, which was
conducted during three weeks in June 2011 in Grindelwald.  
The SES framework was used to design the survey question with the aim to investigate how 
actors’ attributes affect the individuals’ behavior with regard to three focal land-use decisions:
Change in livestock endowment; 
Appropriation behavior; 
Provision behavior. 
The survey referred to the past ten years for change in livestock endowment and to the past 
season for appropriation and provision behavior. A total of 95 questionnaires were collected 
from 125 registered local farmers, mostly at their homes. Data gathering was conducted in 3 
teams with a graduate student posing the questions and an undergraduate filling in the 
farmers’ answers. The sample included mostly males (93.7%), with an average age of 
approximately 52 years. The statistical analysis was based on maximum likelihood (ML) 
estimations to build separated models for the three land-use decisions that link behavior to 
individual attributes.
In order to investigate how contextual variables describing the SES affect the behavior, a Q-
Method approach was adopted. Eleven local farmers, who were deemed to have in-depth 
knowledge of the functioning of the SES, were selected for the procedure. Farmers had to put 
a total of 34 statements (variables) in rank order on a Likert-scale scheme (q-sorting scheme) 
according to their contribution to the sustainable use and maintenance of the CPP. 
The collected samples were analyzed with the standard PQ Method software, Version 2.31. 
Mean z-scores were calculated for each statement and the corresponding rank to represent the 
aggregate view. Data was then analyzed according to the standard q-approach (Fairweather 
and R. Swaffield 2001; Paula 2006). This included the calculation of mean z-scores for the 
variables, principal component analysis, and a varimax rotation in order to achieve insights on
the different views about the role of contextual factors (e.g. agricultural policies) in promoting 
sustainable use of CPP.
4.3 Module 3: Analysis of the Resource System
Module 3 focused on land use and land-cover change. In a first step, land cover data from
areal statistics was analyzed for different time periods from 1979/85, 1992/97, and 
2004/09((FSO) 1979-2009). In a second step, the observed land-use changes were assessed 
qualitatively with farmers, followed by a semi-quantitative questionnaire which was
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conducted with the seven monitors. The themes covered in the questionnaires and interviews 
were: 
1. The current use of the summering area. Monitors mapped which part of CPP was used 
when and with what type of animals; 
2. Pasture quality and its determinants. Monitors had to indicate qualitatively the areas 
with better and worse quality and determine the reason that make particular areas more 
favorable; 
3. Process of pasture selection. Monitors were asked according to which criteria they 
select pastures that are subject to land-use change such as abandonment; 
4. Determining the role of communal work for maintaining the resource systems and 
pasture quality. Monitors indicated where maintenance efforts are particularly needed 
and whether current amount of provision work is sufficient to maintain current status 
of CPP; 
5. Monitors were asked basic questions about the future development of the corporations 
such as how many farms will abandon their farm, or about the development of 
provisions activities or defections on it, respectively.
6. Definition of land-use scenarios. Monitors had to define which part of the corporations 
CPP area is most prone to abandonment and whether and when approximately this will 
take place.
Based on this qualitative data parameters for a GIS-based cost–distance model were derived 
to model pastures’ use. The model allowed generating a spatially explicit land-use model for 
the analysis of current and potential future land use and land-cover changes. The model aimed 
to assess the productivity and accessibility of particular CPP areas based on a surface grid 
involving variables such as topography and enabling or accelerating factors like slope, 
distance from barn, paths, bridges, and physical barriers, such as dense forests or rivers. 
4.4 Module 4: Modeling the Local Social-Ecological System
Module 4 aimed to integrate the insights from modules 1-3 by building an empirically-based 
simulation model of the SES. The model was built following a system dynamics approach
(Ford 1999; Sterman 2001) to match the historical development of the SES. Formative 
scenario analysis was used to define a potential and consistent set of changes in the external 
setting of the SES to simulate its potential future states(Wiek, Binder, and Scholz 2006). As 
such, the model should then serve as a tool for the assessment of the impact of different policy 
options on the sustainability of the SES. 
The aim of the model was to achieve a better understanding of the dynamics behind the
empirical observations from earlier modules. Previous observations have shown that findings 
were highly context-dependent, so that no theoretical model will adequately represent
empirical findings of modules 1-3 without overgeneralizing facts. Therefore, modeling 
approaches based on stylized facts, laboratory or field experiments, or role games would not 
account for the specific properties of the SES in Grindelwald. Accordingly, a simulation 
model representing the SES of Grindelwald as realistically as feasible was needed to account 
for the specific components and interactions of the local SES. 
4.4.1 Purpose of the model 
The purpose of the model is to understand the social-ecological drivers in the use maintenance 
of CPP pastures through application of the SES framework. Given the tendencies of 
abandonment of CPPs in Switzerland, the model needs to address, unlike most models of CPR 
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use, not just the dynamics leading to overexploitation of natural resources, but also the 
dynamics and consequences of underuse. By simulating changes in the external setting, the 
model should help to separate the processes and policy options, under which the SES 
approaches or maintains sustainability, from those that shift the SES away toward less 
sustainable states of over- or underuse. Furthermore, simulation results should then uncover 
the different sustainability trade-offs associated with particular policy options (Janssen and 
Anderies 2007) as a base for scenario assessment.
4.4.2 System dynamics
The system dynamics approach was developed in the 1950s in economics and from there has 
been applied to various disciplines that seek an understanding of developments in complex 
systems. System dynamics modeling is particularly recognized for its ability to deal with 
internal feedback loops, non-linear relationships, and time delays that affect the behavior of a
system.
As the SES framework was developed with certain system theoretic considerations, such as 
decomposability, feedback between subsystems, and non-linear relationships between 
variables, system dynamics provides an appropriate tool for applying the framework to the 
case study. While alternative methods such as agent-based modeling (ABM) also allow for
the implementation of the same system properties, they had some disadvantages for our 
purpose. Firstly, due to the different programming surfaces (stock and flow versus codes), we 
assumed that farmers or experts may more readily understand structural aspects when 
feedback structures were clearly visible as relationships between stock and flows. Secondly,
our aim was to develop a model of the SES at an aggregate level that displays the interactions 
between different subsystems rather than interactions. Since modules 1-3 did nod focus on 
actor-actor interactions, the main motivation for agent-based modeling was eliminated by the 
previous research questions. Thirdly, system dynamics can rely on well-established 
procedures for model testing and validation (Barlas 1989; Oliva 2003) which is still an open 
issue in the younger field of ABM (Rahmandad and Sterman 2008). Fourthly, ABM is more 
resource intensive, requiring more time and attention from both modelers and decision-
makers. As the modeling of all SES components encompasses a rather large system boundary, 
an ABM of the whole social-ecological system would have limited the scope of the model and 
constraint sensitivity (Ford 2000)  
4.4.3 Formative scenario analysis
In order to define a consistent set of scenarios for simulating the potential trajectories of 
development of the SES, formative scenario analysis was used (Wiek, Binder, and Scholz 
2006; Scholz and Tietje 2002). The aim of running the model under different scenario 
assumptions is to predict how different policy options will affect the SES and particular 
outcomes. I hereby concentrated on developments in the external setting (S), and 8 variables 
of the external setting and the respective potential values of variables were identified based on 
literature review and previous work conducted in the study region. The variable set and 
hypothetical values were then validated in expert interviews and refined afterwards. Based on 
the validated impact factors and potential future levels, the impact matrix was developed. The 
impact matrix was completed four times in total, with a total of 10 experts including 
agronomists, farmers, and tourist officials. Each expert only filled in parts of the matrix 
according to his field of expertise. The completed matrices were then computed using KD 
software provided by Systaim. Consistency indicators for scenario selection included (i) 
additive consistency, which is the sum of all coefficients, (ii) the multiplicative consistency, 
which is the average rate of additive consistency, (iii) the number of inconsistencies in a 
scenario, (iv) and the minimum number of consistency (Tietje 2005). Finally, the procedure 
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provided a ranking of a hypothetical combination of parameter developments, which were 
internally most consistent and at the same time covered the widest possible developments of 
trajectories in external developments.  
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5 Results 
This section summarizes the most relevant findings of this thesis, organized according to
research questions (Chapter 2) and the 4 modules (Chapter 4). Further details can be found in 
the respective publications (see Section B – Manuscripts). 
5.1 Institutional Adaptations of the Local Governance System
The first question needed to resolve whether local governance systems originally designed to 
avoid overuse of scarce resources have become a dysfunctional trait of the SES by 
contributing to its underuse. Therefore, the first research question was: Do local governance 
systems in the Swiss Alps change institutions in order to adapt to the socio-economic changes 
to avoid reduced use and maintenance of CPPs? 
The observed institutional adaptations as summarized in Table 4 show that governance 
systems originally designed to avoid overuse of scarce resources can change their properties 
through institutional changes mainly to relax exclusion and subtractability. However, the 
drivers behind these adaptations are not just a decreasing use of CPP, but rather a wider set of 
socio-economic changes such as governmental resource policies (S5), the regulations that 
come with federal efforts to foster the use of CPPs, or a decreasing number of right holders 
who do not make use of their rights (A1). It must be pointed out that previously listed 
adaptations result from particular problems and thus cannot be considered as general 
adaptations patterns. Nevertheless, the study indicates that some general governance 
principles, which facilitate adaptive governance, can be highlighted: 
Constitutional flexibility: allows the governance system to adapt its structure to 
problems such as the decreasing bargaining power of those most interested in the 
productivity of the resource system. 
Multiple nested assemblies: allows the identification of competencies among different 
assemblies to ensure that issues are dealt with in the right assembly. 
Polycentric design: ensures vertical integration and control between user groups 
concerning the rules they are crafting, and at the same time ensures the flow of 
information regarding the performance of rule configurations. 
Subsidiary design: allows the change of rule configuration by the people who are best 
informed about the state of the system. 
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5.2 Farmers’ Land-Use Decisions
As farmers in the study region followed different strategies with regard to changes in 
livestock endowment, appropriation, and provision behavior, the second question aimed to 
explore the causes for behavioral deviations in CPP use by asking: Which individual attributes 
explain differences in the behavior of real CPR users in the field with regard to factor 
endowment, appropriation, and provision activities? 
As displayed in Table 5, livestock endowment can be well explained by the socio-economic 
attributes of users as indicated by the high Nagelkerke R-squared. Age (U2a), marital status 
(U2b), and area (U2c) explained farmers’ changes in livestock endowment. The role of age 
and marital status is best explained by their effect on work organization, as youth and 
partnership allow the handling of larger endowments. Furthermore, the variable area suggests 
that farm size itself is the strongest predictor of endowment growth. Furthermore, the negative 
association of area (U2b) with appropriation and provision behavior in particular suggests that 
farmers with larger-sized farms concentrate labor on private property with reduced use of 
common property. 
Appropriation behavior was shown to have the strongest association with norms (U6a), 
measured as farmers’ aversion against defection on provision, which points to self-interest as
a motivational driver. As individuals who make more use of CPPs are also more concerned 
about the productivity of the resources, they consequently hold stronger norms regarding 
provision fulfilment. Self-interest might equally explain the association of payoff (U5b) and 
the importance of resource with full provision behavior. Hence, the greater the willingness of 
individuals to maintain a common pool resource, the more individuals rely on the resource for 
their livelihood and the higher the generated payoffs.  
Table 5. Direction of significant effects of individuals’ attributes on livestock endowment, appropriation, and 
provision behavior calculated by binary logistic regression (99%***, 95%**, 90%*).
Method Regression Models
Variables
Livestock 
endowment Appropriation Provision 
U2a- Age
U2b- Marital status (+)** (+)*
U2c- Area (+)*** 
U5a- Leadership
U5b- Payoff (+)**
U6a- Norms (+)*** 
U8- Importance of resource (+)*
N 94 93 86
Pseudo R2 (NK) 0.514 0.220 0.248
2LL 82.6 109.0 34.6
BIC 105.2 131.6 52.4
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As behavior in these situations must be considered context-specific (Anderies et al. 2011;
Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 2010), findings may not be valid in other social-ecological 
settings. Thus, context might vary, particularly for settings where users’ aggregate behavior 
leads to over-exploitation rather than underuse. Therefore, the impact of contextual variables 
on behavior had to be investigated separately, which was done by q-method approach.  
The impact of the contextual variable on the use of common property pastures  
Among the subsystems that were considered to contribute positively to the use and 
maintenance of CPPs were the resource units (RU) and to a lesser extent group attributes (A). 
The subsystem challenging sustainability included external settings (S), the resource system 
(RS), and interactions (I). The role of the governance system (GS) was considered neutral. 
In particular, the value of resource units (RU4) was considered to have the most positive 
impact on the sustainability of CPPs. As the economic value affects an individual’s payoff 
ability, a close positive relationship exists between the value of resource units’ appropriation 
activities and the fulfilment of provision activities. With regard to actors’ attributes, farmers 
considered the number of users (U1) and their leadership and entrepreneurial skills (U5)
positively.  
With regard to the external setting (S), farmers associated most negative effects on CPP use 
with agricultural policies. Both government resource polices (S5) and market incentives (S6), 
which are both heavily regulated by the federal government, achieve negative scores. The 
most problematic issues include dependence on direct payments, regulations for obtaining 
them, and the milk price. More positively evaluated was the role of tourism in promoting the 
use of the Alps, mainly due to the fact that farmers acknowledge the positive effect of tourism 
in strengthening local demand and the economic value of resource units, and thus payoffs.
Furthermore, tourism allows for livelihoods with balanced agricultural and off-farm activities, 
reducing the need to increase farm size, which farmers assumed would lead to reduced use 
and maintenance of common property pastures. As a result, tourism can be seen to enable 
rather than compete with farming livelihoods, although it does result in increasing demand for 
building sites and reduces available productive agricultural land in the resource system (RS). 
5.3 Land-Use and Land-Cover Change on CPPs in Grindelwald
After identifying the main social dynamics with regard to the institutional structure of 
farmers’ use of CPPs, the third research question sought to link social processes to observable 
changes in the ecological system. Therefore, we focused on land-use and land-cover change 
by asking: What land-use and land-cover change can be observed in the case study region 
and what are the particular drivers behind these changes?
5.3.1 Land use 
The monitors of the seven corporations highlighted the following factors as major drivers for 
land-use patterns in terms of attributes, which make plots productive and thus less likely to be 
abandoned. 
Short distance to barn  
Gentle slope  
Plant composition (high feed value) 
Water availability 
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Factors, which may lead to abandonment or disregard of potential pasture, were mostly site-
specific and included such variables as natural hazards (e.g., rockfall potential), swampy, 
humid soils, areas interspersed with rocks, and poisonous plant composition. 
Farmers stated that recent land-use change took place in some marginal areas that had one or 
more of the previously listed attributes. Monitors explained these land-use changes with the 
following social process:  
Increasing workload on agricultural holding, leading to reduced use of CPP (as 
confirmed and suggested in Module 2); 
Number and type of livestock summered. The slight decrease in summered livestock 
was considered to have a marginal effect on grazing patterns, while the type of 
livestock summered was considered more important. With regard to dairy cows, even 
though their number has remained stable, their feed requirements and weight have 
been increased through breeding, making them less mobile and making it necessary 
for farmers to graze them closer to the barn on gentle slopes. This tendency has been 
accentuated, as cows from the lowlands have been accepted for grazing on CPPs 
because these breeds are not well adapted to mountainous conditions 
Increasingly, alp enterprises are run by seasonally hired external laborers, which are 
less concerned with the maintenance of the resource system pasture and instead 
emphasize cheese production and cattle herding.  
5.3.2 Land-cover change
Grindelwald extends more than 17,000 ha, more than half of which is unproductive land.
Almost one-third is agricultural land. When comparing longitudinal land-use statistics ((FSO) 
1979-2009), the settlement area has increased by 27.5%, forest stands covering 2,802 ha have 
increased by 2.6%, while agricultural land has decreased by -3.4% since 1980. However, 
these statistics do not differentiate between common and private property. Thus, a second 
source (Alporama 2013) was considered, which allowed for assigning statistically registered 
land-cover changes with regard to the CPP area. According to this source, CPP pastures have 
decreased by 3.6% from 3,272 to 3,154 ha between the years 79/85 to 04/09. As there was 
only a marginal change to the area of overgrown pasture, it must be assumed that 118 ha of a
total of 212 ha of forest growth took place in the common property area.  
Based on land use criteria identified in the monitors’ survey, potential land abandonment was 
visualized by a GIS-based cost-distance model (Figure 5). It shows that those summer pasture 
areas are most prone to shrub or forest encroachment by modeling the time that is required to 
walk from any point (cell) in the study area to the next barn, considering enabling factors such 
as paths (allowing further walking distances and crossing brooks and forests) and hindering 
factors such as brooks, impenetrable forests, or steep slopes (slowing down or diverting 
movement). The more the colors turn to dark red, the more prone the pasture is to 
abandonment and thus – depending on altitude – to shrub or forest encroachment.  
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Figure 5. Summer pasture area most prone to gradual abandonment and to subsequent shrub or forest 
encroachment (zoomed-in detail covering the areas of two Alpine corporations). The more the colors turn to 
dark red, the more prone the pasture is to abandonment and thus – depending on altitude – to shrub or forest 
encroachment. 
5.4 Modeling the Social-Ecological System 
The fourth research questions tried to determine, how previous findings regarding the 
governance of CPP, actors land-use and the observed land-cover changes can be interlinked to 
provide a holistic understanding of the SES. Therefore, the fourth research question was: How 
can the findings from the analysis of the subsystems be integrated into a simulation model to 
represent the specific characteristics of the local SES and to test effects of different policy 
options on the future sustainability of the SES? To answer this research question, a System 
Dynamics model of the SES was developed and potential scenarios were identified using 
formative scenario analysis and simulated.
The baseline simulation of the SES reveals a moderate decrease in the use and maintenance of 
private plots in the valley as well as CPPs, which led to a slight abandonment of CPPs 
between 1980 and 2010. As displayed in Table 6, simulated key developments of the SES 
included:  
In the actors system: process of structural change towards larger but fewer farm 
holdings and decreasing land use intensity as a result of changes in agricultural polices 
(market deregulation and increased direct payments), which reduced the number of  
livestock units in Grindelwald; 
In the resource units: The fewer livestock units present in the valley also impacted on 
the CPP use with reduced stocking density; 
In the governance system: adaptation to a decreasing number of livestock units lead to 
changes in operational rules, as corporations start to summer foreign cattle; 
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In the resource system: as a consequence of reduced stoking density, the model 
simulated a reduction of grazing area of 193 ha between 1980 and 2010.  
Table 6. Value for selected variables describing past and potential future development of the SES (rounded 
values).
Baseline 
Simulation
1980 -2010 Scenario simulation for 2040
Initial 
values 
(1980)
Simu-
lated
values 
(2010)
Rising 
prices
Liberali-
zation 
and 
economic 
growth
Govern-
ment 
support Crisis
Actors System (A)
Farm households (hh) 242 126 62 50 64 60
Livestock units per household 
(LU/hh) 6.3 10.8 24.9 25.7 15.9 25
Land use intensity on private 
parcels 1.13 0.96 1.06 0.88 0.69 1.25
Household income 
(CHF nominal) 64725 87238 121610 31406 155284 113497
Resource units (RUs)
Livestock in the valley (LUs) 1525 1358 1347 1271 1022 1497
Stocking density of CPPs (SLUs) 1448 1393 1199 914 996 1204
Foreign cattle summered (SLUs) 0 22 141 283 243 139
Governance System (GS)
Net provision (hours) 16000 13832 12629 9779 10485 12670
Provision not fulfilled (hours) 0 1260 3034 3490 2408 3436
Resource System (RS)
CPPs in use (ha) 4375 4182 3444 3175 2754 3513
Average productivity of summer 
pastures (kg DM/ha/day) 15.00 15.32 16.32 16.65 17.22 16.25
Overgrown common property 
Pastures (ha) 163 13 519 667 702 482
Forest (ha) 2130 2473 2705 2826 3212 2673
The simulation of the scenarios showed that the use and maintenance of CPPs will further 
decrease in the near future with subsequent loss of CPP area and forest regrowth. With regard 
to the use and maintenance of CPPs, scenario 1 (price increase) and scenario 4 (crisis) 
produce more desirable outcomes than scenarios 2 and 3 (liberalization and government 
support). 
In the rising prices scenario, farmers benefit from a favorable market environment shaping 
incentives for relatively intensive stocking of private plots as well as of CPPs. As a 
consequence, the trend of forest regrowth continues, but is not accelerated. 
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In the liberalization scenario, structural change is accelerated against the baseline trend and 
household income decreases drastically. Only farmers with strong preferences for agricultural 
livelihoods remain in the sector. As a result, the number of farmers is reduced because they 
concentrate their efforts on rather large farms in the valley, rather than on using and 
maintaining the CPPs. As a consequence, the simulation model predicts the abandonment of 
about 400 hectares for this scenario. 
Surprisingly, the government-support scenario sees the lowest levels of use and maintenance 
of CPPs. The increase in direct payments slows structural change and impedes farm growth, 
as farmers conveniently live on land rents. The average holding thus increases to 16 LUs and 
land use intensity is very low because there is no need to generate income from marketable 
dairy products. As a consequence, this scenario predicts a process of afforestation.  
In contrast to this, CPPs are most intensely used and maintained in the crisis scenario. In this 
scenario, agriculture becomes a very feasible livelihood because the cost of production and 
off-farm income decrease, whilst prices for agricultural commodities are comparatively high. 
This shapes incentives for farmers to use their private plots more intensely than they currently 
do. However, the crisis scenario pictures a situation where the use and maintenance of CPP is 
most intense and land abandonment lowest, albeit potentially at the cost to intensely used 
private parcels due to increased land use intensity in the valley.  
However, the simulated changes in the external setting have a delayed impact on land-use and 
land-cover changes. Since the scenarios are simulated as continuous developments, the actors 
and governance system will closely follow the patterns produced in the baseline simulation 
until 2018. Since the changes in the social system affect the ecological system with delays in 
land-use change and land-cover change, changes in the external setting take about 10 years to 
become visible in the form of afforested area in the resource system. 
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6 Discussion 
This section discusses first the theoretical and empirical relevance of the study in the context 
of commons research (6.1), including possibilities for further framework improvement (6.2.). 
Furthermore, the implications for policy makers are discussed (6.3), as well as the limitations 
of the present study and recommendations for further research (6.4). 
6.1 Relevance of the Findings for the Study of the Commons
This study provides an application of the SES framework (Ostrom 2009) to the example of 
CPPs in Grindelwald in the Swiss Alps. The analysis was divided into four modules devoted 
to the particular subsystems. In each module, a different methodological approach (tailored to 
the research question) was applied. The thesis thereby contributed to the three most important 
sub-branches within the study of the commons (Janssen and Ostrom 2006; Ostrom 2007): 
- Institutional analyses (Module 1);
- Experimental studies on cooperative behavior (Module 2);
- Modeling of social-ecological systems (Module 4).
In addition to the contribution in the three sub-branches, the thesis also showed in Module 3
how a less developed field within the study of the commons – the investigation of the 
functioning of resource systems – can be approached, which was herein considered as crucial 
premise for the modeling of SES.  
6.1.1 The contribution to institutional analyses
Module 1 provides an empirical analysis of the institutions over a longer time period, applied 
to govern CPPs. The quality of such institutions is key to sustainable CPR use (Adger et al. 
2005; Gibson, Williams, and Ostrom 2005; McCay 2002). Various empirical analyses have 
focused on institutional design applied to govern CPRs (Acheson 2003). Although various 
theoretical tools are at hand for studying institutions (Beckmann and Padmanabhan 2009;
Ostrom 2005; Scott 1987), they are rarely applied to CPR governance problems. Furthermore,
theoretical concepts are mainly designed for static analysis. Thus, systematic studies of 
institutional change remain a major methodological challenge (Ostrom 2008; Ostrom and 
Basurto 2011). Module 1 provides an example for how the grammar of institutions (ADICO) 
can be systematically and empirical applied to study institutional change in CPR governance. 
Secondly, it shows how institutions and their dynamics can be assessed as process of adaptive 
governance. Therefore, research on Module 1 might serve as an example of how empirical 
institutional analysis may be conducted to overcome shortcomings, such as the lack of 
systematic ordering and classification of institutions, and its static treatment.
The SES framework proves to be a good starting point for this endeavor. However, in-depth 
institutional analysis needs to be based on the institutional analysis and development 
framework (IAD), including ADICO, particularly for the analysis of operational rules. 
Although the SES framework is (implicitly) based on IAD (McGinnis and Ostrom 2010), it 
would be valuable to expand the rules variables (GS5-8) into a further tier, in particular with 
regard to operational rules, which turned out to form the core of institutional adaptations.
Findings in Module 1 suggest that institutional adaptations are key to successful long-term 
governance. Although originally designed to avoid overuse of the CPR, changes in 
institutions counteract tendencies of underuse. In this study, I found that a change in the 
organizational structure of corporations allowed for more subsidiarity in decision-making and 
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thus helped balancing the power between the corporation members who use CPPs, and the 
members who do not. Subsidiarity was considered an important condition for effective 
institutional adaptations in particular with regard to operational rules. Effective measures
included alteration of appropriation and provision rules that eased the exclusion principle to
counteract understocking of CPPs. 
6.1.2 The contribution to behavioral research on cooperative dilemmas 
Module 2 provides insights on behavioral drivers of individuals in cooperative dilemmas. 
Cooperative behavior is an extensively researched field, usually by means of experimental 
methods (Anderies et al. 2011; Cardenas and Ostrom 2004). Laboratory experiments seek to 
manipulate experimental design to achieve insights on the effects on institutional constraints 
such as communication (Bochet, Page, and Putterman 2006), sanctioning (Fehr and 
Fischbacher 2004; van Soest and Vyrastekova 2007) and payoff functions (Janssen and Ahn 
2006) on the aggregate levels of cooperation. However, the situation in the lab differs 
substantially from that encountered by real CPR users. The laboratory does not provide a 
social-ecological context, and psychological traits and respective behavioral drivers of 
Western students might be very different from those of Alpine farmers. Thus, the answer to 
the fundamental question as to why CPR users in the field may differ in their behavior cannot 
be answered by experiments alone. The analysis in Module 2 showed which individual 
attributes account for differences in cooperative behavior in CPR dilemmas and therefore 
aimed to complement the experimental evidence. 
We found that the actors’ use of CPR resources is explained by two major drivers: Firstly, 
socio-economic-attributes (U2), particularly landholding, and secondly, self-interest
manifested in the variables leadership/entrepreneurship (U5), norms/social capital (U6) and 
importance of resource (U8). With regard to contextual factors, the value of resource units 
(RU 4) was deemed most important, as it directly contributes to payoffs. The findings are thus 
largely congruent with users’ attributes identified in the SES framework as promoters of self-
organization (Ostrom 2009). Our study, however, provides further insights about the way 
variables promote pro-social behavior on the individual level. The analysis suggests that the 
larger the endowment of an actor, the lower his appropriation rate. Furthermore, those with 
higher appropriation rates hold stronger norms toward the provision fulfillment of joint users. 
Additionally, the higher an individual’s payoff from appropriation, the more likely he is to 
fulfill his provision duties. Therefore, it can be assumed that within an equitable and well-
defined institutional environment, self-interest contributes positively to the sustainable use of 
resources. Whether this holds independent of context could be investigated in experimental 
settings that link behavior in appropriation situations (CPR games) to behavior in provision 
situations (public good games). According to our findings, subjects in the laboratory 
experiments with higher appropriation levels should make higher investments into the 
common pool and should be equally more willing to invest in costly monitoring or 
sanctioning.  
6.1.3 The contribution to empirically grounded modeling of social-ecological systems
Module 4 aimed to integrate the findings of previous modules into a simulation model. The 
separated treatment of subsystems ensured consistency between the framework, empirical 
observations, the model structure and the ability of the models to replicate real-world 
behavior. The simulation model of CPP use developed in Module 4 thus stands on solid 
empirical and theoretical ground, as the functioning of all subsystems was investigated with a 
focus on its key dynamics, including the main interactions with other subsystems. The 
research therefore shows how system dynamics modeling allows for the operationalization of 
the SES framework, although integration required intensive empirical analysis in advance. 
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System dynamics has proven to be a very suitable approach for the operationalization of the 
framework for three reasons. Firstly, since system dynamics is explicitly valued for its ability 
to display behavior resulting from nonlinear relationships and the feedback mechanisms (Ford 
2000; Sterman 2000), it perfectly matches the framework assumption’s nonlinear relationship 
between variables and feedback between subsystems (see Figure 3). Secondly, the SES 
framework provides a top-down rather than a bottom-up perspective on the SES by 
emphasizing structural components rather than agent interactions. Thus, system dynamics 
seemed a more appropriate approach for operationalizing the framework than agent-based 
modeling (ABM), which is considered to be advantageous when heterogeneous agents 
interact (Bousquet and Le Page 2004). Third, it must be considered that the functioning of the 
SES in Grindelwald is highly dependent on agricultural subsidies. Thus, the system cannot be 
considered self-organized but instead is very much driven by the external settings, in 
particular through agricultural policies, which also calls for a top-down approach such as 
system dynamics. 
The importance of agricultural policies for the functioning of the SES also motivates the 
scenario definition for external setting, which yielded four scenarios that were then simulated 
in order to assess how agricultural policies and other changes in external variables would 
affect the sustainability of the SES in the long run. The scenario simulations showed that the 
trend of decreased use and maintenance of CPPs continues for all of the four scenarios. The 
model predicts that certain panaceas, such as liberalization and increased government support 
for the agricultural sector, will accelerate rather than counteract the trend. Furthermore, it 
shows that stocking density is the most important system component and that reducing 
stocking density should be taken as an early warning signal that further afforestation will take 
place with a delay of between seven and 15 years in the ecological system.  
In summary, combining system dynamics with formative scenario analysis allowed for the 
operationalization of the framework by fruitfully bridging the different methods of the 
previous modules. This shows that system dynamics is an interesting alternative to ABM, 
which is currently considered the most promising option in the field (Poteete, Janssen and 
Ostrom 2010; 171–191), in particular when an SES cannot be considered self-governed, as 
top-down governance processes, such as federal agricultural policies, are of central 
importance.  
6.1.4 A note on the analysis of resource systems 
The development of a simulation model, of course, depended on a proper understanding of the 
ecological subsystems, which was generated in Module 3. The study of the commons, 
however, puts emphasis on social process. Therefore, research on the commons, including the 
SES framework, provides an anthropocentric focus on the resource system, aiming to 
determine whether its properties facilitate or hinder self-organization (Binder et al. 2013;
Epstein et al. 2013). Therefore, the study of the commons can be considered to be in line with 
traditional approaches in human ecology (Bates 2005) or cultural ecology (Harris 2001;
Steward 1968), where behavior and institutions are seen as cultural adaptations to the natural 
environment. In our Module 3, we followed a different approach for the analysis of the 
resource system by focusing on the links between land management practices and the state of 
the ecological system with regard to land cover change. Therefore, our approach was rather 
aligned with traditional land change science (Turner and Robbins 2008).  
For the analysis of SESs, the study of the commons should acknowledge the fact that the 
impact of humans on the environment has been steadily increasing and is outcompeting 
natural processes (Crutzen 2006). Thus, social-ecological research should put more emphasis 
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on the effects of institutions and behavior on ecological processes rather than analyzing the 
attributes of the resource system toward their contribution to self-organization in SESs. In 
Module 3, we tried to acknowledge the deterministic role of the social on the ecological by 
analyzing the ecological system with emphasis on land use and subsequent land cover 
changes. The analysis showed how land use practices relate to land cover change. I thus 
consider that an empirical investigation of the ecological system within the study of the 
commons can be based on land cover data or satellite images in order to show the impact of 
human activities on the ecological system rather than emphasizing the opposite link.  
6.2 Appraisal of the SES Framework
As mentioned above, the framework provided a good starting point for institutional analysis, 
as it is based on the IAD framework. Recent work (McGinnis 2011; McGinnis and Ostrom 
2014) has highlighted that the SES framework is firmly rooted in IAD, which should resolve 
some ambiguities that might arise when the rules and property rights variables (GS4-8) are 
analyzed without explicitly considering IAD (including AIDCO). Additionally, findings in 
Module 1 suggest that the functioning of the governance system is highly influenced by 
federal governance. Thus, the government resource policies variable is a critical component of 
the external setting with regard to different aspects, such as subsidies, market incentives (as 
mostly regulated through agricultural policies) and federal law. Relevant federal law 
comprises environmental law, which constrains land use practices, and civil law, which 
impacts the corporations or the cooperative ability to self-organize. I would thus recommend 
that, in addition to the variable government resource polices (S4), a “federal law” variable be 
added. This would allow clearly differentiating between the impact of external interventions 
into markets through taxing or subsidizing of CPR use and external interventions like 
prohibitions or the prescription through legislative processes. Furthermore, this differentiation 
would facilitate analyzing possible overlaps and conflicts between diverse legislations 
enforced by different juridical levels, as emphasized in legal pluralism (Benda-Beckmann 
2001; Unruh 2003). The framework should therefore explicitly highlight that rules and 
property rights (RU4-RU8) may be defined and enforced through different types of 
governance bodies on local, national and potentially supranational levels. 
With regard to the actors’ system, our analysis reveals that the economic endowment of actors 
is central for their (cooperative) behavior. Although the socioeconomic attributes variable 
(U2) may include economic endowment in the third tier, I consider it fruitful for further 
analysis to split the variable into sociodemographic attributes, such as gender, age and marital 
status, and into economic endowment attributes as characterized by the production factors of 
land, labor and capital. Furthermore, our analysis reveals the key human environmental 
interactions to be appropriation and provision, both of which are listed among the interactions 
(I1, I5). I find that the term “infrastructure investment” could be changed to “maintenance” or 
“provision activities.” Infrastructural investments (I5) can be understood as strictly monetary 
investments into human-constructed facilities (RS4), although this clearly also includes labor 
dedicated to the upkeep and maintenance of the resource system.  
Interactions are essential parts of the framework, which are currently listed without indication
of which subsystems or variables they are linking, and strongly emphasize social processes. 
An important step would therefore be to characterize the interactions as links between or 
within subsystems to add clarity without unwanted theoretical implications. The process of 
characterizing interactions as links between or within subsystems would also reveal a bias in 
the framework toward social processes rather than social-ecological or even ecological 
processes. Depending on the version of the framework (McGinnis and Ostrom 2014; Ostrom 
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2007, 2009), the framework lists 8–10 interactions, two of which can be considered social-
ecological (I1, I5), and the rest refer to strictly social interactions. This means that 
environmental interactions are not being considered at all. 
As the framework is meant to be a starting point for a multidisciplinary study bridging social 
and natural sciences, it might be necessary to amend the framework with regard to its 
characterizations of the ecological subsystem and its interactions to make it more useful for 
natural scientists. Epstein et al. (2013) have undertaken an effort in this direction and propose 
inclusion of a seventh subsystem, “ecological rules,” to describe ecological processes. 
Another potential way of making the framework more useful to the natural scientist may be 
the use of the ecosystem services concept (Carpenter et al. 2009; De Groot et al. 2010; Fisher, 
Turner, and Morling 2009). Accordingly, provisioning and cultural services might then 
constitute additional social-ecological interactions, while regulating services describe 
ecological interactions. With regard to ecological components, one could start with adding 
physical characteristics, including land cover types and distribution as well as topography, or 
biological characteristics, such as species pool and geologic setting, as proposed in the LTER 
framework (Redman, Grove, and Kuby 2004). A second option would incorporate an 
operationalization of ecological processes through resilience thinking. Rooted in ecology, 
resilience thinking might allow social scientists to better understand the ecosystem dynamics 
and the way they are influenced by human activities (Gunderson and Holling 2002). 
6.3 Policy Implications
The implications for policy making can be differentiated into two themes: first, the role of 
local governance systems with regard to the problem of CPP underuse and second, policy 
options for the federal government for providing a favorable external setting to foster the use 
and maintenance of CPPs.  
Recent concern about the appropriateness (Knoepfel et al. 2005) and persistence (Kissling-
Näf, Volken, and Bisang 2002) of a local governance system in light of reducing use of CPPs 
can be rejected based on our study. Findings from Module 1 suggest that the governance 
system is able to counteract the problems of underuse through the opening of CPPs to foreign 
cattle and other institutional adaptations. However, the opening of the governance system 
may, to a large part, result from the incentives through summering payments by the federal 
government, which encourage corporations to maintain stocking density close to carrying 
capacity. However, a shift in operational rules from strict to partial exclusion has just begun,
and if the trend continues, as Module 4 suggests, the governance system might put further 
efforts into acquiring foreign cattle to achieve the desired stocking density. Thus, corporations 
might slowly develop into more service- than governance-oriented organizations, which offer 
summering opportunities for lowland cattle against monetary compensation and potentially 
conduct provision activities themselves or hire labor from the fees paid by externals for 
summering. As Module 2 suggests, there is a close link between the level of appropriation and 
provision activities, so that it might well be possible that the willingness to maintain the 
resource decreases with the increase of foreign cattle on the CPP. Thus, a shift from an 
exclusion-based access regulation to a market-based approach may not provide better 
outcomes with regard to the maintenance of the resource system and the prevention of 
afforestation. To counteract this situation, the upkeep of CPPs might increasingly rely on the 
availability of voluntary labor or maintenance efforts as part of social service programs. 
Governance efforts should therefore consider whether and how provision activities on CPPs 
could be integrated as part of social service schemes.
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In order to provide sufficient livestock in the valley, and more importantly to ensure high 
appropriation levels of local farmers, policies need to target the payoff from appropriation of 
CPPs. The introduction of appropriation contributions within the new policy framework 
(2014–2017) is therefore targeting the right point in the system and might be more effective 
than subsidies made to corporations or alp-enterprises respectively. Other options may include 
payments for environmental services, which target the upkeep of CPP areas most prone to 
abandonment. In Module 3, a first step was made to spatially define the plots most prone to 
abandonment. However, based on the characteristics identified, we are unable to suggest 
concrete policy measures due to the diversity of site-related factors leading to CPP plot 
abandonment, as discussed in Module 3. A promising option to foster the use and 
maintenance of CPPs may include centralized marketing activities efforts on the federal as 
well as the local level. On the local level, centralized marketing efforts are reported to have a 
strong positive impact on the overall functioning of the local agricultural sector (Bardsley and 
Bardsley 2014). In addition, better labeling and better communication of values associated 
with the consumption of alpine products (through labels declaring mountainous origin, for 
example) may help raise consumers’ awareness of different production methods, feedstock 
used and the cultural and natural attributes associated with alpine products and thus help 
strengthen prices and, accordingly, farmers’ payoff, which was found to be a key factor in 
encouraging the use and maintenance of CPPs.  
6.4 Limitations and Further research
Although this research follows a case study approach, it offers methodological pluralism. 
Case studies are considered advantageous for hypothesizing relationships, theory 
development and the investigation of particular mechanisms (Bates et al. 2000; Lieberman 
2005). The weakness of a case study approach is the resulting uncertainty about the 
generalizability of the findings. This research put emphasis on precision and realism at the 
cost of generalizability (Costanza et al. 1993). Therefore, the results of different modules need 
further validation through multiple methods. The insights gained in the different modules 
suggest the following avenues for further research:  
Module 1 provides a step toward a theory of institutional change. Yet, without additional case 
studies, patterns of institutional evolution cannot be generalized. Therefore, future studies 
need to further elaborate on the patterns of rule evolvement and relate them to changes in the 
SES and outcomes. The SES and the IAD framework provide valid tools for doing so. 
Applied to multiple settings, it will deliver the empirical base for meta-analysis toward a 
general theory of institutional change, applicable to the governance of CPR.  
In Module 2, the findings were based on a rather large number of cases, but the effect of 
contextual variables limits its value for formulating a general theory of behavior of 
individuals in commons dilemmas. However, the findings and the hypothesis derived in 
Module 2 provide an important reality check for experimental research and entail valuable 
information for formulating future research questions and for designing experiments. First, it 
should be considered that endowment is a major driver behind behavior and second, that 
appropriation behavior is closely linked to provision behavior. Whether this holds 
independent of context could be investigated in experimental settings that link behavior in 
appropriation situations (CPR games) to behavior in provision situations (public good games). 
According to our findings, subjects with higher appropriation levels should make higher 
investments into the common pool and should be equally more willing to invest in costly 
monitoring or sanctioning. If this could be proven in laboratory experiments, we would have 
important additional insights about the mechanisms that allow overcoming social dilemmas.
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In Module 3, we investigated land cover changes as a consequence of land use change. This is 
a topic that desires more attention within the study of the commons. Efforts will require better 
integration of knowledge from the natural sciences, including potential amendments in the 
SES framework and elaboration on the methods most suitable to analyze a resource system 
and its dynamics. For our case study, we had some land use statistics available, but it may 
well be that in developing countries, official land cover data may not be reliable or not 
available in the desired resolutions. Therefore, it remains conceptually and methodologically 
challenging to capture the relevant resource system dynamics, in particular as social-
ecological modeling depends on previous investigation of ecological and social-ecological 
interactions. 
In Module 4, system dynamics and formative scenario analysis showed to be useful tools for 
building simulation models of SESs. The method mix constitutes a feasible alternative to 
agent-based modeling (ABM), in particular when the SES is highly interconnected and 
dependent on federal policy or regional economic development. The model was simulated on 
aggregated levels for the whole region. Running the model at the corporation level instead of 
at the regional level could reveal information about future developments of the single 
cooperation to identify the properties that make a cooperative more robust or vulnerable to 
particular types of external changes. That knowledge would then allow theorizing about the 
social-ecological links, feedbacks and sustainability trade-offs that increase the robustness or 
vulnerability of the SESs to external perturbations (Anderies, Janssen, and Ostrom 2004;
Janssen, Anderies, and Ostrom 2007). 
A further step in advancing the model would be its extension toward spatially explicit design. 
Coupling the system dynamics model with the cost distance model would allow the 
identification of the areas that are most prone to abandonment and their characteristics. 
Information about potentially abandoned CPP plots would provide useful information for 
policy making, allowing the targeting of the specific characteristics of potentially abandoned 
plots. Unfortunately, Vensim and other system dynamics software currently do not offer the 
interface for doing so. Therefore, further coupling of findings of Module 3 with the simulation 
results would rely either on substantial programming efforts or on “soft coupling,” using the 
generated data from the systems dynamics model as input to for the GIS based cost-distance 
model to spatially locate the potentially abandoned CPP plots for particular scenarios.  
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7 Conclusion
Sustainable natural resource use depends on humans’ abilities to shape institutions that keep 
the levels of exploitation, pollution or other externalities in line with the resource system’s
capacity to recover from these activities. Common property arrangements and the institutions 
enforced by local communities often provide effective solutions for sustaining resources over 
centuries. The CPPs in the Swiss Alps provide much empirical proof. However, social-
ecological systems are subject to constant change and often fail to maintain sustainability 
when major changes are at stake. In the Swiss Alps, the situation has changed over the past 
decades. The CPPs that need protection from overexploitation today depend on governance 
efforts to foster their use. This dissertation analyzed how the SESs in which CPP use is 
embedded cope and respond to these new challenges. 
Capturing the complexity and different problems driving natural resource use requires 
multidisciplinary approaches and a combination of different methods. The framework for 
analyzing sustainability in SESs was developed as a starting point for this endeavor (Ostrom 
2009). This thesis demonstrated how the framework can be operationalized through multiple 
methods to enhance the understanding of complex SESs. In Module 1, it was shown by 
institutional analyses that the local governance systems, although originally designed to avoid 
overuse, are able to adapt to problems of underuse. In Module 2, it was investigated how 
actors’ attributes affect individuals’ behavior in commons dilemmas. In Module 3, the 
changes in the resource systems were observed and linked to human land use. In Module 4, 
the insights from Modules 1–3 were used to formulate a simulation model of the SES. As part 
of these four modules, the thesis covered and advanced key problems within the study of the 
commons, provided feedback about the strength and weaknesses of the framework for its 
further development, and allowed the proposal of governance options to enhance the 
sustainability of CPP use. 
In sum, this thesis showed that analysis of resource use and social-ecological systems requires 
a mixed-method approach, as the complexity of SESs cannot be captured with only one tool 
or through the lens of a particular discipline. Multidisciplinary efforts need to acknowledge 
that SESs are constantly changing, and emphasis must be given to the SES’s dynamics rather 
than its state. Only if the interplay of different components and the resulting dynamics of an
SES are understood can policy suggestions move beyond simple blueprints. As humans’ 
interference with the environment steadily enlarges, sound social-ecological research is 
evermore needed to identify effective governance principles and institutions to promote the 
resilience of scale social-ecological systems.  
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Adapting to Socioeconomic Developments by Changing Rules in the
Governance of Common Property Pastures in the Swiss Alps
Ivo Baur 1 and Claudia R. Binder 1
ABSTRACT. The common property meadows in the Swiss Alps have been managed by local self-organized governance systems
since the Middle Ages, thus preventing their overuse. During the past century, socioeconomic developments, such as
industrialization and rapid nonagricultural economic growth, have shifted employment opportunities from the agricultural sector
towards the service sector. In the agricultural sector, this has led to less intensive use and maintenance of the meadows in the
Alps and consequently to a reduction in biodiversity. We use the example of Grindelwald in the Swiss Alps to analyze how the
governance system has adapted to these socioeconomic developments. We based our analysis on the Program in Institutional
Analysis of Social-Ecological Systems (PIASES). We coded five statutes ranging in date from 1867 to 2003, and conducted
interviews to investigate changes in the governance system. In so doing, we focused on changes in the operational rules that
structure the focal interactions between the social system and the ecological system, namely harvesting level and investment
activities. Our results show that the governance system has adapted to the socioeconomic changes (1) by creating an additional
organizational subunit that allows appropriators to alter operational rules relatively autonomously, and (2) through changing
several operational rules. We conclude by outlining the properties of the governance system that have allowed for constant
harvesting levels and investment activities over time.
Key Words: common property pastures; rules; SES; social-ecological systems
INTRODUCTION
Since the Middle Ages, summer pastures in the Swiss Alps
have predominately been held as common property. At
present, 80% of the summer pastures located at higher altitudes
are managed as common property. Common property
resources are natural or human-made resources that are jointly
used and managed. In most cases, exclusion is difficult, and
joint use of these resources involves subtractability (Berkes et
al. 1989). In the Swiss Alps, local authorities such as
cooperatives, corporations, and citizens’ communes have
established institutional arrangements to regulate access to the
summer pastures (Picht, unpublished manuscript). The
members of these organizations jointly own and manage the
resources and have successfully avoided the overexploitation
of summer pastures for centuries by (1) excluding outsiders,
and (2) restricting the harvesting levels of the eligible users
(Netting 1981, Ostrom 1990, Stevenson 1991, Tiefenbach and
Mordasini 2006).  
During the past century, socioeconomic developments have
resulted in the decreasing use and maintenance of summer
pastures. In particular, industrialization and the shift towards
the service-oriented economy increased labor demand in the
corresponding sectors. Thus, labor moved from the
agricultural sector to the industrial and service sectors (Bergier
1984). When looking at agriculture, one can observe that in
the beginning of the 19th century, alpine agriculture reached
its peak in terms of land used for agriculture (Stöcklin et al.
2007). In the early 20th century, economic activities in the
alpine regions were still mostly agricultural and subsistence-
based, and highly dependent on livestock husbandry. The
physical infrastructure, such as huts and barns, together with
the summer pasture, which we refer to as “alp”, were crucial
assets of the community. Industrialization and the subsequent
rapid expansion of the service sector created new job
opportunities in the centers and brought tourism into the
valleys. As a result, subsistence farming lost its importance,
and the number of farmers on the alps decreased (Volken et
al. 2002). The remaining farmers increased their farm size
through tenure agreements, and intensified production in the
productive areas, while labor-intensive pastures became less
intensively used and maintained (Stöcklin et al. 2007). 
The changes in land use practices that resulted were twofold:
on the one hand, there was regrowth of shrubs and forests in
marginal areas. On the other hand, the intensification of
productive pastures (in the valley and the alps) reduced their
ecological value (Stöcklin et al. 2007, Baur et al. unpublished
manuscript), as extensively used pastures provide much higher
species diversity than intensely used pastures or forests
(Freléchoux et al. 2007, Stöcklin et al. 2007). In the 1980s,
the Swiss federal government started subsidizing the
summering of livestock in the alps, which reduced, but did not
overcome, the trend of land abandonment in the higher regions
(Baur et al. 2007, Mack et al. 2008). It is apparent that the
provision of public goods such as biodiversity and the beauty
of maintained landscape and infrastructure are strongly
interlinked with continuous use and maintenance of the alps
(Lehmann and Messerli 2007). 
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Contemporary research on common property resources has
predominantly investigated the social and ecological variables
that allow for self-organization to avoid overexploitation of
the resources (Ostrom 1990, Balland and Platteau 1996,
Agrawal 2001, Dietz et al. 2003). Results of these analyses
show why some groups build institutions that support them in
managing resources sustainably while others do not.
Furthermore, institutions and the incentives they shape are
considered to be the key for economic welfare (North 1990,
Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Because the importance of
institutions for the well-being of humankind is widely
acknowledged, methods to analyze institutional structures
have been developed in economics and social sciences
(Hollingsworth 2000, Gronow 2008). These methods are
designed to relate institutional structures to outcomes at one
single point in time (Hodgson 1998, Ostrom 2008, Ostrom and
Basurto 2011). However, the world is constantly changing and
so are social-ecological systems (SESs) (Gunderson and
Holling 2002, Dietz et al. 2003, Walker et al. 2004, Olsson et
al. 2006, Folke et al. 2007). Accordingly, institutions need to
adapt to changes occurring within and around the SES to
ensure sustainable outcomes. Therefore, it is of key
importance to understand the properties of governance
systems and the institutions that allow them to “better cope
with, manage or adjust to some changing condition, stress,
hazards, risk or opportunity” (Smit and Wandel 2006:282). 
We aim to contribute to the analysis of institutional change in
governance systems of common property resources. We use
the case of Grindelwald in the Swiss Alps to provide an indepth
understanding of how the local authorities have adapted their
governance system as a reaction to the socioeconomic
developments in the region. We address the following
questions: 
1. Which variables of the social-ecological system were
affected by socioeconomic developments? 
2. How is the local governance system structured? 
3. What changes in the local governance system have
occurred over time? 
4. How did the governance system adapt to socioeconomic
developments? 
First, we introduce the study area. Second, we describe the
methods applied. Third, we present the results of the analysis
as to which variables of the SES framework were affected by
socioeconomic developments, including changes in the
governance system. In this, we focus on changes in the
operational rules that directly affect harvesting levels (number
of livestock summered on the alps) and investment activities
(maintenance of pastures, huts, and fences). We summarize
by discussing the properties of the governance system that
allow it to respond adaptively to socioeconomic
developments.
The study region
Grindelwald is a Swiss municipality located in the Bernese
Alps. The municipality is bounded by the mountains Eiger,
Mönch, and Jungfrau, and it covers 171 km2. About 13% of
the area is settlement area or agricultural area held as private
property, 25% is commonly owned meadows (pastures), and
62% is unused land. The border between common property
pastures (alp) and private property in the valley is shown in
Fig. 1. Unique to the case of Grindelwald is the fact that seven
spatially defined corporations (“Bergschaft”) are embedded
in a cooperative (“Taleinung”). The cooperative assigns the
territory to the seven corporations. The small alp “Pfingstegg”
is the only alp that is privately owned. The alp Holzmatten is
a special case because it is common property but is not
connected to the private property in the valley (Nägeli-Örtle
1986, Tiefenbach and Mordasini 2006).
Fig. 1. The seven corporations of Grindelwald. Adapted
from Tiefenbach and Mordasini (2006). HM = Holzmatten
corporation, with common property separated from the
private property in the valley. The red dotted line marks the
border between common property pastures (alp) and private
property in the valley.
METHODS
Theoretical framework
The common property pastures in Grindelwald were analyzed
as a social-ecological system (SES). According to the SES
framework (Ostrom 2007, 2009), SESs are composed of four
nested subsystems embedded in a broader social, economic,
and political setting. As displayed in Table 1, the system’s
social compartment consists of the Governance System (GS)
and the Actors (A). The ecological compartment entails the
Resource System (RS) and the Resource Units (RU). These
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Table 1. Variables of the social-ecological system in Grindelwald affected by societal transitions. Based on Ostrom (2007,
2009), and M. McGinnis and E. Ostrom (unpublished manuscript).
Social, Economic, and Political Settings (S)
†S1 - Economic development; S2 - Demographic trends; S3 - Political stability; †S4 - Government resource policies; †S5- Market
incentives; S6 - Media organization
Resource System (RS) Governance System (GS)
RS1 - Sector (e.g., water, forests, pasture, fish) GS1 - Government organizations
RS2 - Clarity of system boundaries GS2 - Nongovernmental organizations
RS3 - Size of resource system GS3 - Network structure
†RS4 - Human-constructed facilities ‡GS4 - Property rights systems
RS5 - Productivity of system ‡GS5 - Operational rules
†RS6 - Equilibrium properties ‡GS6 - Collective-choice rules
RS7 - Predictability of system dynamics ‡GS7 - Constitutional rules
RS8 - Storage characteristics ‡GS8 - Monitoring and sanctioning rules
RS9 - Location
Resource Units (RU) Actors (A)
†RU1 - Resource unit mobility †A1 - Number of actors
RU2 - Growth or replacement rate †A2 - Socioeconomic attributes of actor
RU3 - Interaction among resource units A3 - History of use
†RU4 - Economic value †A4 - Location
RU5 - Number of units A5 - Leadership/entrepreneurship
RU6 - Distinctive markings A6 - Norms (trust–reciprocity)
†RU7 - Spatial and temporal distribution A7 - Knowledge of social-ecological system/mental models
†A8 - Importance of resource (dependence)
†A9 - Technology used
Action Situations (Interactions [I] → Outcomes [O])
§I1 - Harvesting levels O1 - Social performance measures (e.g., efficiency, equity,
accountability, sustainability)
I2 - Information sharing
I3 - Deliberation processes O2 - Ecological performance measures (e.g., overharvested,
resilience, biodiversity)
I4 - Conflicts
§I5 - Investment activities O3 - Externalities to other social-ecological systems
I6 - Lobbying activities
I7 - Self-organizing activities
I8 - Networking
Related Ecosystems (ECO)
ECO1 - Climate patterns; ECO2 - Pollution patterns; ECO3 - Flows into and out of focal social-ecological system
 †Variables directly affected through socioeconomic developments
‡Governance responses by changing variables
§Focal action situations
subsystems interact (I) at various spatial and temporal scales
to produce outcomes (O). 
Each subsystem can be divided into its further properties. The
GS entails organizations, property rights, and a set of rules
that structure interactions among actors and their use of the
resource system. The property rights system (GS4) consists
of a bundle of rights that regulate access and the degree of
command of individual actors or organizations over a resource
(Schlager and Ostrom 1992). The rules operate at three
hierarchical levels: the operational level (GS5), the collective-
choice level (GS6), and the constitutional level (GS7). Hereby,
the highest level (constitutional) changes at a slower pace and
determines the lower ones (Ostrom 2005). For example, the
constitutional level refers to the legal form of a users
association as this determines who is a member and is allowed
to participate in collective-choice processes. On the collective-
choice level, actors are then to agree on the operational rules
according to prescribed procedures. The operational rules
structure everyday interactions of users with the resources
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systems, such as harvesting or investment activities. An
example of an operational rule might be a timely restriction
of harvesting activities for the preservation of the resource.
The resource system, which is the alp, includes the meadow
and physical infrastructure, such as huts, barns, and fences.
The resource system generates the resource units, which is the
grass used as fodder.  
The Program in Institutional Analysis of Social-Ecological
Systems (PIASES) complements the SES framework by
combining it with the Institutional Analysis and Development
(IAD) framework (McGinnis 2011, Ostrom 2005). It thereby
highlights the importance of seven operational rules that
structure focal action situations (McGinnis and Ostrom 2010).
In this study, we analyzed the changes in the operational rules
for two focal interactions, namely harvesting levels (I1), which
we operationalized as the indexed number of livestock grazing
on the alps (appropriation), and investment activities (I5),
which we operationalized as maintenance of the alps by
communal work and the installation of fences (provision).
These focal interactions determine the intensity of use and
maintenance of the alps, and thus directly affect the ecological
state of the resource system.
Data collection and analysis
In a first step, we conducted a workshop with farmers from
the seven corporations to analyze the impact of socioeconomic
developments on the SES (Table 1). In a second step, to
investigate the functioning of the SES, 12 farmers, including
the monitor of each corporation, were interviewed using a
semistructured questionnaire (Schensul et al. 1999:149–164).
Monitors keep track of appropriation and provision levels
within a corporation, and lead the users association. That is,
they have the best knowledge of the ongoing social and
ecological processes in their corporations. In a third step, we
conducted structured interviews with three monitors and the
president of the cooperative to identify changes in the rules
and property rights system (GS4–GS8) devised by the
cooperative and corporations for the governance of the alps.
Furthermore, the statutes of the cooperative named Taleinung
from the years 1867, 1923, and 2002, and the statutes of the
corporation “Scheidegg” from 1913 and 2003 were coded for
changes in rules following the grammar for analyzing
institutional statements (ADICO) (Crawford and Ostrom
1995, Basurto et al. 2009, Schlüter and Theesfeld 2010). The
corporation Scheidegg was chosen as an example because of
its excellent data availability. The operational rules structuring
harvesting activities and infrastructural investment were
organized according to the IAD framework (McGinnis and
Ostrom 2010). To allow for the fact that rules might exist in
form but not in practice and vice versa (Ostrom 2005), the
findings were validated through three interviews with elderly
farmers.
RESULTS
Socioeconomic developments
In the last century, several socioeconomic developments
changed the external setting of the local SES. First, economic
development (S1) created off-farm income opportunities and
increased tourism considerably. This development transformed
the local economy from an agriculture-based to a tourism
driven economy (Fig. 2), which resulted in competition for
land between touristic use (e.g., skiing, biking) and
agricultural use in both the productive agricultural areas and
the alps. It should be noted that the tourism sector is the main
reason why Grindelwald does not suffer from emigration like
other regions in the Swiss Alps, and instead has seen modest
population growth (Fig. 2). Second, state control of
agricultural production has steadily increased. Both
production standards (S4) and market incentives (S5) have
been increasingly regulated by the state through agricultural
policies. Furthermore, state policies have accelerated
structural change in the agricultural sector towards fewer but
larger farms, and have increased farmers’ dependence on
direct payments. Thus, without state support, agriculture in
Grindelwald is not feasible. 
Due to the structural transformation of the local economy, the
number of farmers owning livestock (A1) decreased from 432
to 126 within a century. During the same period, tourism
increased with 863 index points, resulting in 111,728 guest-
nights in 2010 (Fig. 2). The remaining farmers in Grindelwald
have taken advantage of the income opportunities offered by
the growing tourism sector, and work on the ski lifts during
the winter (A2). The decreasing number of farmers and the
inheritance regulations which foresee that land is equally
divided among successors, has led to dispersed farm structures
in the valley (A4). Farmers who increase their farm size do so
mainly through tenancy agreements, and at the cost of
dissipating their land holdings. Furthermore, subsidies, off-
farm income, and the use of additive fodder (A9) have reduced
farmers’ dependence on pastures for their livestock and dairy
products for their livelihoods (A8). In addition, tourism
strengthened local demand for alpine cheese (RU4).  
As mentioned, intensification of the productive areas and
extensification of marginal areas is also affecting the alps.
Productive areas are most often close to the huts, while the
marginal areas are characterized by longer walking distances,
steepness, and higher altitude. Furthermore, cattle breeds have
been increasing in size, and their mobility has declined as a
result (RU1), which makes them less suitable for grazing in
marginal areas (RU7) since long walks tend to decrease milk
yield. This has impacted land cover: marginal meadows have
been abandoned, bushes have started colonizing them, and the
area is being transformed into forest (fir forest) (RS6). In the
intensified areas, closer to huts, over-fertilization due to the
high density of cows has taken place, and consequently, the
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Fig. 2. Number of overnight stays, farm enterprises and employees, and inhabitants in Grindelwald from 1910 to 2010
(Sources: Nägeli-Örtle 1986, Wiesmann 2001, Federal Statistical Office (FSO) several years).
amount of persistent weeds (such as alpine sorrel or sheep
sorrel [Rumex alpinus]) has increased.  
Nevertheless, farmers in Grindelwald continue with their
labor-intensive traditional farming system, which is based on
dairy cattle farming and the seasonal cycle of transhumance,
with cheese production on the alp during summer. Strategies
observed in other regions, such as leisure farming,
characterized by a shift from dairy cows to suckler cows or
sheep husbandry, have not yet taken place in Grindelwald.
The local governance system
The local governance system in Grindelwald consists of three
nested levels with their own assemblies and constitutional
design:  
1. the cooperative (Taleinung), where every holder of usage
rights (“Bergrecht”) is a member; 
2. the corporations (Bergschaft), where every holder of
usage rights of a specific corporation is a member; and 
3. the corporations’ users association (“Besetzerschaft”),
where every holder of usage rights appropriating in the
specific corporation becomes a member. 
Rules mandatory for all corporations are designed and altered
collectively by the cooperative. This ensures vertical control
among the corporations by limiting the set of rules that can be
crafted autonomously on the corporations’ level. Similarly,
the cooperative is limited in its constitutional design, since
collective-choice rules and organizational principles for
cooperatives are determined by cantonal and federal
legislation (meta-constitutional level). Nevertheless, at each
level, the lower levels still have some autonomy in designing
additional rules (Fig. 3).  
The cooperative (Taleinung) is an organization that functions
as a legislative body in the interest of the corporations
(“Bergschaften”). In its statutes (“Taleinungsbrief”), it assigns
the territory to the corporations, and sets the constitutional
rules, the collective-choice rules, and to some extent, the
operational rules for both the corporations and the cooperative
itself. The cooperative is headed by a board, which functions
as the executive body. The board implements the decisions
made in the assembly. The assembly is called whenever the
board or a corporation decides to do so, or 100 rights holders
demand it. 
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Fig. 3.The structure of the local governance system in Grindelwald.
The corporation is an operational unit concerned with the
management of the alp. Each corporation is obliged to have
its own statutes (“Bergschaftsreglement”), which must be in
agreement with the rules prescribed in statutes of the
cooperative. Formal positions within corporations, such as
monitors, are prescribed by the statutes of the cooperative. 
Over the last century, the structure of the local governance
system has changed considerably as the corporations have split
into two associations, one for the users who exercise their
rights of usage (Besetzerschaft), and one for the holders of
rights of usage (“Bergteiler”) who do not make use of their
rights to harvest the pastures. The division of the corporation
into Besetzerschaft and Bergteiler was first mentioned in the
statutes of the cooperative in 1923. At that time, the number
of rights holders not engaging in agriculture became the
majority in the corporations, and their bargaining power
increased to the disadvantage of farmers. Thus, the division
was implemented in order to prevent conflicts over the
allocation of the corporation’s resources. Today, the users
association and the usage rights association even have to run
separate budgets as stipulated in the statutes of the cooperative
from 2002. Within the users association, farmers can make
autonomous decisions about the agricultural use of their
respective alp. Decisions about the touristic use of the resource
system are negotiated within the usage rights association.
The property rights system
The cooperative and the corporation are recognized as legal
entities under civil law. The right to own natural resources
such as forest, water, and pastures in common is guaranteed
by cantonal law (BSG 211.1 Art. 20). The meadows and the
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forest are the property of the corporation, or their members,
respectively. The cooperative prescribes that the rights of
usage are attached to private parcels in the valley and that they
are inalienable but leasable. Villagers owning or leasing
private property are allowed to access, harvest, and manage
the pastures. Formally, every holder of usage rights is allowed
to send as many livestock to the alps as they have rights tied
to their leasehold or privately owned parcels in the valley. The
location of the private parcels determines in which
corporation-alp the usage rights are to be appropriated. The
sum of usage rights present in the corporation defines the
maximum sustainable yield (MSY) of the corporation’s alp. 
Originally, this property rights system had four functions: first,
the exclusion of nonvillagers; second, the assignment of
harvesting levels to actors in proportion to their land holdings;
third, the assignment of duties to provide infrastructural
investments based on the usage rights one holds; and fourth,
the definition of the MSY for each corporation. Today, usage
rights still serve to exclude outsiders and assign provision
duties but do not restrict the individual’s harvesting activities
and no longer define MSY. 
During the 20th century, many private parcels that were once
used as private pastures were used as land for vacation homes.
Since the property rights remain attached to the plot in the
valley, many rights are coupled to land that is no longer in
agricultural use. Thus, while the area in the valley that is
pasture land and in agricultural use has been decreasing
constantly, the usage rights have not. This has resulted in an
excess of usage rights, leading to a low lease fee, which in
absolute terms barely changed over time. For example, in
Scheidegg from 1867 to 2009, the fee for the lease of one
single right for one season decreased from CHF 8.80 to CHF
8.50. That is, since the lease of rights is permitted among rights
holders, and rights can be leased at very low fees, farmers’
appropriation decisions are not restricted by the rights they
hold. Because the rights holder is not allowed to lease
unexercised rights to nonrights holders, the property rights
system continues to serve to exclude outsiders. Furthermore,
the opportunity to lease usage rights among local farmers
allows appropriation in the corporation of their choice,
regardless of the location of their privately owned parcels. 
Between the two World Wars, the federal government started
to estimate the MSY based on the practices found in the
commonly owned pastures. Since the 1980s, the government
has based its subsidies on prescribed harvesting levels.
Payments related to the summering of livestock are
incrementally reduced if total appropriation does not remain
within 75–110% of the sustainable yield as defined by the
canton (BLW 2010). These subsidy rules offer the corporation
strong monetary incentives to keep appropriation within a
sustainable range, including a minimum harvesting level.
Since summering payments are conditioned on maximum and
minimum harvesting levels, state policies determine the MSY
for the alps. Because breeding has increased cow size, milk
yields, and the cows’ fodder needs, the total number of usage
rights would no longer reflect the MSY of the alps, and the
appropriation of all usage rights would result in serious
damage and overharvest of the summer pastures, especially in
the easily accessible areas.
Rules
Statutes entail different constitutional rules (GS7) that
determine the collective-choice as well as operational rules
for the corporations. The statutes of the cooperative thus
stipulate that the corporations must keep the rules within the
statutes of the cooperative.  
Collective-choice rules (GS6) are prescribed for each level in
the statutes of the superior level. At present, collective choices
are made at all levels according to the majority rule (50% +1).
If no majority is obtained, presidents have the deciding vote
in the cooperative and in the corporation, and act as monitor
in the users association. 
Operational rules (GS5) directly regulate appropriation and
infrastructural investments, and are defined at various levels.
The cooperative defines the boundary rules (ownership of land
in the valley) and position rules (e.g., “appropriator” and
“rights holder”). The corporation’s statutes stipulate that every
holder of property rights must invest in infrastructure by
installing a defined length of fence on the alps in proportion
to the rights they hold. Furthermore, it prescribes that every
appropriator has to provide communal work in proportion to
their personal harvesting levels. The users assembly defines
and changes sensitive operational rules, mainly the payoffs
that affect appropriation and investment levels. For example,
the users association may set the hours of communal work
required per appropriated livestock unit and the monetary fines
for underprovision of communal work.  
The monitoring (GS8) of the individual’s compliance with
appropriation and provision rules is a jointly shared task of all
farmers. The monitor is to be informed about any unjustified
appropriation and has to confiscate the trespassing livestock.
Furthermore, they have to control the provision of
infrastructural investment and penalize noncompliance
through fines. For most of the violations of operational rules,
such as underprovision of communal work or failure to install
a fence, the catalogue of fines is defined every year by the
users association. If a violator has not paid their fine by the
start of the following season, they lose their property rights
until the fine is paid. In the case of violation of constitutional
or collective-choice rules by corporations, a forfeit can be set
by the cooperative’s board.
Adaptation of rules
As shown in Table 2, we found several changes in the
operational rules that directly structure appropriation and
provision situations.  
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Table 2. Rule inventory: displays the level that enforces the operational rule at certain points in time. It shows the seven types
of operational rules that directly structure the adjacent action situations appropriation (A) and the provision of infrastructural
investment (P). The rule codes are as follows: R = the rule must be complied with; P = the rule may be complied with; P* = the
rule may be complied with, but agreement from the cooperative board is required; F = the rule does not have to be complied
with; n.r. = no rules exist at this time. MSY = maximum sustainable yield.
Cooperative
(Taleinung)
Corporation
(Scheidegg)
User
assembly
(Scheidegg)
Types of rules 1867 1923 2002 1912 2003 current
Position rules
AP1: Appropriator (member of the users association) n.r. R R R R R
AP2: Rights holder (holds rights but does not
appropriate)
n.r. R R R R R
PP1: Provider of infrastructural investments R n.r. n.r. R R R
Boundary rules
AB1: Appropriator; must be appropriating during
current season
n.r. R R R R R
AB2: Rights holder; must own land in the valley R R R n.r. R R
BP1: Appropriator; becomes provider of communal
work and fencing
R n. r. n. r. R R R
BP2: Rights holder; becomes provider of fencing n.r. n. r. R n.r. R R
Choice rules
AC1: Lease of rights (to or from holder of usage rights) P P P P P P
PC1: Provision levels; pay fine instead of providing
communal work
n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. P P
PC2: Fencing; pay fine instead of installing fence n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. R R
PC3: Delegation of provision activities to proxy F n. r. P n. r. P P
Information rules
AI1: Standardized measurement for appropriation R R R n. r. R R
AI2: Reporting of illegal appropriation to higher
instance
n.r. R n.r. n.r. R R
PI1: Reporting of provision levels R R n.r. R R R
PI2: Reporting of fencing levels n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. R R
Aggregation rules
AA1: Agreement on the appropriation of external cattle F P* P* F P* R
AA2: Agreement when to drive livestock up and down
from the Alps
n.r n.r n.r n.r n.r R
AA3: Collective choice rules: proportional to shares P F F P F F
AB1: Defining the levels of provision required n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. R R
AB2: Reimbursement of additional contribution n.r. n.r. P n.r. P R
Payoff rules
AP1: Setting the interest for the lease of shares n.r. R n.r. P* R R
AP2: Reimbursement for unused shares R R n.r. n.r. n.r P
AP3: Fixed penalty for unreported appropriation R R n.r. R R R
AP4: Price for appropriating a livestock unit n.r. R n.r. R R R
PP1: Fees for under/overprovision of communal work R n.r. n.r. R R R
PP2: Fees for not fencing R n.r. n.r. R R R
Scope rules
SA1: Respecting MSY; appropriation must remain
within MSY of corporation
n.r. R n.r. R n.r R
SP1: Infrastructural investments must serve agricultural
purpose
n.r. R R n.r. R R
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Including constitutional, collective, and operational rules,
seven key changes have occurred over the last century, which
are worth summarizing: 
1. At the constitutional level, since the beginning of the 20th
century, the cooperative has prescribed that the
corporations must be divided into a users association and
a usage rights association. 
2. At the collective-choice level, voting procedures
prescribed for all levels have been refined. In the statutes
of 1923, it was mentioned that voting can be conducted
in proportion to the rights one holds, if 20 rights holders
or the board demand it at the cooperative level, or the
board or 10 rights holders do so at the corporation level.
This option was eliminated in the statutes of 2002, since
it is not in agreement with the voting procedures for
corporations and cooperatives as defined in civil law. At
present, every actor holding property rights is assigned
one vote. 
3. At the operational level, the differentiation between the
positions “appropriator” and “rights holder” led to the
diversification of rules for the provision of infrastructural
activities. The statutes of 1867 prescribe that any holder
of rights is obliged to keep their share of the alp in a good
state. Accordingly, every rights holder was automatically
urged to become a provider of public infrastructure,
including fencing and communal work. Infrastructural
investments were set in proportion to the usage rights that
an actor held, and did not depend on their appropriation,
as is the case today. Currently, a rights holder becomes
a provider of fencing in proportion to the rights they hold,
and the appropriator becomes a provider of communal
work in proportion to their harvesting level. A novelty is
that the statutes of 2002 allow appropriators to delegate
their duties, which has resulted in farmers’ spouses
engaging in the maintenance of the alps. 
4. Appropriation of “foreign” cattle has become permitted
pending agreement of the cooperative. Although usage
rights were always tied to private property in the valley,
the cooperative’s statute of 1923 contains the clause that
if the livestock population in the valley is significantly
reduced “due to forces of nature,” the corporations are
allowed to admit foreign cattle to the alps, if the
cooperative board permits it. At present, questions are
raised over whether (foreign) cattle that do not belong to
rights holders can be appropriated. The commission has
recently allowed the corporation Scheidegg to
appropriate foreign cattle, even in the absence of a natural
hazard that reduces livestock populations. 
5. Over the past century, the rules affecting the payoffs for
appropriation and the provision of infrastructural
investment came to be totally under the jurisdiction of
the corporations. The constitution of the cooperative from
1923 still entailed fixed rental fees for the lease of a right
distinguished for the seven corporations. Nowadays, the
prices for the lease of a right are defined by the users
association and are very low (CHF 8.50 per right in the
case of Scheidegg). Similarly, the corporations can now
decide whether they will reimburse for unused shares;
this was compulsory in the earlier statutes. Most of the
payoff rules affecting infrastructural investment are set
by the users association. The users association can decide
about the hours of communal work they require per
appropriated unit. The Scheidegg corporation is currently
requesting 8 hours per appropriated unit. Penalties for
not providing communal work, and the reimbursement
of additional hours of communal work are autonomously
set by the corporations. That is, farmers decide whether
they contribute in coin or in kind. Furthermore, farmers
are offered the opportunity to generate additional income
by working more than the required hours. Currently,
payments in the Scheidegg corporation for overcompensation
are fixed at CHF 20 per hour, while the fee for
undercompensation is CHF 25 per hour. If farmers carry
out communal work with light private machinery (e.g., a
chainsaw) or with heavier private machines, such as
smaller carriers for the dispersal of manure, hours are
counted double or even fourfold, respectively. However,
these fees and payments can always be changed by the
users association, and by altering them, the users
association guarantees a steady level of provision of
communal work within the corporation. Similarly, the
cooperative allows the corporations to set the tariffs for
failure to fence (one right is equivalent to 15 m). Actors
who hold usage rights but do not engage in agricultural
activities are charged CHF 1.50 per meter that they do
not fence. This has become an additional source of
income for the corporation. 
6. A newly added rule states that the infrastructure,
particularly huts and barns on the alp, must not be used
for purposes other than agricultural, and that they cannot
be sold to externals. This was allowed in older versions,
if the cooperative board agreed. The change in this rule
ensures that the huts are not transformed into recreational
infrastructure. 
7. Since the introduction of summering payments in the
1980s, MSY is ensured through agricultural policy
incentives. The total number of usage rights therefore no
longer defines the MSY of the alp. The summering
payments are conditioned upon a minimum harvesting
level in order to increase incentives to use the alps more
intensively. Today, these payments are tied to a minimum
(75%) and maximum (110%) harvesting level of the
state-defined sustainable yield. In 2010, Scheidegg
hosted 103% of the MSY (Table 2).
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DISCUSSION
We analyzed whether and how local governance systems
governing the management of common property meadows in
the alps in Grindelwald have adapted to socioeconomic
changes. We applied the SES framework to identify the
relevant variables within the SES that have changed due to
socioeconomic developments, and we used PIASES in order
to identify changes in the rules within the governance system.
Our study is original in its contribution because it empirically
analyzes changes in rule configurations in the governance of
common property resources. Additionally, it links the
observed changes in rules to changes in the social-ecological
context. Therefore, our study supports the development of a
general theory of institutional change and a better
understanding of the conditions that enhance the capacity of
governance systems to change rules successfully.
Socioeconomic changes and their impact on the social-
ecological system
In the following, we link the impact of the socioeconomic
developments in Grindelwald (industrialization, rapid
nonagricultural economic growth, subsidy scheme in
agriculture) on the variables of the SES, in particular, the
changes in the governance system (Table 3). We focus on the
main key reactions of the governance system to these changes.
Changes in the governance system as a response to
socioeconomic development
Adapting to a decreasing number of rights holders making
use of their rights
Socioeconomic developments have led to a decreasing number
of appropriators and an increasing number of rights holders
who are not engaging in agriculture (Fig. 3). As a response to
this shift in bargaining power, at the level of the cooperative
the decision was made to restructure the corporations by
dividing them into a rights holders association and a users
association. This division ensures that farmers decide
relatively autonomously within the users association about the
operational rules they apply to govern the agricultural use of
the alps. In particular, the ability to alter payoffs for
appropriation (e.g., setting the price for the lease of a right)
and provision (e.g., setting the fees for under- and
overprovision) allows them to balance harvesting and
investment activities at the corporation level.  
The distinction between the position of an appropriator and a
rights holder, furthermore, allowed the provision rules to be
adapted, which led to a more flexible labor allocation for
investment activities. Initially, communal work and fencing
were in proportion to the number of the usage rights one held.
Currently, communal work is tied to the appropriation level
of an individual, while the duty to install fencing remains
proportionate to the usage rights one holds. The actual
provision rules allow farmers to plan whether they will pay
fines or contribute with labor and machinery work to fulfill
their obligations. Additionally, they are free to provide more
than the required fences or hours of communal work and to
be reimbursed by the corporation or to delegate the provision
duties to a proxy. Hence, changes in provision rules increased
the flexibility of the single user to contribute with respect to
their opportunity costs and machinery assets, which is very
likely to increase overall productivity of investment activities
in any SES. The fact that provision rules assign different
investment activities to different positions is considered key
to ensuring high levels of cooperation in the provision of
investment activities.
Adapting to declining numbers of cattle and national
subsidy schemes
As shown in Fig. 4 for the corporation of Scheidegg, the
number of cows in the region has been decreasing.
Furthermore, summering subsidies are tied to the number of
cows harvesting meadows on the alps and are paid only if the
harvesting level is higher than 75% and less than 110% of the
MSY. To adapt to this situation, operational rules were
changed to allow the possibility to agree upon the
appropriation of foreign cattle. It has been observed that some
corporations have started hosting livestock that are not owned
by local farmers. The result of this adaptation strategy on the
MSY in shown in Fig. 4, which depicts the initial MSY, which
still exists in form but not in use. The introduction of
summering payments had two major effects on the local
governance system. First, MSY is now defined through
summering payments as they are tied to state defined MSY.
Second, the payments shaped stronger incentives for the
summering of cattle, which is the reason why the Scheidegg
corporation is currently hosting about 40 foreign cows during
the summer.
The role of a multileveled governance system for
sustainable common property management
Our results show that the local governance system in
Grindelwald is a complex system with three levels that have
changed its constitutional rules toward a more subsidiary
design by creating an additional level. The cooperative
(Taleinung) constitutes the highest level and includes seven
corporations (Bergschaft). The creation of the additional level,
which is the users association, allows farmers to govern the
agricultural affairs of the corporation without involvement of
tourism entrepreneurs. Furthermore, our findings suggest that
these multilayered governance systems enhance the capacity
to handle scale-dependent and cross-scale issues (Cash et al.
2006, Berkes 2007, Termeer et al. 2010), and provide a basis
for linking local knowledge, action, and the state of the social-
ecological system (Lebel et al. 2006). In the case of
Grindelwald, the changes in the structure of the local
governance system enhanced farmers’ capacity to create and
alter operational rules within the users association. At this
level, farmers are best informed about harvesting and
investment activities and have the strongest interest in finding
Ecology and Society 18(4): 60
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol18/iss4/art60/
Table 3. Variables of the social-ecological system framework affected by external socioeconomic developments
(industrialization, rapid nonagricultural economic growth, subsidy scheme in agriculture) for the case of Grindelwald.
Variables Changes that occurred
Resource System (RS)
RS4 - Human constructed
facilities
•Unused alp-huts (mainly cheese storage huts)
•Modernized barns (e.g., heating, electricity)
•Increased facilities for tourism, such as restaurants, ski lifts, or water reservoirs for artificial snow
production, led to reduced grazing area
RS6 - Equilibrium properties •Decreasing harvest in the marginal areas on the alps has led to observable forest and bush
encroachment
•Areas covered with forest have increased at the expense of the grazing areas
Resource Units (RU)
RU1 - Resource unit
mobility
•Decreasing mobility of cows due to new breeds
•Pastures that are further away from huts/barns are not “harvested”
RU4 - Economic value •Economic value of milk and milk products has significantly decreased in net value over time
•Farm gate prices for milk have decreased from about CHF 1 in the early 1990s to CHF 0.45 at
present
•Tourism in Grindelwald ensures a high demand for alpine cheese, thereby increasing the relative
value of alpine cheese to milk sales
RU7 - Spatial and temporal
distribution
•Grazing in marginal areas has been reduced as cows became less mobile
Actors (A)
A1 - Number of actors •Slightly increasing number of rights holders
•Increasing number of holders of rights not engaging in agriculture
A2 - Socioeconomic
attributes
•Income diversification (off-farm income share increased)
•Increasing farm sizes (farmers own more livestock and private land than the previous generation)
A4 - Location •Farm enterprises consist increasingly of dispersed private land holdings in different corporations
•Farmers therefore often hold use rights in several corporations, and the location of the farm is no
longer the single factor determining the corporation in which the farmer appropriates his cattle
A8 - Importance of resource •Decreasing importance of meadows as a resource for cow fodder
•Increasing importance of meadows for landscape beauty and recreational activities (for tourism)
A9 - Technology used •Technologies such as modern mowing and transport machineries, or milking technologies have
particularly increased productivity on the farm level. On the alps, farmers can use some of their
private machinery in order to fulfill their investment requirements.
Governance System (GS)
GS4 - Property rights
systems
•Serves to exclude nonvillagers
•No longer required for the assignment of harvesting levels
•No longer used to assign the hours of communal work to be fulfilled
•The total number of user rights no longer defines the maximum sustainable yield
GS5 - Operational rules •Division between the position of the appropriator and the rights holder; provision rules tied to these
two positions
•Hours of communal work conducted with light machinery (e.g., a jigsaw) are counted double
•Hours of communal work conducted with heavy machinery (e.g., a small transporter) are counted
fourfold
GS6 - Collective-choice rules •Voting within the association was conducted according to the rights one holds
•Currently, all collective choices are made at all levels according to majority rule (50% +1)
GS7 - Constitutional rules •Corporations were divided into a rights holders association and a users association
•In addition, payoff rules can now be autonomously set by the users association, mainly through the
setting of fees for over- and underprovision of communal work
GS8 - Monitoring and
sanctioning rules
•Sanctions were prescribed at the cooperative level
•Currently, most of the penalties for noncompliance regarding the fulfillment of infrastructural
investments are set within the users association
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Fig. 4.Changes in maximum sustainable yield, constant appropriation, number of rights users, and number of rights holders in
the Scheidegg corporation.
adaptive responses to fluctuations in these two focal
interactions because they are most affected by the outcomes.
The horizontal interplay between the corporations is ensured
through the presence of the cooperative and binding statutes.
Some operational decisions, such as the appropriation of
foreign cattle, can be realized only under the agreement of the
cooperative, which allows for checks among corporations.
Interlinks with federal law and resource policies have similarly
grown stronger as summering payments have become an
essential monetary incentive for farmers to keep appropriation
within a sustainable range.
Utility of the social-ecological system framework
The SES framework allowed for a systemic analysis of the
changes that occurred in the SES, given external
socioeconomic developments. As shown in Tables 1–3, the
classification along the variables for the SES framework
allowed for a structured analysis of the changes in the SES
and supports the understanding of how the governance system
adapted to changes in other variables of the SES. As the SES
framework and the proposed governance variables are rooted
in the IAD framework, its key strength lies in the analysis of
rules, and the way they structure interactions and outcomes.
Furthermore, the framework allows institutional change to be
related to changes in the natural resource system because it
offers a set of resource-related variables that may affect the
governance process. This suggests that the framework is
particularly suitable for studies that focus on the social
compartment of a SES. Scholars emphasizing the ecological
processes within an SES might find frameworks originating
in the natural sciences to provide better concepts for their
purpose (Redman et al. 2004, Walker et al. 2004, Turner and
Robbins 2008). The future integration of these concepts into
the present SES framework would be a major step towards a
common framework that allows for analysis of equal depth
for both the ecological and social compartment of SESs.
Lessons learned
It became evident that analysis of the changes in the structure
and rules of the governance system is essential if we want to
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look into the dynamics and potential adaptation mechanisms
within SESs. As our study has shown, the governance system
in Grindelwald adapted to socioeconomic developments by
changing rules. Even if the governance system was originally
designed to avoid overuse of the resources, it managed to adapt
to socioeconomic changes that would have led to reduced use
and maintenance of the alps. Although the observed changes
in the governance system and its rules are successful
adaptations in this case, they might be far from optimal if
applied to other contexts. Accordingly, it cannot be assumed
that the rule configuration as reported herein serves as a
blueprint for effective rule evolvement for the governance of
common property resources. However, based on the findings,
we suggest four properties of governance systems that
facilitate successful adaptation of rules to socioeconomic
changes: 
● Constitutional flexibility: allows the governance system
to adapt its structure to problems such as the decreasing
bargaining power of those most interested in the
productivity of the resource system 
● Multiple nested assemblies: allows competencies among
different assemblies to be located, which ensures that an
arising issue is processed in the corresponding assembly 
● Polycentric design: ensures vertical integration and
control between user groups about the rules they are
crafting, and at the same time ensures the flow of
information about the performance of rule configurations 
● Subsidiary design: allows changing the rule
configuration by the people best informed about the state
of the system
Future research
Future studies that address the dynamics of SESs should focus
on further investigating the linkage between changes in the
SES and changes in the governance system. We have shown
that for the case of Grindelwald, a close relationship can be
postulated. These studies need to further elaborate the patterns
of rule evolvement, and to relate them to changes in the SES
and outcomes. Such research will provide a better
understanding of the properties of governance systems that
allow for effective rule change, and thus provide the empirical
base for the general theory of institutional change, applicable
to the governance of common property resources.
Furthermore, a simulation model might support the assessment
of strategies that support or hinder the sustainable
development of the SES given its external and internal
dynamics and regulatory structures.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/5689
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Abstract: The sustainable use of common-pool resources depends on users’ 
behaviour with regards to appropriation and provision. Most knowledge about 
behaviour in such situations comes from experimental research. As experiments 
take place in confined environments, motivational drivers and actions in the field 
might differ. This paper analyses farmers’ use of common property pastures in 
Grindelwald, Switzerland. Binary logistic regression is applied to survey data to 
explore the effect of farmers’ attributes on livestock endowment, appropriation and 
provision behaviour. Furthermore, Q methodology is used to assess the impact of 
broader contextual variables on the sustainability of common property pastures. It 
is shown that the strongest associations exist between (a) socio-economic attributes 
and change in livestock endowment; (b) norms and appropriation behaviour; and 
(c) area and pay-off and provision behaviour. Relevant contextual variables are 
the economic value of the resource units, off-farm income opportunities, and the 
subsidy structure. We conclude that with increasing farm size farmers reduce 
the use and maintenance of common property. Additionally, we postulate that 
readiness to maintain a resource increases with appropriation activities and the 
net returns generated from appropriation.
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1. Introduction
Natural resources like fishing grounds, forests, pastures, and water are often 
managed as common-pool resources. Common-pool resources are jointly 
managed resources, for which individuals’ appropriation diminishes the resource 
stock and potential beneficiaries of which are difficult to exclude (Berkes et al. 
1989). Additionally, most common-pool resources rely on provision activities for 
the supply of resource units and the upkeep of the resource system. Appropriation 
and provision activities comprise social dilemmas, in which users’ short-term 
self-interest stands opposed to the interest of the group, that is to maximise 
appropriation and minimise provision activities (Gardner et al. 1990).
The behaviour of individuals in commons dilemmas affects the sustainability 
of all common-pool resources. Game theory provides the means to simulate 
both appropriation and provision behaviour in laboratory experiments, whereby 
the appropriation problem equals a common-pool resource game. As such, the 
appropriation of users diminishes the resource and hence reduces the stock and pay-
offs of co-players (Keser and Gardner 1999; Cárdenas and Ostrom 2004; Osés-
Eraso and Viladrich-Grau 2007; Ahn et al. 2010; Janssen et al. 2010). The provision 
problem matches a public good game. Public good experiments require players to 
invest in a common stock. The stock changes depending on the investments made 
and with it the individual’s return on the investments (Isaac et al. 1994; Ledyard 
1994; Fischbacher et al. 2001; Gächter and Thöni 2011). Recent attempts to 
validate findings from the laboratory with field experiments underline that users are 
sometimes able to overcome social dilemmas to achieve socially desirable outcomes 
(Cavalcanti et al. 2010; Rustagi et al. 2010; Prediger et al. 2011).
Whilst experiments provide important information about the factors facilitating 
cooperation, they offer limited explanations for the behaviour of real common pool 
resource users, mainly because the material constraints, preferences, and motives 
as they appear in the field are difficult to control for in experiments. This is due to 
the following reasons: Firstly, the underlying assumption of game theory that self-
seeking players behave strictly rational to maximise pay-offs does not reflect reality 
(Smith 2010). Secondly, the behaviour of individuals in experimental settings is 
detached from personal characteristics (Levitt and List 2007; Anderies et al. 2011). 
Thirdly, subjects in laboratory experiments are usually students from Western 
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countries, whose personality traits might differ from those of common-pool resource 
users (Henrich et al. 2010). To complement experimental studies, more information 
is needed about the variables driving the behaviour of real common-pool resource 
users (Janssen and Ahn 2006; Poteete et al. 2010; Anderies et al. 2011). That 
information can then be integrated in experimental design to provide the common 
ground towards a more general behavioural theory of human actions in the use of 
common-pool resources beyond models of pay-off maximising individuals.
In doing so, this study analyses the use of common property pastures in 
Grindelwald, Switzerland. Common property pastures in Switzerland are located at 
higher altitudes, characterized by mountainous terrain. Therefore, they can only be 
used to graze cattle during the summer months. These pastures are typically managed 
and owned by public corporations. The sustainable use of common property pastures 
depends crucially on social-ecological interactions, namely appropriation (grazing 
intensity) and provision (maintenance of the ecological system and the respective 
infrastructure). Since both under- and overgrazing have adverse effects on the 
resource system, for example by reducing biodiversity or pasture productivity, total 
appropriation should remain within a sustainable yield. Furthermore, provision 
activities are needed to maintain or enhance the productivity of the resource system. 
Therefore, the sustainable use of common property pastures is analogous to common 
pool and public goods games, dependent upon the following actions of farmers:
•	 Change in livestock endowment: As livestock provides the means to 
harvest from common property pastures, farmers’ livestock endowment 
determines potential appropriation and provision levels.
•	 Appropriation: The decision whether to send animals to the local common 
property pastures or have them graze in the valley.
•	 Provision: The work or capital farmers invest to maintain common 
property pastures and the related infrastructure.
To better understand the drivers behind individual’s actions and the role of 
contextual variables for the use of common-pool resources, the study aims to 
answer the following questions:
a. What are the overall outcomes for change in livestock endowment, 
appropriation, and provision situations?
b. What are the individual attributes explaining behavioural differences?
c. How do broader contextual variables relate to the use of common property 
pastures?
d. What are the implications for the study of the commons and policy makers?
The paper is structured as follows: Firstly, we introduce the case study region and 
the institutions that influence and structure farmers’ actions. Secondly, we describe 
the conceptual framework, expanding on microsituational and contextual variables, 
and the methods to study their impact on farmers’ actions. Thirdly, we present the 
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regression models explaining change in livestock endowment, appropriation, and 
provision. Furthermore, we present the results from Q methodology, which show the 
impact of contextual variables on the sustainable use of common property pastures. 
Finally, we discuss the implications of the study for policy makers and further research.
2. The case study region
Grindelwald is a Swiss municipality in the canton of Bern covering 171 km2, located 
in the heart of the European Alps (46° 37′ 32.98″ N, 8° 2′ 0.02″ E). With seven 
corporations self-governing the use of common property pastures, Grindelwald 
offers a natural lab-like setting for the study of appropriation and provision 
behaviour analogous to common pool and public good experiments (Table 1). Due 
to its natural beauty and snow sport facilities, Grindelwald is an internationally 
known tourism resort that attracts visitors all year round. Consequently, tourism is 
the most important source of income and offers diverse employment opportunities. 
Unlike other rural regions, the local population remains stable with about 3800 
inhabitants. Besides tourism, agriculture, in particular dairy farming, manages to 
coexist with tourism, even if the number of farmers is steadily diminishing as a 
result of structural changes in the agricultural sector towards fewer, but larger sized 
farms. Since 1980, the number of farmers in Grindelwald has roughly halved from 
242 to 123 in 2010. As a consequence, the average farm size has nearly doubled 
in terms of livestock and land holdings from about 5–6 to nearly 12 livestock 
units and hectares per household. Correspondingly, land use intensity on private 
grounds has been relatively stable in terms of livestock units per hectare, but has 
been significantly intensified in terms of cuts per year.
In addition to private land holdings, common property pastures provide an 
important source of animal feed. In the summer months, when farmers produce 
hay on their private lands for wintertime, the livestock grazes on common property 
pastures, looked after by herdsmen that produce artisan cheese from the milk. The 
herdsman is either the owner of the alp’s huts himself or a seasonal employee. 
The fees farmers pay to the corporation for the care of the animals provides the 
Table 1: Institutions for regulating appropriation and provision activities (Units in brackets; 
NST = a summered livestock unit).
Corporation
Units
 Maximum 
sustainable yield 
(NST)
 Provision 
requirements 
(hours/NST)
 Penalty for defection 
on provision
(CHF/ hour)
 Reimbursement of 
extra hours of provision
(CHF/hour)
Grindel  251   8  25  22
Scheidegg  234   8  24  20
Wärgistal  167   8  25  25
Itramen  217   8  30  29
Bussalp  256  10  25  20
Bach  149   8  25  22
Holzmatten   74   8  25  25
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herdsman’s income. At the end of the season, the cheese stock is redistributed to 
the cattle owner according to the cows’ milk yield.
2.1. Property arrangements
As Figure 1 shows, the productive area of Grindelwald is divided between 7 
corporations (“Bergschaft”). The corporations separate their land into private 
property in the valley (inside the red dotted line) and common property in higher 
altitude regions (outside the red dotted line). The small corporation “Holzmatten” 
is a special case as its private lands are cut off from the common property. The large 
uninhabitable area to the southeast is the only municipal territory not assigned to a 
corporation, but instead is under the sovereignty of the canton of Bern.
2.2. Institutional arrangements
The corporations enforce institutions to regulate appropriation and provision 
activities. Ownership and leasehold of private land allows for appropriation of 
common property pastures (Naegeli-Oertle 1986; Mordasini and Tiefenbach 
2006). All sections of land in the valley have rights attached to them that allow 
for appropriation in the corresponding corporation. Therefore, the location and the 
number of private plots formally restrict a farmer’s appropriation activities. Since 
rights can be leased among locals at reasonable rates, appropriation is not restricted 
for locals, neither by the amount of rights nor by the exact location of private plots. 
Figure 1: The case study region with the seven corporations (Source: Swisstopo).
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In return for the benefits obtained from appropriation, farmers must carry 
out provision activities or face fines. Provision activities consist of tasks such as 
the cleaning of pastures from bush, shrubs and stones, the installation of fences 
and drinking troughs, the distribution of manure, and the maintenance of storage 
facilities (Mordasini and Tiefenbach 2006). As indicated in Table 1, corporations 
schedule the hours of provision activities required per appropriated unit, set out 
penalties for defection and reimburse for additional provision efforts if the budget 
allows for. Each corporation elects a monitor who sanctions defection on provision 
activities and organises additional provision activities. If defectors fail to settle fines 
within a year, they lose the right to appropriate from the common property pasture. 
The maximum sustainable yield (MSY) is governed by agricultural policy 
through summering payments. The federal government subsidises each appropriated 
unit with CHF 320 per year, paid to the corporation. The subsidy must be reinvested 
to maintain the resource system and is incrementally reduced, if actual appropriation 
levels are above 10% or below 25% of the maximum sustainable yield as defined 
for the corporation. In Switzerland, the sustainable use of common property 
pastures is currently threatened by under- rather than by overgrazing which results 
in land abandonment and regrowth of forest and shrubs and consequently reduced 
bio- and landscape diversity. Summering payments therefore provide incentives for 
the corporation to keep grazing levels within a sustainable yield, including a lower 
and upper limit. The maximum sustainable yield is measured in appropriated units 
(NST). An appropriated unit corresponds to a livestock unit (GVE) summered for 
a hundred days. A livestock unit reflects an animal’s weight and nutritional needs. 
Accordingly, a dairy cow represents one unit, young cattle of 1–2 years 0.4 units, 
cattle up to 1 year 0.2 units, sheep 0.25 units, and goat 0.2 units. 
3. Methods
3.1. The Framework for analysing behaviour of common-pool resource users
This study uses the framework for analysing behaviour in commons dilemmas 
(Poteete et al. 2010). The framework build on the social-ecological systems 
framework proposed by Ostrom (2007, 2009), which compasses three levels 
of analysis: Firstly, the action situation with the users’ behaviour; secondly, the 
microsituation with the behavioural drivers; thirdly, the broader social-ecological 
context, where the latter affects the outcome of the microsituation. 
Figure 2 displays the framework focus on the action situation. Recent extensions 
of this framework highlight the adjacency of action situations (McGinnis 2011). As 
changes in livestock endowment determine potential appropriation and appropriation 
determines provision, the observed action situations are closely linked. The actions 
result in an overall intensity of use and maintenance of the common property pasture as 
the outcome. The microsituation refers to the users’ actions driven by personal attributes 
(U1...U10). The broader social-ecological context determines the microsituation 
and consists of the second tier variables, which describe a social-ecological system 
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(Ostrom 2007). Consequently, contextual variables include external settings (S), the 
resource system (RS), the governance system (GS), the resource units (RU), users’ 
attributes on the group (A) level, and social interactions (I) (Ostrom 2007; McGinnis 
2011). As user attributes describe both group (A) and individual characteristics (U), 
they are part of the microsituation as well as of the broader context as group attributes.
3.2. Analysis of the microsituation
In the microsituation, users’ attributes are the explanatory variables and the 
actions the dependent binary variables. Data was collected in a standardised 
survey carried out in the course of three weeks in summer 2011. Ninety-five 
questionnaires were collected from 125 registered local farmers, mostly at their 
home. The interviews lasted on average 105 minutes and were conducted in 
teams of two, with a graduate student leading the interview assisted by a bachelor 
student completing the questionnaire. We interviewed at least 50% of the farmers 
in each corporation. Only 6 of the interviewed farmers were female. 
The dependent variables were cross-checked for reliability with census data 
and against information collected from the monitors in order to ensure data quality. 
Livestock endowment was compared as nominal and as binary measure. The survey 
data for appropriation in absolute numbers were extrapolated to population size and 
then compared with the census data. The measures for provision behaviour were 
also extrapolated and compared with the information from a survey conducted 
with monitors of the corporations (n=7). The main purpose of this survey was 
to gather data on land use change published in another study. In this survey, the 
monitors had to state the number of defectors for 2010 in their corporation. For 
measuring change in livestock endowment we referred to a timespan of ten years 
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Figure 2: Conceptual model for analysing behaviour in adjacent action situations. Adapted and 
modified after Poteete et al. (2010, 220–239).
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(2000–2010) as it is constrained by fixed factors. As appropriation and provision 
are seasonal decision, we referred to the behaviour in the past season (2010). 
3.2.1. Operationalization of explanatory variables
The explanatory variables consisted of second tier variables describing the users 
as proposed in the Social-Ecological Systems framework (Ostrom 2007, 2009; 
Poteete et al. 2010). Moreover, we added variable opportunity costs (U10) and 
operationalized the variables as follows:
U1-  Number of users referred to the number of farmers in the corporation. 
U2-  Socioeconomic attributes include 
 a) Age 
 b) Marital status
 c)  Successor: whether the farmer expected a family member to continue 
with the farm enterprise
 d) Area under cultivation
 e) Land use intensity for private plots
 f) Labour productivity of the farm enterprise 
U3-  History: a change in the farming strategy in the past ten years e.g. a switch 
in production standards or shift from dairy to mother cows. 
U4-  Location: geographic location of the farm. Since corporations with 
exposition North-East (Itramen, Wärgistal) are facing less demand for land 
from tourism, we expected agriculture to be more prosperous in that area. 
U5a-  Leadership referred to farmers holding a formal function within the 
corporation. 
U5b-  Entrepreneurship was measured as the pay-off per livestock unit resulting 
from the farmers’ appropriation behaviour (equation 1). 
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Farmers pay-off (p
i
) per livestock unit (e
i
) depended on their appropriation behaviour. 
For each livestock unit, the farmer decided to either send it to common property 
pastures (x
i
), or have it graze on private land (e
i
–x
i
). Each appropriated unit (c) costs 
a fee of CHF 700 to compensate herdsman for the care and milking of the animal. 
The revenue of the appropriated unit (w
i
) is the farmer’s revenue from cheese sales. 
The revenue from grazing a livestock unit on private land (a
i
) equals the revenue 
of milk sales during the period. Since the corporation receives a subsidy (s) of CHF 
320 per appropriated unit, the difference between maximum sustainable yield of 
the corporation (MSY
corp
) and the actual appropriation levels in the corporation (x
j
) 
results in foregone subsidies. We considered the forgone subsidies as costs that a 
farmer bears according to his share of the total appropriation in the corporation. 
(x
i 
/∑x
j
).
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U6a-  Norms measured the farmer’s aversion against defection on communal 
work of joint-users.
U6b-  Social capital measured the amount of voluntary labour available to the 
farmer. This included family and friends who do not live in the same 
household.
U7-  Mental model referred to the identity of the individual regarding his 
profession. That is, whether the person considered his job title “Farmer” 
or not.
U8-  Importance of resource reflected the household’s dependence on 
agricultural income. 
U9-  Technology used referred to the production standard. Integrated 
production (IP-SUISSE) is the dominant production standard in the region 
and refers to a set of production requirements stricter than conventional, 
but more lenient than for organic farming. 
U10-  Opportunity costs measured the farmer’s relinquished benefit from off-
farm income when doing agricultural work (equation 2).
 
Opportunity cost
LA
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i
i
i
i
 = *
  
(2)
Whereas (LA
i
) is the household’s work hours allocated to agricultural activities 
divided by hours spent doing off-farm activities (LO
i
), multiplied by the off-farm 
income (IO
i
) over the agricultural income (IA
i
).
3.2.2. Statistical procedure 
We calculated binary logistic regression models to predict growth in livestock 
endowment, appropriation and provision behaviour based on the users’ attributes. 
Binary logistic regression calculates the log of the odds for a dichotomous 
dependent variable by maximum likelihood (ML) estimation (Hosmer and 
Lemeshow 2000; Menard 2001) (equation 3): 
 
Logit (Y)=
−

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
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P
X X Xk k1 0 1 1 2 2
β β β β…
 
(3)
Where: 
P is the probability of the outcome for Y=1 (i.., growth in livestock endowment, 
full appropriation and provision)
b
0
 is the constant in the model
X
1
…X
k
 represent the explanatory variables 
b
1
…b
k
 represent the coefficients for the respective explanatory variables
To estimate the parameters of the model, we first calculated full models including 
all explanatory variables. As we had solely 89 data points for the variable labour 
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productivity (A2e) and 84 data points for the variable opportunity costs (A10), we 
omitted the two variables if not of significant explanatory power when calculating 
the reduced models. Thirdly, we estimated the parameters for the reduced 
models by maximum likelihood. The reduced models were selected by Bayesian 
Information criterion (BIC). Test statistics included for all models a non-significant 
Pearson Chi-squared, and significant Chi-squared tests. Lastly, we calculated 
standardised beta weights based on the mean of the predicted probability and the 
standard deviation of x
1
…x
k (King 2007). The standardised beta transformed the 
coefficients into “standard deviation units” that allowed for scale-free comparison 
of binary and nominal variables (Menard 2004). The analysis was performed with 
the software package SPSS, Version 20.
3.3. Analysis of the broader contextual variables
We then applied a Q method approach to analyse the impact of contextual variables 
on the ecological, economic, and social sustainability of the social-ecological 
system. Originating in psychology, this method has been applied to a variety of 
social-ecological problems aiming to develop detailed portraits about people’s 
perspectives on a given problem (Swaffield and Fairweather 1996; Paula 2006; 
Swedeen 2006; Doody et al. 2009). As the local farmers were deemed to have 
the best knowledge about the way contextual variables affect the use of common 
property pastures, Q methodology was chosen to extract that knowledge by means 
of a five-step procedure.
i. Problem definition: Based on literature review and explorative 
interviews, we identified 34contextual variables that potentially 
affect the use of common property pastures. We identified 9 variables 
describing the external setting (S), 10 variables for the local governance 
system (GS), 3 for the resource system, 2 for the resource units (RU), 
5 for interactions (I), and another 5 describing the group attributes of 
the users (A). 
ii. Formulation of statements and definition of the sorting scheme: We used 
contextual variables instead of normative statements and decided that 
farmers should group the variables on a scale according to their perceived 
impact on the sustainable use of common property pastures. The scale 
ranged from +4 to −4, with the most positive impact at +4 and the least 
positive impact at −4 (Table 2).
iii. Selection of subjects: For our purpose, sampling included the people best 
informed and most affected by the problem under concern (Rajé 2007). 
Thus, we selected the seven monitors and four additional farmers for 
participation. 
iv. The sorting procedure (Q sorting): Before sorting, we asked farmers to 
divide statements into three piles according to their impact on the use 
of common property pastures; one with variables considered to have a 
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positive impact, one with variables considered to have a negative impact, 
and one with neutral variables. We simply asked farmers to evaluate 
whether the variables have a positive or negative or neutral impact on 
the use of common property pastures instead of mentioning sustainability. 
This pre-sorting mostly resulted in unequally distributed piles. Farmers 
then had to rank the statements on the scheme (Q sorting). During sorting, 
we asked farmers to comment on the reasoning for the placement which 
was recorded. At the end of sorting, farmers were given the opportunity to 
reflect on their choices and to reallocate variables. In order to qualitatively 
understand the impact of the variables on the different sustainability 
dimensions and on the functioning of the overall social-ecological system, 
we finally discussed sorting with the farmers. We then photographed the 
Q sorts and computed them later on.
v. Factor analysis and interpretation of results: We analysed the collected 
samples using the standard PQ Method software, Version 2.31. We 
calculated the mean z-scores for each statement and the corresponding 
rank to represent the aggregate view. Additionally we conducted a 
principal component analysis that generated 8 factors of which 4 had an 
Eigenvalue bigger than 1. As all subjects loaded significantly on one of the 
two factors with the highest Eigenvalues, we considered these two factors 
for Varimax rotation, which finally displayed the two most contrasting 
views (Fairweather and Swaffield 2001; Paula 2006).
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive statistics of the microsituation
Table 3 presents the measures for the dependent variables by corporation. Farmers 
with increasing livestock endowment outweighed farmers with decreasing 
endowment. The majority of farmers appropriated their entire endowment. Among 
the farmers with reduced appropriation strategy, nine farmers didn’t appropriate at 
all and were therefore exempt from provision duties. The 86 farmers with provision 
duties showed strong tendencies towards full accomplishment of provision. On 
an aggregate level, all corporations achieved sustainable appropriation levels in 
terms of compliance with the range of state defined sustainable yields (75%−110% 
of optimal yield). The most intensive appropriation levels were observed in the 
Table 2: Q sorting scheme.
Q sorting scheme  Least positive impact   Most positive impact
Statement ranking  −4  −3  −2 −1 0  1  2  3  4
Number of statements 2  3  4   5 6  5  4  3  2
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corporation Scheidegg with 107% of maximum sustainable yield and lowest for 
Bach with 82% of maximum sustainable yield. Since no corporation showed 
a serious amount of defectors, overall provision activities are very close to the 
institutionally determined maximum. Therefore, both actions can be considered 
ecologically sustainable.
As indicated by the Cronbach’s-α, survey data show very good to satisfying 
reliability for dependent variables if compared with census or respectively 
monitors information. Livestock endowment ideally matches census data 
if coded as binary. However, our sample shows a nominal increase in total 
livestock endowment by 9%, while the census shows a reduction of 8% from 
2000 to 2010. Therefore, farmers with growing livestock endowment are slightly 
over-represented in the sample. The comparison of appropriation data with the 
census also shows good reliability with Cronbach’s-α at 0.874. The provision 
data shows lower reliability with Cronbach’s-α at 0.723, as monitors indicated 
15 defectors, whilst our sample included six. The reason for the deviation is 
that our sample includes local farmers only while the monitors also referred to 
8–10 external farmers, which, according to monitors, are more likely to defect 
on provision activities. 
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics for farmers’ attributes considered in 
the regression models. Farmers were on average 51.6 years old (U2a) with a mean 
cultivated area (U2c) of nearly 12 hectares. Typically, farmers held one livestock 
unit per hectare (U2d). According to the farm size index (SAK), a farm of this 
size can be managed by one person. The mean value for labour productivity 
(U2e) indicates that it took in fact two persons to run the farm, including the 
work of partners and voluntary labourers. With regard to family structure, 
most farmers were married (U2b) and often counted on voluntary labour (U6b) 
provided by their own children, grandparents, or neighbours but rarely expected 
family succession (U2f). Importance of resource (U8) shows that most farming 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for dependent variables listed per corporation.
Corporation  Livestock endowment  Appropriation  Provision
Reduced Growing Reduced Full Reduced Full
Grindel   3   9   3   9  2   9
Scheidegg   7   8   7   8  2  12
Wärgistal   3   7   2   8  0   9
Itramen   7  11  10   8  0  18
Bussalp   9  12  10  11  1  19
Bach   6   4   3   7  1   8
Holzmatten   8   1   4   5  0   5
Total
(%)
 43
(45%)
 52
(55%)
 39
(41%)
 56
(59%)
 6
(7%)
 80
(93%)
Cronbachs-a 0.958  0.874  0.723
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households substantially relied on off-farm income and no household relied 
solely on agricultural income. With regard to their pay-off (U5b), farmers differed 
widely, as the function allows for negative values. Farmers that appropriated 
non-milked animals or used a substantial amount of the cheese for their own 
consumption did not cover the costs of their appropriation decisions. The variable 
importance of resources shows that farmers in the region have good off-farm 
income opportunities. On average, their earnings per hour off-farm work triple 
the earnings from agricultural work. The sample also includes 11 retired farmers 
that have no opportunity costs (U10) for farming activities.
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for explanatory variables.
Farmers’ attributes Description  N Mean SD
U1- Number of 
users
Number of farmers in the corporation to which the 
farmer belongs
 94 21.45 4.73
U2- Socioeconomic 
attributes of users
a) Age of farmer – Nominal (years)  95 51.62 12.28
b) Marital status – Binary variable. Value 1 if farmer 
is married
 95 0.75 0.44
c) Area under cultivation – Nominal (ha)  94 11.93 7.84
d) Land use intensity for private plots – Nominal 
(GVE/ha)
 95 0.98 0.37
e) Labour productivity – Effective working hours / 
work time needed according to farm size index 
(SAK)
 89 0.5 0.29
f) Successor – Binary variable. Value 1 if farmer 
thinks that there will be a successor in the family 
willing to continue with the farm business.
 95 0.27 0.45
U3- History of use History – Binary variable. Value 1 if farmer has changed 
the farming strategy within past 10 years.
95 0.67 0.47
U4- Location Location – Binary variable. Value 1 if the farmer is 
located exposition North-East.
 94 0.31 0.46
U5- Leadership/ 
entrepreneurship
a) Leadership – Binary Variable. Value 1 if the farmer 
has a formal function within the corporation
 95 0.32 0.47
b) Pay-off per GVE during summering season – 
Nominal variable (CHF)
 94 149.1 533.6
U6a- Norms Norms – Binary variable. Value 1 if the farmer dislikes 
other farmers avoiding communal work and paying 
fines instead.
 94 0.45 0.5
U6b- Social capital Social capital – Percentage of voluntary labour available 
to the farmer when needed (excluding their partners).
95 64.16 56.43
U7- Mental models Mental model – Binary variable. Value one if the farmer 
considers his job title to be “Farmer”.
 94 0.64 0.48
U8- Importance of 
resource
Importance of resource – Share of agricultural income 
in proportion to total household income 
 95 36.78 29.46
U9- Technology 
used
Technology – Binary variable. Value 1 if the farmer 
produces according to IP standards.
 95 0.68 0.47
U10- Opportunity 
costs
Opportunity costs – Share of agricultural working hours 
in relation to total working hours divided by the share of 
agricultural income in proportion to total income.
 84 2.92 3.26
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4.2. Regression model for change in livestock endowment
Table 5 lists variables significantly associated with change in livestock endowment. 
Considering the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), the model with 4 variables 
offers the best fit to the data in relation to the variables included. The b-values 
reveal positive effects for marital status (U2b) and area (U2c), and negative effects 
for age (U2a) and norms (U6a) on the odds of increasing livestock endowment. 
The standardised β-values display the actual effect of the variables in the model, 
irrespective of scale. 
As indicated by the standardised b, area is the strongest predictor for change in 
livestock endowment. With every additional hectare of cultivated area (U2c), the 
odds for livestock growth increased by 17.5%. This suggests that size conditions 
growth and those farmers with larger sized farms are more likely to attempt to 
realise economies of scale than colleagues with smaller landholdings.
Age proved to be the second best predictor for change in livestock endowment, 
as an additional year of life reduced the odds for livestock growth by 7.8%. This 
relationship might be partly linked to farmers’ fitness and partly to policies. As 
age (U2a) is negatively correlated with labour productivity (U2e), decreasing 
physical abilities possibly forced some farmers’ to reduce livestock endowment. 
Additionally, farmers receive substantial direct payments until retirement age. 
This suggests that farmers’ willingness to invest in factors constraining livestock 
endowment such as barn capacity or land decreases as they approach retirement 
age. The main reason might be that without direct payments, such investments are 
likely to become untenable.
Table 5: Estimated and standardised b-coefficients for binary logistic regression models 
predicting change in livestock endowment. Standard errors (se) in brackets and significance 
levels p are indicated by asterisk (99%***, 95%**, 90%*).
Explanatory
Variable
 β
(se)
 βs
U2a- Age  −0.081  −0.230***
 (0.026)  
U2b- Marital status 1.602  0.163**
 (0.645)  
U2c- Area  0.161  0.288***
 (0.048)  
U6a- Norms  −1.354  −0.158**
 (0.576) 
Constant  2.358  
 (1.339) 
N  94  
Pseudo R2 (NK)  0.514  
−2LL  82.6  
BIC  105.2  
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Growth in livestock endowment was also associated with marital status 
(U2b). For married farmers, the odds for endowment growth increased 4 times. 
This suggests that partnership facilitates dealing with the extra workload resulting 
from additional livestock. Rather surprisingly, norms (U6a) which display 
positive attitude towards the fulfilment of provision activities decreased the odds 
for endowment growth by a factor of 0.24. This suggests that with growth in 
endowment, the concern for the maintenance of common property decreases. 
4.3. Regression model for appropriation behaviour
Table 6 presents the variables significantly associated with appropriation 
behaviour. The b-values show a positive association of marital status (U2b) and 
norms (U6a) and negative association of area (U2c) and leadership (U5a) with 
full appropriation. As displayed by the standardised beta weights, norms (U6a) 
are the best predictor for appropriation behaviour followed by leadership (U5a), 
marital status (U2b), and area (U2c).
We found the strongest association to be between norms (U6a) and 
appropriation behaviour. Hence, farmers with aversion against defection on 
communal work had 2.4 times higher odds for appropriating all their livestock 
which points to self-interest. A farmer appropriating all his livestock is likely 
to be more concerned about the state of the resource and therefore also cares 
about joint-users fulfilling their provision activities. Leadership attributes (U5a) 
assigned to farmers with formal function in a corporation reduced the odds 
for full appropriation by a factor of 0.38. As farmers communicated, reduced 
Table 6: Estimated and standardised b-coefficients for binary logistic regression models 
predicting appropriation. Standard error (se) in brackets, significance levels indicated by 
asterisk (99%***, 95%**, 90%*)
Explanatory
Variable
 β
(se)
 βs
U2b- Marital status  0.916  0.096*
 (0.522)  
U2c- Area  −0.038  −0.073*
 (0.032)  
U5a- Leadership  −0.945  −0.106*
 (0.524)  
U6a- Norms  1.253  0.150***
 (0.484) 
Constant  −0.045  
 (0.599) 
N  93  
Pseudo R2 (NK)  0.220  
−2LL  109.0  
BIC  131.6  
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Table 7: Estimated and standardised b-coefficients for binary logistic regression models 
predicting provision behaviour. Standard error (se) in brackets, significance levels indicated by 
asterisk (99%***, 95%**, 90%*)
Explanatory
Variable
 β
(se)
 βs
A2c- Area  −0.213  −0.127**
 (0.116)  
A5b-Pay-off  0.003  0.108**
 (0.001)  
A8-Importance of resource 0.048  0.103*
 (0.027)  
Constant  3.734  
 (1.223) 
N  86  
Pseudo R2 (NK)  0.248  
−2LL  34.6  
BIC  52.4  
appropriation lessens workload. In this case, mostly younger cattle are kept in 
the valley to graze unproductive pastures for which mowing is labour intensive. 
Possible explanations would therefore be that leaders cultivated more marginal 
pastures or tended to have younger animals.
Socio-economic attributes such as marital status (U2b) and area (U2c) were also 
significantly associated with appropriation behaviour. Married farmers were 1.5 
times more likely to appropriate their full endowment, while an additional hectare 
of area leads to a decrease in the odds of full appropriation by 3.7%. The reasoning 
for both variables again might point to the role of workload. When hay collection 
and provision duties can be split among couples during peak times, appropriation 
behaviour of married farmers might be less determined by labour scarcity. The 
need to reduce workload might also increase with area (U2c), leading farmers with 
larger land holdings to reduce appropriation and concentrate on private lands.
4.4. Regression model for provision behaviour
Table 7 displays the reduced model for provision behaviour. The models entail 
fewer cases, as farmers without appropriation were exempt from provision 
activities. The uneven distribution of the dependent variable explains larger 
standard errors. Stepwise reduction points to area (U2c), followed by pay-off 
(A5b), and importance of resource (A8) as the most important predictors. 
The strongest association existed between area (U2c) and provision behaviour. 
That is an increase in land holding by an additional hectare reduced the odds 
of full provision by 19.2%. The negative effect of land holding on provision 
suggests that extra workload resulting from additional plots prevents farmers 
from accomplishing their provision duties. Regarding the beta coefficient, an 
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additional Swiss franc in pay-off (U5b) increased the odds of full provision by 
0.3%. Although this seems negligible, the standardised coefficient illustrates that 
with a coarser scale, the effect would have become more pronounced. Moreover, 
importance of resource shows that an increase in agricultural income of 1% 
compared to non-agricultural income, increased the odds of full provision by 
4.9%. The positive association of pay-off (U5b) and importance of resource (A8) 
with full provision suggests a strong positive relationship between the benefits 
obtained from a resource and farmers’ willingness to maintain it. 
4.5. The impact of contextual variables on the sustainable use of common 
property pastures
Table 8 shows the impact of contextual variables on the sustainable use of 
common property pastures in terms of ecological, economic, and social outcomes. 
The Mean value represents the overall sample, while Factor A and B represent 
the most distinguishing views. According to the overall sample, sustainability is 
promoted in particular through the functioning of the subsystems resource units 
(RU) and to a lesser extent by group attributes (A). The subsystem challenging 
sustainability includes the external settings (S), the resource system (RS), and 
interactions (I). The role of the governance system (GS) is neutral. 
The mean value for the external settings reflects discontent with agricultural 
policies. Both government resource polices (S5) and market incentives (S6) 
achieve negative scores. The most problematic issues include dependence on direct 
payments, regulations for obtaining them and the milk price. In summary, farmers 
see government support and the relevant regulations as threatening entrepreneurial 
freedom and would instead appreciate stronger market incentives. Among 
government policies, only summering payments contribute to sustainability and 
provide financial resources to the corporation for the maintenance of the resource 
system. The mean value for income opportunities in the tourism sector shows the 
importance of off-farm income for farmers’ livelihoods. Accordingly, tourism 
rather enables than competes with farming, even though in the resource system 
(RS) increasing demand for building sites, reduces available productive agricultural 
land. Within the governance system (GS), the local constitutional rules (GS7) are 
considered to have a positive impact, including the recent opening of common 
property pastures to non-local users. Thus, the presence of foreign cattle is not 
a desired development, but a necessary response to decreasing local livestock. 
Furthermore, the agricultural sector faces decreasing standing in municipal politics.
Resource units (RU) achieve the highest scores, as their economic value (RU4) 
provides incentives for the use of common property pastures. Particularly the 
added value in the production of alpine cheese compared to milk sales motivates 
appropriation. The main reason for the high added value of alpine cheese is 
sales opportunities resulting from the demand strengthened by the local tourism 
sector. Besides high scores for the resource units, users’ group attributes (A) also 
achieved a slightly positive score. Surprisingly, interviewees consider the group 
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Table 8: Normalised factor scores for contextual variables on ordinal scale ranging from +4 
indicating the most positive impact to −4 indicating the least positive impact of the variables on 
the sustainable use of common property pasture. The Mean values refer to the overall sample, 
while Factors A and B display the most distinguishing views. Asterisks mark the variables 
distinguishing Factors at a significance of 99%. Values for subsystems and second tier variables 
are calculated by means of the referring statements.
Contextual variables Normalised scores
Mean Factor A Factor B
External Settings (S) −0.7 −0.7 −0.1
S5- Government resource policies −0.7 −0.2 0
Dependence on agricultural income* −1 −3 4
Direct payments tied to livestock* −1 2 −2
Direct payments tied to private land* 0 0 3
Ecological regulations for obtaining direct payments* −3 0 −4
Rules for the obtainment of summering payments* −1 −3 1
Summering payments* 2 3 −2
S6- Market incentives −0.7 −1.7 −0.3
Off-farm income opportunities in the local tourism sector 4 3 2
Dependence upon direct payments* −4 −4 0
Milk price −2 −4 −3
Resource System (RS) −0.3 −0.7 −0.7
RS3- Size of resource system −0.5 −1 −1.5
Availability of agricultural area in the valley −2 −1 −2
Area of the corporation 1 −1 −1
RS5- Productivity of system
Quality of common property pastures 0 0 1
Governance System (GS) 0 0.3 0.4
GS3- Network structure −0.7 1 1.3
Recognition of agriculture by local politics −3 −1 −1
Reimbursements of railway operators to the corporations 0 2 2
Solidarity between the corporations 1 2 3
GS4- Property rights system −0.7 −0.3 −0.7
Flexibility and lease of use rights* 0 −2 1
Amount of use rights in relation to the stock of animals present in the valley −2 1 0
Attachment of use rights to private parcels in the valley* 0 0 −3
GS5- Operational rules 0.3 −0.3 −0.7
Hours of communal work to be conducted 2 1 1
Opening of the common property pastures for foreign cattle* 3 0 −2
Presence of foreign cattle on the common property pastures −4 −2 −1
GS7- Constitutional rules
Rules of the local constitution* 3 2 4
Resource Units (RU) 3.5 4 1
RU4- Economic value 3.5 4 1
Added value of alpine cheese* 4 4 2
Marketing and sales opportunities* 3 4 0
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Contextual variables Normalised scores
Mean Factor A Factor B
Group attributes of Users (A) 0.4 0.4 −1.2
A1- Number of users 1 1 −1
Number of farmers* 2 1 −1
Share of locally born and raised farmers* −1 0 −1
A5- Leadership/entrepreneurship 1 2 0
Farmers innovative abilities and entrepreneurship 1 1 0
Leadership within the corporation 1 3 0
A7- Knowledge of SES
Know-how of the employees on the Alp* −1 −3 −1
Interactions (I) −0.4 −1 0.6
I3- Deliberation process 0 −2 0
Common values and goals for administering corporations*
I4- Conflicts among user −2 −2 3
Negotiability of conflicts on the local level*
I5- Investment activities 1.5 0 1.5
The amount of resources invested into the infrastructure 2 1 2
Willingness to fulfil provision requirements* 1 −1 1
I7- Self-organizing activities
Cohesion and solidarity among the farmers* −3 −1 −3
Table 8:  Continued
of farmers to be large enough, although the number of farmers (A1) is constantly 
decreasing. Interactions (I) were valued slightly negatively. Farmers complained 
of solidarity among themselves (I3), negotiability of conflicts (I4), cohesion (I7), 
and, while infrastructural investments (I5) and willingness to fulfil provision 
activities achieved positive scores.
4.5.1. Disagreement regarding the impact of contextual variables
As indicated by Factors A and B in Table 8, we identified two groups of farmers with 
different perceptions regarding the role of contextual factors for the sustainable use 
of common property pastures. Factor A represents a liberal market-oriented view 
and Factor B represents a traditional view. Their views differ mostly with regard 
to the functioning of the government’s resource policies (S5) and interactions (I). 
The liberal viewpoint is closer to the overall sample with an Eigenvalue of 2.89 
and seven people loading on it. The traditionalist view achieves an Eigenvalue of 
2 with four people loading on it. 
The liberal viewpoint displays preferences for market incentives (S6) resulting 
from interrelations with tourism accompanied by scepticism against agricultural 
policies. Accordingly, the tourism sector supports local demand for alpine products 
and off-farm income opportunities to reduce dependence on agricultural income and 
direct payments. Overall, the liberal viewpoint claims that an external setting (S), 
which offers more room for market forces and entrepreneurial freedom enhances 
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the sustainable use of common property pastures. The estimation of the economic 
value of resource units (RS) as incentives for the sustainable use of common 
property pastures underlines the market-oriented perspective. According to their 
perception, higher returns for alpine products determines farmers’ willingness to 
use and maintain the Alps sustainably and was considered the best means to prevent 
land abandonment. In contrast, increasing governmental regulations cause higher 
transaction costs with governmental agencies, for example through controls, and 
furthermore requires unproductive investments to meet the prescribed standards, 
which are often considered bureaucratic burdens that interfere with sustainable 
traditional practices. In accordance with preferences for market incentives, the 
liberals show less concern over the presence of foreign cattle, but more concern 
over interactions (I) among farmers. Particularly common values (I3) and goals in 
negotiating affairs in the corporations and the negotiability of conflicts (I4) on the 
local level achieve negative scores. Such conflicts arise mostly over the organisation 
of sales activities or the management of the resource system in co-existence with 
tourism. The latter includes questions such as whether to allow tourist infrastructure 
such as ponds, artificial snow production or new trails and restaurants.
In contrast to the liberal view, the traditional view shows preferences for a 
closed agricultural system and livelihood focused on income from agriculture. The 
traditionalist viewpoint considers a dependence on agricultural income and direct 
payments tied to private plots to foster the sustainable use of common property 
pastures. Although the traditionalists are critical about the regulations for obtaining 
direct payments, they acknowledge that government support secures agricultural 
livelihoods. According to the traditional view, an external setting (S) that relies 
on heavy government support, enables agricultural livelihoods and thus promotes 
the sustainable use of common property pastures. Furthermore, traditionalists 
prefer a closed self-organised system as represented by the strong positive value of 
constitutional rules (GS7) and the possibility of leasing use rights among farmers. 
In terms of opening the system, traditionalists are concerned about the presence of 
foreign cattle and the number of farmers and their origin. They are concerned that 
the opening of the system might endanger the local cohesion and self-organisation. 
5. Discussion
The behaviour of individuals in social dilemmas is a central puzzle in the study of 
the commons (Poteete et al. 2010; Anderies et al. 2011). Since information about 
behavioural drivers derives mostly from experimental research, this study aims 
to complement experimental findings with field observations from Grindelwald, 
Switzerland. In doing so, we estimated regression models from survey data to 
predict the behaviour of alpine farmers regarding change in livestock endowment, 
appropriation, and provision. Data showed that a slight majority of farmers (55%) 
increased endowment and applied full appropriation strategy (59%). Completion 
of provision activities was remarkably high (93%). 
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As summarised in Table 9, behaviour depended significantly on diverse user 
attributes. Socio-economic attributes, in particular age (U2a), marital status 
(U2b), and area (U2c), explained farmers’ changes in livestock endowment. The 
role of age and marital status is best explained by their effect on work organisation, 
as youth and partnership allow the handling of larger endowments. Furthermore, 
the variable area suggests that farm size itself is the strongest predictor for 
endowment growth. The key role of area and also age in determining farm 
development is widely confirmed in the literature and indicates structural change 
towards fewer but larger sized farms (Baur 1999; Weiss 1999; Lauber et al. 
2008). Other variables found to be associated with farm development such as 
presence of a successor (Potter and Lobley 1996; Mann 2003), opportunity costs, 
and labour productivity (Schmitt 1992), did not have a significant effect upon 
livestock endowment in the study region. Furthermore, the negative association 
of area with appropriation and particularly with provision behaviour suggests 
that farmers with larger sized farms concentrate labour on private property and 
reduce the use of common property. Likewise, farmers with larger land holdings 
are more likely to defect. As discussed, reduced appropriation reduces workload 
in two ways. Firstly, marginal private pastures are grazed by animals instead 
of labour intensive hay production. Secondly, lower appropriation reduces 
provision requirements.
Appropriation behaviour showed the strongest association with norms 
(U6a) – measured as farmers’ aversion against defection on provision, assuming 
individuals with a full appropriation strategy are more concerned about the 
Table 9: Direction of significant effects of individuals attributes on behavior in social dilemmas 
as calculated by binary logistic regression (99%***, 95%**, 90%*). Additionally, the effects 
of contextual variables on the sustainable use of common property pastures as calculated 
by Q Method are indicated by arrows (moderate negative; neutral; moderate positive; 
positive)
Method
Variables
 
 
Regression Models  
 
Q Method
Livestock endowment  Appropriation  Provision Outcomes
U2a- Age  (−)***    
U2b- Marital status  (+)**  (+)*   
U2c- Area  (+)***  (−)*  (−)**  
U5a- Leadership   (−)*   
U5b- Pay-off    (+)**  
U6a- Norms  (−)**  (+)***   
U8- Importance of resource    (+)*  
S- External setting     
RS- Resource system     
GS- Governance system      
RU- Resource units      
A- Group attributes of users     
I- Interactions     
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productivity of the resource and consequently hold stronger norms towards 
provision fulfilment. Self-interest might equally explain the association of pay-
off (U5b) and the importance of resource with full provision behaviour. Hence, 
the willingness of individuals to maintain a common-pool resource increases the 
more an individual relies on the resource for his livelihood and the higher the 
generated pay-offs. 
To assess the impact of contextual variables on the sustainable use of common 
property pastures, we applied Q methodology. Among the contextual variables, 
the value of resource units (RU4) was considered to have the most positive impact 
on the sustainability of common property pastures. As the economic value affects 
an individual’s pay-off ability, we have reason to assume that a close positive 
relationship exists between the value of resource units and the fulfilment of 
provision activities. Tourism helps strengthening local demand and the economic 
value of resource units, and thus pay-offs. Furthermore, tourism allows for 
livelihoods with balanced agricultural and off-farm activities reducing the need to 
increase farm size, which is assumed to reduce use and maintenance of common 
property pastures. With regard to the perception of external settings (S), farmers 
differed significantly in their views. A liberalist viewpoint was identified that 
favours price incentives over governmental support, while the traditional view 
assumes that sustainability of common property pastures is promoted by strong 
governmental support securing agriculture-based livelihoods.
5.1. Implications for policy makers
The study provides further evidence that structural change towards fewer but 
larger sized farms results in decreasing use and maintenance of common property 
pastures (Gellrich et al. 2007). As average farm size increases, farmers reduce 
appropriation levels, resulting in an overall reduction of provision activities. 
Furthermore, the defection rate is likely to increase as farms grow bigger. To 
balance the reduced use resulting from structural change, we see three major policy 
options: (i) within the local governance system (GS), a further opening of the 
pastures and active acquisition of cattle from the lowlands; (ii) regarding external 
settings (S), stronger incentives for summering particularly of younger cattle; and 
(iii) policies for increasing the value of resource units. The further opening of 
pastures is likely to have some undesirable consequences. As the monitors stated, 
external users are more likely to defect on communal work and pay fines instead. 
This might lead to situations, where appropriators and maintenance providers 
become two separate groups, with external appropriators paying fees for defection 
on provision that might be used by the corporation to reimburse local farmers for 
provision. It is likely that both the quantity and quality of provision activities 
might then decrease as incentives, for provision are closely linked to appropriation 
levels. Furthermore, the Q method results for the governance system (GS) showed 
that farmers consider the presence of foreign cattle an undesirable, but necessary, 
as foreign cattle is less suitable to alpine conditions. Therefore, policies should 
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target incentives to foster the appropriation of local cattle with focus on younger 
cattle in particular, which are often left grazing in the valley. Furthermore, the 
maintenance of common property pastures depends on farmers’ pay-offs, which 
are determined by the economic value of resource units. As a consequence, 
marketing tools for alpine dairy products should be considered as a policy option. 
A clear communication of the non-industrial production process and of the added 
cultural and ecological values potentially secures demand and prices for alpine 
products which are crucial for the sustainable use of common property pastures.
5.2 Implications for the study of the commons
5.2.1. Variables associates with appropriation and provision behaviour
Ostrom identifies six user attributes (U1, U2, U5, U6, U7, U8) that are potentially 
important for the sustainability of social-ecological systems (Ostrom 2009; 
Poteete et al. 2010). Although these variables relate to successful self-organisation 
of groups, our study expands on how the variables promote sustainable 
interaction of users with the ecological system. Along the lines of the framework, 
entrepreneurial attributes (U5), norms (U6) and importance of resource (U8) 
were central behavioural drivers in our study that relate to Ostrom’s findings. 
According to Ostrom, presence of leaders and entrepreneurship in a group 
facilitates self-organisation; our study shows that entrepreneurship has a positive 
impact on fulfilment of provision duties, while leaders (defined as those who hold 
a formal function in a corporation) are more likely to apply reduced appropriating 
strategies. The latter is mostly context-specific, as leaders tend to be those with 
a long regional family tradition who own the ancient “Vorsassen” located on the 
border to common property; these private plots are generally less productive 
and difficult to mow and thus particularly suited for grazing younger animals. 
Furthermore, Ostrom shows that groups with shared moral and ethical norms 
face lower transaction costs for self-organisation. Our study reveals that with 
higher appropriation levels, users develop stronger norms for the maintenance 
of the resource which suggests that they show more commitment to leading self-
organising and monitoring activities. Furthermore, users depending on a resource 
for their livelihood are more willing to invest in the maintenance of the resource, 
which is shown in the provision model. In contrast to the Ostrom framework, the 
variables number of users (U1) and mental models (U7) had no significant impact 
in our case. This is probably due to the heterogeneous group size of corporations 
and the fact that the mental model, which measured the farmers’ identity, does 
not significantly affect farmers’ actions. We expected that individuals, who define 
farming as their main occupation, are more likely to run growing enterprises, 
show higher appropriation and provision levels, which proved not to be the 
case. Recent studies propose an understanding of mental models as the inner 
representation of the external world (Jones et al. 2011). Q-methodology is a valid 
tool to elaborate on individuals’ mental models. Unfortunately, our study design 
does not allow us to draw conclusions on how the perception of the functioning 
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of the social-ecological system (e.g. liberalist view) relates to actual behaviour. 
Nevertheless, mental models constitute a central part in the study of social-
ecological interactions that can be equally addressed in experimental research 
(Lynam et al. 2012). Similarly, the variable opportunity costs of farming (U10) 
that we added to the framework did not significantly affect behaviour. 
5.2.2. Implications for commonpool and public good experiments
The study provides implications for future experimental research exploring 
appropriation and provision problems. Most importantly, our findings suggest 
that appropriation and provision behaviour is closely linked through norms 
(U6a) and pay-offs (U5b). People with higher appropriation levels hold stronger 
norms regarding the provision fulfilment of joint users. Thus, we hypothesise 
that individuals with higher appropriation levels are more willing to invest in the 
monitoring and sanctioning of provision defectors in public good experiments. 
Experiments have shown that sanctioning possibilities increase corporation (Falk 
et al. 2002; Nikiforakis and Normann 2008), that individuals willingness to invest 
in sanctioning is best explained through inequality aversion (Fehr and Gächter 
2000) and that even externals who do not benefit from public good provision 
make substantial investment for punishing defectors (Fehr and Fischbacher 
2004). Nevertheless sanctioning has not been interpreted as an altruistic act 
to increase common welfare, but rather rooted in the desire to invoke costs 
on defectors (Bowles and Gintis 2002). Our results suggest that self-interest 
might be of central importance for sanctioning behaviour as those with highest 
appropriation rates hold the strongest norms regarding the corporation of joint 
users for the provision of public goods. Therefore, future experiments might test 
if individuals’ investment levels are indeed positively associated with higher 
willingness to punish defectors in public goods games. Furthermore, the study 
suggests that people with higher pay-offs from appropriation will make higher 
investments into the public good. This finding relates to public good experiments, 
where investments increase with marginal returns (Isaac and Walker 1988; Isaac 
et al. 1994; Janssen and Ostrom 2006) but is contrasted by a study showing that 
individuals with higher income contribute less (Chan et al. 1996). Therefore, 
future experiments might consider linking common-pool experiments with public 
good experiments to test, if individuals with higher appropriation pay-off make 
larger investments into the public good.
5.2.3. Methodological challenges in linking behaviour to context
As this study observed behaviour for a single period, longitudinal studies are 
needed to observe the behaviour repeatedly and relate it to actions of joint users. 
Such studies will allow the inclusion of variables such as reciprocity, which is 
considered crucial for behaviour in experimental studies (Rustagi et al. 2010; 
Gächter and Thöni 2011) and whether predicted patterns of strategies towards 
concentration of either full or cero contribution (Janssen and Ahn 2006) can be 
equally observed in the field. Furthermore, additional studies on individuals’ 
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behaviours are needed in the context of other common-pool resources to further 
theorise the interplay of microsituational and contextual variables and the way they 
determine behaviour. In our study, individuals are guided by robust institutions 
(Baur and Binder 2013). It might well be that our findings do not apply to a social-
ecological context, where incentive structures are entirely different, in particular 
in settings, where over-exploitation and under-provision are dominant modes of 
behaviour. Therefore, it remains a methodological challenge to control for the 
impact of contextual variables on behaviour. Q methodology was used in this 
study to elaborate on the role of different contextual variables and on the different 
dimensions of sustainability of the SES. Given the notion of Q methodology that 
the number of distinct viewpoints on a given topic is limited (Van Exel and de 
Graaf 2005), we decided to extract knowledge from the people best informed 
using a rather small sample. The sharp distinction between the two views that we 
found as confirmed by the individuals’ factor loadings increases confidence that 
the results from Q method best represent the farmers’ views. 
Unfortunately, the study design does not reveal how differences in the perception 
of contextual variables link to the observed behaviour on the individual level as 
this would require a larger sample of the q method to gather more data points for 
the individuals in order to make reliable predictions. Future studies adopting the 
same combination of methods would potentially benefit from including not only 
resource users, but also external experts on the topic from governmental, NGO 
or science for sampling. Experts might provide different perspectives that would 
allow distinguishing between farmers and experts opinions more clearly.
6. Conclusion
This study offers explanations about the way personal attributes affect 
individuals’ use of common-pool resources. It thus elaborates on the general 
framework of studying social-ecological systems and laboratory experiments, 
which simulate appropriation and provision problems. Our findings suggest that 
socio-economic attributes (U2) determine the endowment of resource users and 
provision activities. Norms (U6a) and pay-off (U5b) determined appropriation 
and provision behaviour. The analysis shows that individuals, who appropriate 
intensely, hold stronger norms towards maintaining the resource stock and as 
a result would be probably more willing to invest in the punishment of free-
riders. In turn, it was shown that the higher an individual’s economic benefit 
generated from appropriation, the less likely a user is to defect on externally 
assigned provision duties for maintaining the resource stock and the physical 
infrastructure. In summary, the study reveals that those individuals who use 
a resource intensively and benefit most from it also have the biggest interest 
in maintaining resource productivity in the long run, and thus apply and 
enforce pro-social behaviour. The analysis of contextual variables suggests 
that this mechanism is accelerated with increasing value of resource units for 
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the management of common property pastures. This raises two questions for 
experimental research that would require linking appropriation to provision 
situations: (i) Are individuals with higher appropriation rates also more willing 
to invest in the sanctioning of provision defectors in public good situations in 
order to sustain or increase their appropriation pay-offs? (ii) Does an increase in 
an individual’s pay-offs from appropriation result in higher investments into the 
public good? If so, self-interest can be indeed considered a motivational driver 
leading to pro-social behaviour. Nevertheless, behaviour remains context-specific, 
which limits the extent to which these findings can be generalised. Behaviour is 
thus likely to vary with factors such as the quality of institutions, the type, and 
prices of the resource used, and the overall condition of the social-ecological 
system; the control for contextual factors and their effect on the associations 
of personal attributes with behaviour in field studies and experimental research 
consequently remains a central methodological challenge for the study of the 
commons.
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ABSTRACT. Open summer pastures in many Alpine regions of Switzerland have diminished over the 
past decades, as land extensification and gradual land abandonment has led to forest expansion and 
shrub encroachment. To what extent this has occurred is closely related to the individual characteristics 
of the human–environment system in any particular area. Taking the example of one case study area, 
the research presented here shows how drivers related to location and social change are shaping land 
use and land cover, and how these changes can be assessed from a sustainability perspective. As the 
trend looks set to continue, ways will need to be found to promote sustainable land use in the 
summering areas. Defining priority areas in which to prevent encroachment will require a negotiation 
process that takes into account both external and local interests.  
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1. Introduction 
Land use extensification or abandonment and related shrub and forest encroachment in formerly 
pastured areas is a new phenomenon that is becoming more and more prevalent in industrialized 
countries (see e.g. Agnoletti 2007; Lasanta et al. 2009; Chételat et al. 2013; Komac et al. 2013). This 
also applies to mountain regions in Switzerland, where the summering of livestock on Alpine pastures 
is a widespread practice. Such processes are visible in changing landscape patterns, and give an 
indication of societal transformations and complex human–environment interlinkages. Since the 7th 
century AD (Ewald & Klaus 2009: 271), and the start of population expansion into Alpine regions, 
landscapes have been modified by their users, for example by clearing forest plots for pasture land, 
which led to the diverse and often small-scale structure of the cultivated landscape of today. Especially 
in summering areas, this process of land appropriation was often accompanied by the development of 
common property regimes that frequently still govern pasture use at the regional level. But while 
deforestation was the main way of gaining agricultural land in times of land shortage, the past decades 
show a trend in the opposite direction: forest expansion and shrub encroachment have led to a 
diminishing of open summer pastures in many regions of Switzerland (see e.g. Bebi & Baur 2002; 
Gellrich 2006; Stöcklin et al. 2007). Statistics confirm that in Swiss mountain regions, forest regrowth 
between 1993/95 and 2004/2006 has taken place at a total rate of about 9% (Brändli 2007: 50), with the 
highest regrowth rates attributed to those regions that are used for summering livestock (Baur 2006: 31). 
Research has also shown that the continuous use of Alpine pastures is strongly interlinked with the 
provision of public goods such as biodiversity and landscape beauty. With pasture abandonment and 
related processes of forest encroachment, these values are said to be endangered (Baur et al. 2006: 33; 
Lehmann & Messerli 2007).  
The major drivers behind these developments are related to structural changes in the agricultural sector 
resulting from adaptation to a liberalized market and rising competition (see e.g. Stöcklin et al. 2007: 
85). These changes can be seen, among others, in the decreasing number of farms (change per year 
between 2000 and 2010 in mountain areas: –1.9%; FOAG 2011: 8, from SFOS), increased size of 
remaining farms, and a related adaptation of production and land use strategies. In many regions, this 
has led to a production focus on high-potential, easily accessible areas, and a decreased interest in 
grazing livestock on marginal Alpine summer pastures. As a result, summer pastures and related, often 
collective, usage systems face a decrease in both livestock numbers and workforce needed for pasture 
maintenance and grazing control, and raising costs of summering (see e.g. Mack et al. 2008: 277), 
which in turn again decreases demand for livestock summering. In some areas, this development has 
led to a complete abandonment of remote summer pastures (e.g. in some areas of the Swiss canton of 
Ticino or the southern Grisons) (Stöcklin et al. 2007: 54). Other areas, however, are well maintained, 
and a breakdown of the system is not expected in the near future. In view of enhancing the sustainable 
use of natural resources, it is important to obtain a better understanding of the drivers behind such 
differences; to this end, it is crucial to add localized insights to the analysis of national or larger 
regional trends.  
The research presented here takes a case study approach and aims to provide a broader understanding 
of a local human–environment system and the driving factors of land use and landscape change in 
common property Alpine pastures. It visualizes the current land cover status and outlines future trends 
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of Alpine pasture use. Furthermore, it describes the role of the current governance system in 
maintaining and reproducing the local landscape, and evaluates the local land use dynamics from a 
sustainability perspective. The article is structured as follows: We (i) characterize the current status and 
recent changes in land cover and land use in the study area, (ii) provide insights into the driving forces 
and challenges of such changes, (iii) outline future perspectives on the use of Alpine pastures, and (iv) 
discuss the current status and potential future of summer pasture use from a sustainability perspective. 
By doing this, we aim to contribute to the growing debate on pasture land extensification or 
abandonment. Contrary to intensification processes and pasture overuse and degradation, the relation 
between extensification or abandonment of common property and sustainable development has, to our 
knowledge, not been studied so far. 
  
2. Characteristics of the human–environment system in the study area 
The research presented here is based on a case study in Grindelwald, a Swiss Alpine commune popular 
with tourists. The commune is located at 1050 m asl in the Alpine zone of the Bernese Oberland, and 
has about 4000 inhabitants. The combination of well-kept agricultural landscape alongside rugged 
glaciers, rocks, and mountains is an aesthetic contrast that has attracted tourists from all over the world 
since the 19th century. These days, most of the local income is generated in the tourism sector, mainly 
by winter sports such as skiing, but also by summer outdoor activities. Agriculture, dominated by 
livestock husbandry and the production of dairy products, is responsible for the cultivation of meadows 
and pastures in the different vegetation zones of the commune, which are located between 1000 m and 
2400 m asl, depending on the seasonal cycle of transhumance. Village plots and Vorsassen (= areas of 
the lower pasturing area that is partly cut) are located in private, summer pastures in common property 
(see Figures 1a-c). For a high proportion of the 125 farming households (year 2010) in Grindelwald, 
agriculture is a side activity, which complements either a higher or lower percentage of off-farm 
income (Baur et al. unpublished manuscript).  
The governance structure of the study area can be characterized as follows: 
Internal governance: The whole area of the commune is divided into seven Alpine corporations, legal 
entities by civil code. Their right to own common natural resources such as pastures and forest is 
guaranteed (Art. 20 EG ZGB). These corporations are involved in organizing and structuring all 
collective work related to livestock herding and the use of common property summer pastures (see 
Tiefenbach & Mordasini 2006). The basic regulations of the Grindelwald corporations (German: 
Taleinungsbrief ) date back to the year 1414 and resulted from the growing independence of local 
farmers and a sustainability crisis (Nägeli 1986: 146). They are, with minor changes, still valid today 
(Taleinungsbrief – most recent version from 2002) (see Commune of Grindelwald 2002; Baur & 
Binder 2013), and regulate the use of common property summer pastures, such as access or the relation 
between lowland land tenure and the number of livestock allowed to be summered in the highlands. 
Furthermore, they are the basis for the statutes of the individual corporations, which contain further 
regulations such as the maximum stocking rate for the respective Alpine pastures or amount of 
communal work per summered cow. These regulations have for centuries successfully prevented the 
overuse of pastures.  
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External governance: In view of a sustainable and comprehensive use of the summering areas (FOAG 
2012a), the summering of livestock has since 1980 been supported by government subsidies. These 
subsidies are linked to farmers maintaining a stocking range between 75% and 110% of the maximum 
sustainable yield defined by the canton (Federal Assembly of the Swiss Confederation 2007; see also 
FOAG 2012b). Observing these conditions is intended to prevent both over- and under-stocking as well 
as maintain both a biodiverse cultural landscape and well-established land use system that is also of 
importance for national identity. The official stocking range in Grindelwald is largely based on the 
Alpine corporations’ traditionally-set stocking rate which proved to be sustainable. Depending on size 
and quality of the pasture area, the corporation with the lowest stocking rate is allowed to summer a 
range of around 71 livestock units, while the one with the highest may summer around 318.  
Agriculture as a nested system: While the Alpine corporations were originally mainly involved in 
managing the use of common property summer pastures, they became more involved in tourism-related 
development during the last century, for example by becoming shareholders or owners of infrastructure 
such as cable cars and hotels. Tourism infrastructure aside, there is a high mutual dependency between 
the agriculture and tourism sectors regarding their economic and ecological functions: while agriculture 
provides a well-kept, open, and biodiverse landscape that is key for tourism development, tourism 
provides the economic base of the commune. And as the majority of the farming households have an 
(often major) income related to tourism, e.g. in the operation of cable cars, in lodging, or in the 
construction business, agriculture and tourism can be seen as highly interdependent (Baur et al. 
unpublished manuscript; Wiesmann 1985/1986).  
 
   
a) Summering area with the 
typical cattle breed of the region  
b) View encompassing common 
property Alpine pastures 
(foreground) and private, partly-
cut lower pasturing areas 
(background) 
c) High-Alpine pasture with 
typical Alpine settlement (at 
1983 m asl) 
Figures 1a-c: Some impressions of the study area (Photos: Karina Liechti) 
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3. Materials and methods  
The results of the present study are based on a method triangulation (Flick 1998: 282) combining 
qualitative and spatial data. The qualitative data not only served as a basis to understand the observed 
land cover changes, but also as model input variables to identify future land use and land cover. 
The qualitative data were generated based on semi-quantitative questionnaires followed by qualitative 
semi-structured interviews (Flick et al. 2004) collected from all the Alpine wardens of the seven Alpine 
corporations in Grindelwald. The Alpine wardens were chosen as they are considered to be the main 
experts in the fields of summering and its trends. The themes covered in the questionnaires and 
interviews were 1) the actual use of the summering area (mapping), 2) the perceived quality of pastures 
and ongoing intensification and extensification processes, 3) the relevant factors for pasture selection, 4) 
communal work, 5) the perceived future of the corporation and the practice of summering livestock, 
and 6) land use scenarios. Other qualitative data were derived from semi-structured interviews with 
internal and external mountain agriculture experts. They covered themes such as general summering 
tendencies in the region, land cover changes, and future perspectives of Alpine farming. The analysis of 
the interviews mainly involved categorizing the data according to the thematic lines of current status 
and recent changes in land cover and land use, driving forces and challenges of such changes, and 
future perspectives for Alpine pastures use.  
The spatial data comprise 1) land cover data analysis of different time assessments of the Swiss land 
use statistics from 1979/85, 1992/97, and 2004/09 (SFSO 2009) using GIS for the past land use 
changes, 2) a land use classification with eCognition®, a software that is designed for object-based 
image analysis for the current land cover status, and 3) a GIS-based cost–distance model (ESRI 2011) 
allowing for the analysis of potential future land use and land cover changes. The input parameters for 
the cost–distance model were based on the results of the qualitative data as well as digital datasets 
derived from the Swiss topographic map (map scale 1:25,000) and the DTM AV (Swisstopo 2012). 
GIS-based cost–distance analysis provides a useful tool for assessing animal movements and 
accessibility parameters. For the current research, a cost or resistance surface grid was derived from 
one or more spatially-explicit variables such as topography; enabling or accelerating factors like paths 
or roads; and physical barriers such as dense forests or rivers. Raster cells were weighted in travel time 
according to the expected time–cost required by an animal (or herder) when moving across the cost 
surface, and linear features like roads or rivers were merged with the weighted cost surface (see also 
Adriaensen et al. 2003). The cost–distance model was not calibrated, but served explorative and 
illustrative purposes, and was used to stimulate the scenario-focused discussion in a stakeholder 
workshop. 
In order to assess the information extracted from the spatial and qualitative data – above all that related 
to actual shrub and forest encroachment – five transect walks were undertaken in the summering area. 
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4. Results and discussion  
4.1  Land cover change of the recent past  
The total area of the commune of Grindelwald covers more than 17’000 ha; of this, more than half is 
considered unproductive (glaciers, rocks etc.), and almost one-third is agricultural land (see Table 1). 
When comparing the development of settlement areas, agricultural areas, forest stands, and 
unproductive areas between 1979/85 and 2004/09 (SFSO 2009), the major changes have occurred in 
the settlement areas (+27.5%): this is a sign of booming tourism in the region. This development is 
partly at the expense of agricultural land, especially the meadows in the lowlands. Forest stands cover a 
total area of 2802 ha (about 1/6 of the total area), according to the last assessments in 2004/2009. They 
increased by 2.6% (70 ha) between 1979/85 and 2004/09. For information on developments that go 
further back to the past, one has to rely on the available literature: according to an assessment by 
Stampfli (1983: 30), forest stands rose by another 0.6% (17.7 ha) between 1940 and 1978. In an 
analysis of topographic maps since 1900, Fürstenberg (2011), showed that the process of forest 
encroachment already started in earlier decades. 
 
Grindelwald 1979/85 [ha] 1992/97 [ha] 2004/09 [ha] 
Change 1979/85-
2004/09 
Settlement areas 240 270 306 +27.5% 
Agricultural land 5121 5039 4947 -3.4% 
Forest stands 2732 2799 2802 +2.6% 
Unproductive 
areas 9020 9005 9058 +0.4% 
Total 17113 17113 17113  
 
Table 1: Land cover change in Grindelwald [Source: SFOS 2009: Swiss land use statistics 1979/85, 
1992/97, 2004/09]  
 
Regarding shrub coverage, Swiss land use statistics from 2004/09 show that 13% of the pastures in the 
summering area are shrub covered. An investigation on pasture quality from the beginning of the 1980s 
shows the same phenomenon and speaks of some underused and partly shrub-covered or reforested 
areas in Grindelwald (Nägeli-Oertle 1986: 210-217). Also the Alpine Land Register (German: 
Alpkataster) from 1973 (FDEA 1973: 68) considers some pastures prone to continuous shrub 
encroachment and reforestation. In other areas, shrubs are said to have “always” been there. These 
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areas were never used as pastures and the vegetation is site specific (e.g. different types of dwarf-shrub 
heaths) and not a result of a dynamic abandonment process. An analysis of the developments between 
1979/85 and 2004/09 shows that there was some change (+4%) from brush pastures to scrubs or forest, 
and from favorable pastures to brush pastures (see Figure 2). A development in the other direction 
could not be observed.  
 
Figure 2: Land cover (selected items) and land cover change (shrub and forest encroachment) in the summering area of 
Grindelwald  
 
Shrub and forest encroachment is taking place mainly in regions where shrub coverage was already 
prevalent in 1979/85 (southwestern and northeastern part of the commune; see Figure 2). This result is 
confirmed by Peter (2006: 680), who investigated the change in botanical composition of Alpine 
pastures in Grindelwald over the past two decades; he observed that dwarf shrubs had increased 
especially at sites where shrubs were already abundant in the initial survey and where initial forage 
quality was poor. Also in an aggregated (national) analysis, Baur et al. (2006: 29) found a high 
relevance of the explanatory factor “neighbourhood”, which means that in places where shrubs are 
already prevalent, the process of shrub invasion continues (see also Gellrich et al. 2007: 102). Related 
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to this factor, shrub and forest encroachment processes are taking place above all in regions with 
swampy humid soils or on steep slopes, which means in regions that are unfavorable for grazing. These 
findings correspond to land use scenarios for Grindelwald that were elaborated in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Messerli et al. 1986: 56f). They suggested a reduction or even an abandonment of steep Alpine 
pastures (gradient more than 40%) under both a mechanization and minimization scenario. 
Visualizing the situation today, Figure 3 shows the land cover of a summering area in the southwestern 
region of Grindelwald and the potential transition areas where young forest, open forest, shrubs, and 
brush are prevalent. 
 
Figure 3: Vegetation cover of a summering area in the southwestern region of Grindelwald in 2009 and the presumed 
transition areas (zoomed in selection covering areas of two Alpine corporations) 
 
4.2 Spatial drivers: location-related decision making  
Location-related drivers for past (and current) land cover changes are to a large extent related to pasture 
selection criteria. The Alpine wardens view the following factors as the most important ones for 
assigning grazing areas for cows: distance to the barn, slope, plant composition, and water availability 
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(see Table 2). Other factors such as natural hazards are considered site specific (e.g. certain pastures 
below the Eiger north face, which are often wet and prone to rockfall) or of minor importance.  
Factors considered when selecting grazing areas for dairy cows 
Factors of major 
importance (all Alpine 
wardens agree) 
Variable factors (depending on the 
location of the Alpine corporation) 
Factors of minor importance (not 
or rarely selected or mentioned) 
Short distance to barn (+) 
Gentle slope (+) 
Plant composition (high 
feed value) (+) 
Water availability (+) 
Natural hazards (e.g. rockfall) (-) 
Swampy, humid soils (-) 
Plant composition (poisonous 
plants) (-) 
Rock coverage (-) 
Shrub coverage (-) 
Long distance to road / path (-)  
Unpalatable plant cover (-) 
Touristic locations (e.g. hiking 
paths) (-) 
Table 2: Factors considered when selecting grazing areas for dairy cows ((+) = enabling factor; (-) = obstacle)  
 
The results on the drivers of vegetation change on Alpine pastures, in particular, “location with respect 
to barns”, “slope”, and a combination of both, are to a large extent congruent with previous scientific 
research in the region. Peter (2006), after an in-depth study in Grindelwald, showed that there is some 
evidence for directional changes that could be explained by alterations in grazing management. “At 
sites far from cattle sheds, swards of initially intermediate forage quality showed evidence of nutrient 
enrichment, whereas poor quality swards tended to become encroached by shrub vegetation. These 
trends suggest a shift in grazing pressure towards more favourable areas” (Peter 2006: 679). Far from 
cattle sheds, increasing N-values on sites with gentle slopes and increasing dwarf-shrub cover on sites 
with steep slopes were observed (Peter 2006). The finding that slopes represent a key factor in land 
abandonment decisions is also confirmed by research results from other mountainous regions in 
Switzerland (see e.g. Gellrich et al. 2008: 134; Schneider et al. 2013: 225). 
In addition, there are vegetation indicators that suggest an intensive use and a related nutrient 
enrichment of close-to-barn or other favorable pastures with gentle slopes (see also Peter 2006, above). 
However, one sign of high nutrient presence or over-fertilization close to barns – the presence of 
Alpine sorrel (rumex alpinus) – is said to have been prevalent for generations. Therefore, it cannot be 
considered to be the result of a recent process (see Figure 4c).  
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Figures 4a-c: Two processes: shrub and forest encroachment on marginal pastures and/or on steep slopes (a/b) and 
intensive use with related over-fertilization close to barns (c) (Photos: Karina Liechti) 
 
4.3 Social drivers: current challenges of pasture use  
The drivers within the agricultural system that are contributing to these processes are manifold and 
highly interrelated. Our investigation showed the following to be crucial:  
Workload of farming households and related communal work: The number of farms in Grindelwald 
has continuously decreased in the last decades. At the same time, there has been only a slight reduction 
in the cultivated area and the number of livestock. As a result of this, the size of individual farms 
(defined by the amount of arable land and number of livestock) has constantly risen, which implies that 
the workload of the individual farming households has increased. Consequently, farmers with large 
farms are not always able to fulfill all their communal work duties on the summer pastures (20 
summered cows would add up to about 200 hours of communal work). Also farmers with small farm 
sizes and high percentages of off-farm income face this problem. Unable to carry out the communal 
work, both groups tend to take the option of paying a fee instead. Or as one Alpine warden (July 2011) 
puts it: “The workforce is missing. We have to maintain the same number of cows with fewer workers. 
The work in the lowlands has increased. Of course certain works could be rationalized. But in the 
mountain areas, there is a limit somewhere.” For the maintenance of the summer pastures, this means 
that priority is given to the most urgent tasks such as fencing or water provision, while other tasks such 
as cutting shrubs become second priority. Related to the above-mentioned workload issues is also the 
decreasing engagement of farmers in local government und thus decline in political influence (we 
return to this point later). 
Type of livestock that is summered: Related to the total number of livestock in the valley, the stocking 
rate on the summer pastures showed only a slight decrease in the case study region. Some corporations 
even managed to increase the stocking rate by summering external cattle (LANAT 2011; Baur & 
Binder 2013). More crucial for pasture quality is the type of livestock that is summered: with regard to 
dairy cows, even though their number has remained more or less stable, their fodder needs and weight 
have risen through breeding. This means they are less mobile and farmers are reluctant to graze them 
far from the barn or on steep slopes. This tendency is accentuated when cows from the lowlands are 
taken to Grindelwald: often, these breeds are not well adapted to mountain conditions. Also, there is a 
decrease in the number of young cattle traditionally suited to grazing marginal or steep pastures in the 
summering area. This is because they reach earlier reproduction maturity and are held as dairy cows, 
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and because meat production is not considered as profitable as producing Alpine cheese. These days, 
the younger cattle are also more frequently kept in the lowlands to graze the private land holdings that 
cannot be mowed by machine. This is also the case for other livestock that would be suited to mountain 
areas – goats and sheep. Despite a decrease in total numbers, they are sometimes even summered 
outside the region. Also, keeping suckling cows is currently of minor importance in Grindelwald, 
compared to other regions in Switzerland. This situation might however change in future. If animals 
that are less labour intensive are sought and cow milk prices continue to decrease, niche production (e.g. 
“natura” beef) might become an option for some farmers.  
High turnover of external herders: In Grindelwald, as in the whole of Switzerland, there is a tendency 
for herding duties to be taken over by external herders rather than by local farmers. The external 
herders have a high, sometimes annual, turnover rate, and while their cheese making and other cattle-
related work abilities are considered good, they are less concerned with pasture quality and pasture 
improvement works. These works are long-term issues and thus of more interest to herders who work 
in the same place for several summers or for local farmers, who have an interest in maintaining the 
quality of all traditionally-used pastures. 
Besides the above-mentioned changes in agriculture, tourism-related developments such as new 
infrastructure for winter sports (e.g. storage lakes for the production of artificial snow) can be 
considered further challenges to Alpine pasture use. This shift in priorities is the result of a decreasing 
number of farmers, a growing influence of people related to tourism in the Alpine corporations, and the 
dependence of farmers on an additional income from tourism. Finally, climate change with the related 
rise of forest and dwarf-shrub line (Straehl, in preparation) might also be contributing to a higher forest 
and shrub invasion pressure. This observation was also made by one of the Alpine wardens (July 2011): 
“Twenty years ago, it was never necessary to cut small fir trees above the restaurant. And nowadays 
we have to cut like crazy up to 2000 meters asl in order to prevent pastures from becoming overgrown. 
Some people say the reason might be climate change.” 
Despite these obstacles, there are also developments that to a certain extent can balance or improve 
current trends. These are mainly related to grazing management: better education in the last decades 
has led to an increase in knowledge about vegetation, pasture issues and grazing. As a result, pasture 
management has become more sophisticated, as seen in improved grazing rotation as well as higher 
focus on adequate fencing and animal separation (e.g. dairy cows and young cattle are grazed 
separately). This has led to a more sustainable use of Alpine pastures in several areas. Similarly, weed 
control has gained importance in farmers’ concerns. “Farmer vocational training has clearly improved 
the quality of pasturing. This, and learning by imitation” (vegetation expert, January 2012). 
Furthermore, social cohesion within the Alpine corporation is still relatively high and communal work 
is therefore not only seen as a duty but also as a social event. 
 
4.4 Future Alpine pasture use and land cover changes  
The Alpine wardens and experts consulted believe the processes described above that contribute to 
extensification and intensification of pastures are likely to continue. The following figure on the future 
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of Alpine pasture use as seen by Alpine wardens, among others, shows that farmers will face a 
significant increase in workload (Figure 5). Given the decrease in the number of farmers, it will 
become even more difficult to provide communal work (e.g. pasture cleaning) requiring a big 
workforce. 
Considering the future use of summer pastures, the most probable scenario entails a stable number of 
dairy cows, a rising proportion of external cows that are not well adapted to mountainous pastures, and 
a slightly decreasing number of young cattle. This implies continuing forest and shrub encroachment 
on distant and steep pastures below the tree- or dwarf-shrub line and intensification on close-to-barn 
pastures.  
 
 
Figure 5: Future of Alpine pasture use as seen by Alpine wardens (legend (solid line): 1=will decrease significantly; 2=will 
decrease slightly; 3=will remain stable (dashed line as a reference); 4=will raise slightly; 5=will raise significantly). 
 
One possibility of visualizing these scenario conditions is a GIS-based cost–distance model (Figure 6). 
It shows those summer pasture areas that are most prone to shrub or forest encroachment by modeling 
the time that is required to walk from any point (cell) in the study area to the next barn, considering 
enabling factors such as paths (allowing further walking distances and crossing brooks and forests) and 
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hindering factors such as brooks, impenetrable forests, or steep slopes (slowing down or diverting 
movements). The more the colors turn to dark red, the more prone the pasture is to abandonment and 
thus – depending on altitude – to shrub or forest encroachment.  
 
Figure 6: Summer pasture area most prone to gradual abandonment and thus to shrub or forest encroachment (zoomed in 
selection covering the areas of two Alpine corporations). The more the colours turn to dark red, the more prone the pasture 
is to abandonment and thus – depending on altitude – to shrub or forest encroachment.  
 
5. Conclusion and Outlook: Land use change from a sustainability 
perspective 
 
The results of the research show that pasture extensification processes are taking place in the study 
region. However, the processes are less pronounced than in other regions in Switzerland. This current 
trend is likely to continue, along with current challenges related to structural changes in the agricultural 
sector: fewer farmers, a higher workload, and a changing composition of herds. An assessment of these 
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land use change processes from a sustainability perspective has to take into account that sustainability, 
as a normative concept, is always gradual and value-based, and that negotiating it is therefore a 
complex endeavor. Negotiating sustainability has to address economic, ecological, and socio-cultural 
dimensions (see e.g. Wiesmann 1998: 84) and include both scientific results (external knowledge) and 
local knowledge derived from the interviews with the Alpine wardens:  
Economic dimension: Regarding fodder availability, the current land use pattern is considered 
adequate. The grazing of cows at the current locations provides them with adequate fodder, both in 
quality and quantity. One exception is the weed coverage close to barns due to intensive use and lack of 
weed control, as those weeds cover areas that would be most suitable for grazing. From the economic 
perspective, revenue and expense are better balanced if grazing patterns and maintenance work are 
focussed on certain areas and not all the marginal pastures are maintained. The abandonment of certain 
pastures is thus a provident decision, common to other regions in Switzerland, where other studies have 
shown that forest regrowth took place where the cultivation costs were high and yield potential was low 
(Gellrich et al. 2007: 105). 
Ecological dimension: With regards to ecology, and above all, biodiversity, we have a different 
situation. In the Swiss context, it has been shown that provision of public goods such as biodiversity 
and the beauty of a maintained landscape are strongly interlinked with continuous use of the Alpine 
pastures (Lehmann & Messerli 2007). Pasture abandonment and related processes of forest 
encroachment can therefore cause the loss of valuable biodiverse areas (Baur et al. 2006: 33; see also 
Zoller & Bischof 1980; Maurer et al. 2006). The number of plant species is high on very extensively 
used plots (Mack et al. 2008: 279), but it only takes a small reduction in the number of summered 
animals to cause a proportionately greater loss of extensively used pastures (Mack et al. 2008: 290). In 
Grindelwald, a positive correlation between areas worthy of conservation and the traditional 
agricultural utilization pattern has been shown (Wiesmann 1987: 161).  
In terms of natural hazards, the abandonment of certain areas (e.g. below the Eiger north face, or in 
brook gullies) is a positive development, especially for animal health. Rockfall-prone areas and steep 
slopes that caused injuries in the past were among the first to be abandoned. Another benefit is that 
shrub or forest regrowth in these areas might reduce velocity of falling rocks (Perret et al. 2004). 
Regarding the presumed ecological instability of Alpine regions in general, agricultural use, restoration, 
and maintenance work are however all considered stabilizing factors (Bätzing 2003: 91ff). Thus, fallow 
areas are also prone to non-influenceable labile processes (see e.g. Newesely et al. 2000). 
Socio-cultural dimension: The high interlinkage between tourism and agriculture, which provides the 
one sector with a well-kept environment and the other with additional income, has led to the fact that 
still a comparatively high number of members in the Alpine corporations are farmers. Influence in 
decision making, favorable work conditions for part-time farmers, and thus comparatively well 
maintained and used summer pastures were a result of this. However, recent developments such as a 
decline in the number of farming households as well as farmers’ decreasing political influence and 
social recognition suggest that the link between the agricultural and tourism sectors has weakened in 
the last years. For this reason, agriculture-related works may in future be assessed more from a tourism-
utility perspective than by their usefulness for farming. This change might also lead to less secure 
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employment conditions for part-time farmers, because they are dependent on a certain flexibility of 
their employer, e.g. when communal works are due. 
In terms of identity, it is primarily the local farmers who are negatively affected if the pastures that 
were maintained by their forefathers are abandoned and overgrown (see e.g. Tiefenbach 2006). Up to 
now, reference to the past and the wish to uphold tradition was one important motivation for farmers to 
contribute to communal work. With fewer farmers and a growing focus on farming work in the valley, 
the significance of identity aspects will most probably diminish.  
From a landscape aesthetics point of view, the current processes will not significantly alter the visual 
appearance of the landscape. This is because some of the potentially abandoned areas are above the tree 
line. Also, most visitors to the area are unlikely to notice a low extent of shrub or forest regrowth in 
marginal areas. Studies from other areas confirm that forest encroachment is considered problematic 
only once it surpasses a certain level (see e.g. Soliva et al. 2010). This level has not yet been reached in 
Grindelwald. 
In order to promote sustainable land use in the summering areas, the above-mentioned dimensions have 
to be negotiated. Such a process has to include both external and local knowledge and values on the 
issue of pasture extensification or abandonment, and has to result in a setting of priority areas where 
encroachment processes should be prevented. In these areas, the level of losses (e.g. biodiversity, 
aesthetics) are higher than the level of gains (e.g. reduced labour input).  
As the scenarios developed above are mainly based on a continuation of current trends, negotiations 
and further research also have to include alternative scenarios for such areas. Measures such as the 
introduction of new types of livestock (sheep, goats, suckling cows) could be discussed as an 
alternative to prevent average intensive (suckling cows) or marginal pastures (sheep and goats) from 
shrub or forest encroachment. Improved pasture care also implies improved grazing systems (which 
have already been tested in many areas) and a fortification of communal work. In order to support the 
current system, the hiring of additional workers (which for those Alpine corporations that are well-off 
should be feasible), or the introduction of new actors such as volunteer workers could be tested. 
Whatever path will be taken in Grindelwald, measures that are favorable to both nature and society 
must be adequately rewarded. For this, it is crucial for livestock summering to enjoy both government 
support that includes pasture-area-related quality criteria, as well as support from the tourist sector, 
which enjoys an unique selling point due to agriculture. Decisive in these endeavors are the governance 
aspects that are related to livestock herding in Grindelwald. The Alpine corporations and their 
regulations have proven to be a strong factor in the cohesion of society up to now and should continue 
to shape the use of Alpine common lands. However, a relatively sustainable and stable use of Alpine 
pastures can only be maintained if farmers’ influence within the corporations remains stable and 
approved, and a balance between tourism and agriculture is found. The challenge for further research is 
to address viable pathways on how cooperative governance systems and the related agricultural actors 
can be supported and strengthened, and to support negotiations on what new roles corporations can take 
in future to enhance sustainable land use. In order to do so, comparison and collaborations with other 
regions facing pasture extensification processes are crucial.  
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MODELING AND ASSESSING SCENARIOS OF COMMON PROPERTY 
PASTURES MANAGEMENT IN SWITZERLAND
Modeling and assessing scenarios of common property pastures 
management in Switzerland 
Ivo Baur1 and Claudia R. Binder1
Abstract. Common property pastures (CPPs) in the Alps provide examples of enduring, 
sustainable, and self-organized resource use. During the past few decades, the situation has 
changed, and abandonment of marginal pastures with subsequent forest regrowth has been widely 
observed. To better understand current drivers, challenges, and policy impacts on the sustainable 
governance of common property pastures, we present an application of Ostroms’ general 
framework for analyzing social-ecological systems (SESs). We use system dynamics (SD) 
modeling to operationalize the SES framework for the case study region of Grindelwald, 
Switzerland. Based on formative scenario analysis, we identify four consistent simulation 
scenarios. The simulation results show that increasing loss of common property pastures and 
resulting afforestation can be expected. Scenario assessment shows that policy blueprints such as 
liberalization or increased government support do not halt but instead accelerate abandonment of 
common property pastures. Furthermore, the simulation results show the sustainability trade-offs 
associated with changes in the external setting. We conclude by discussing options for 
sustainably governing CPPs. 
Keywords: 
System dynamics model 
Common pool resources 
Social-ecological systems 
Formative scenario analysis 
1 University of Munich, Department of Geography, Chair for Human-Environment Relations, 
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1 Introduction 
Natural resources use is embedded in complex social-ecological systems (SESs; Ostrom 2009). 
Understanding resources use patterns in SESs requires analyses of the feedback mechanisms (Liu 
et al., 2007), non-linear relationships (Folke, 2006), and thresholds (Walker and Meyers, 2004) 
that link actors, institutions, and resources. Dissection of the SES complexities is the base for 
developing effective policies, particularly under rapidly changing external conditions (Dietz et 
al., 2003), while disregard of complexities has often led to the implementation of simple policy 
blueprints with unintended consequences (Ostrom et al., 2007).  
In European alpine regions, governance of alpine pastures currently faces the challenge of 
adapting to the problems of underuse and land abandonment (Baur and Binder, 2013; Kissling-
Näf et al., 2002; Knoepfel et al., 2005). For centuries, alpine pastures needed protection from 
overgrazing, which was often achieved through common property arrangements (Casari, 2007;
Netting, 1981; Ostrom, 1990; Stevenson, 1991). During the past few decades, the situation has 
rapidly changed, and many alpine pastures have been abandoned (Keenleyside et al., 2010;
MacDonald et al., 2000). In Switzerland, alpine pastures make up approximately 12% of the 
national area (Lauber et al., 2008), of which almost 80% are communal (Baur et al., 2007) Since 
the sustainable use of common property pastures (CPPs) provides not only forage but also public 
goods, such as species and landscape diversity (Burel and Baudry, 1995; Giupponi et al., 2006;
Stöcklin et al., 2007), and cultural values (Bignal and McCracken, 2000; Plieninger et al., 2006), 
governing CPPs is a major policy challenge for mountainous regions. 
Researchers have identified several drivers of land abandonment, including structural change in 
the agricultural sector and the resulting labor scarcity (Gellrich et al., 2007), intensification of 
more productive areas at the cost of less productive areas (Lauber, 2006), dwindling livestock 
numbers in mountainous regions (Mack et al., 2008), low policy incentives for grazing marginal 
land, and political barriers that hinder payments for environmental services (Huber et al., 2013). 
Integrating the different aspects that drive resources use into a simulation model provides a 
highly valuable tool for assessing different strategies for regulating resource use (Costanza et al., 
1993). Essentially, the SES models depend on the incorporation of knowledge across disciplinary 
boundaries and a holistic account of the properties that characterize the SES (Kelly et al., 2013;
Schlüter et al., 2012). However, integrated SES simulation models for CPP use do not exist. 
Accordingly, this work aims at promoting sustainability of CPP by addressing the following 
questions: 
a. How can we capture the dynamic interactions within an SES and consecutive patterns of 
CPP use?  
b. How does the SES respond to changes in the external setting, and what are the 
sustainability trade-offs associated with different policy options? 
To answer the first question, we operationalize the general framework for analyzing the 
sustainability of SESs (Ostrom, 2009) with a system dynamics (SD) approach for the case study 
region of Grindelwald, Switzerland. To answer the second question, we simulate four consistent 
scenarios developed with formative scenario analysis to investigate the SES reaction to external 
change. Based on the scenario simulation, we assess the sustainability trade-offs associated with 
each scenario and discuss different policy options for governing sustainable CPP use.  
3
2 Case Study Region 
Grindelwald is a municipality located in the heart of the Alps in the canton of Bern in 
Switzerland (E 8°01′48″/ N46°37´30). The municipality covers 171 km2 with the highest peak 
reaching 4,100 meters above sea level and the village located 1,000 meters above sea level (Fig. 
1). As a result of the impressive mountainous scenery and winter sports facilities, over the last 
century Grindelwald has become an internationally recognized tourist resort. The local 
population of 3,800 inhabitants hosts an increasing number of visitors. In 2010, the village 
counted 111,078 overnight stays. Consequently, tourism is the main economic driver in the 
region, and gastronomy, the hotel business, the building sector, ski lifts, and public transportation 
provide a vital local labor market. 
Fig. 1. The case study region of Grindelwald, Switzerland, and its basic social and ecological characteristics. 
Sources: author’s own map; data source: (Baur and Binder, 2013; Baur et al., 2014) 
In the local agricultural sector, farmers profit from off-farm income opportunities and typically 
generate a larger share of their household income through off-farm work, although they spend 
more time farming. As a result of structural changes in the agricultural sector, the number of farm 
households has decreased from 242 in 1980 to 123 in 2010. During that period, farm holdings 
have grown to an average of about 10 hectares and livestock units (Baur et al., 2014).
Agricultural activities are based on livestock production. In the summer, farmers use their private 
parcels in the valley to produce hay for wintertime, while cattle graze on the CPPs. The CPPs in 
Grindelwald are located on the hillsides surrounding the valley and start from roughly 1,200 to 
Grindelwald
Area 171.1 km2
Altitude 720 – 4107 meters a.s.l.
Surface of private agricultural land 1422 ha located in the valley
Common Property Pastures 4106 ha located on hillsides
Carrying capacity 1342 livestock units per 100 days
Inhabitants 3796 persons
Demographic development - 6.1% (2000-2010)
Number of farms 123
Number of managing authorities of CPP 1 cooperative & 7 corporations
Rights of usage for CPP Tied to private parcels in the valley
Maintenance of CPP Tied to farmers appropriation levels
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1,400 meters above sea level and extend up to 2,500 meters above sea level. A total of 34 alpine 
enterprises, most of which are privately owned, look after the livestock in the summer and 
produce artisan cheese, which is redistributed among the livestock owners according to their 
animals’ milk yield. Management of the CPP is organized in seven corporations 
(“Bergschaften”), which are embedded in a cooperative (“Taleignung”), which functions as an 
umbrella organization to protect the common interest of the corporations (Baur and Binder, 
2013).  
3 Model Description 
3.1 Model Purpose 
The purpose of the model is to understand the effect of social-ecological drivers on the use and 
maintenance of CPPs. Given the tendency in Switzerland to abandon CPPs, the model needs to 
address, unlike most models of CPR use, not just the dynamics leading to overexploitation of 
natural resources but also the dynamics and consequences of underuse. By simulating changes in 
the external setting, the model should help to separate processes and policy options, under which 
the SES approaches or maintains sustainability, from those that shift the SES away toward less 
sustainable states of over- or underuse. Furthermore, simulation results should then uncover the 
different sustainability trade-offs associated with particular policy options (Janssen and Anderies, 
2007) as the base for assessing scenarios. 
3.2  Theoretical Framework 
The model is based on Ostroms’ general framework for analyzing SESs (Ostrom, 2007, 2009).
Accordingly, the SES consists of four subsystems, which are embedded in an external setting (E). 
The social subsystems characterizing the SES include the actors system (A) and the governance 
system (GS). The social entities are the farmers (A) and the corporations (GS). The ecological 
subsystems consist of the resource system (RS) that produces the resource units (RUs). The 
ecological entities consist of the common property area with pasture and forest stands (RS), while 
the resource units consist of the livestock that graze the CPP and the grass used as fodder. These
subsystems describe the SES at its highest level, but can be divided into attributes and subtypes 
that interact at common spatial and temporal scales to produce outcomes. The dynamic behavior 
of the SES therefore derives not simply from external inputs but results equally from the complex 
interactions between and within the subsystems. 
3.3  Empirical Basis and Data Sources 
The data used to build the model included qualitative data for the structural design of the model, 
and quantitative data for the numerical formulation of the SD model. Qualitative data was derived 
from a workshop, during which we discussed key challenges for CPP management with 
representatives of the seven corporations. We also conducted 10 interviews and four field 
excursions guided by farmers and experts to gain a detailed understanding of how the SES 
functions in order to conceptualize the model’s structure.
For the numerical formulation of the model, we relied partially on our own data and on secondary 
quantitative data. The different data sources provided values for the period 1980–2010, upon 
which the model was validated and calibrated to match historical behavior. The initial values for 
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1980 derive mostly from the Man and Biosphere project conducted in the eighties in the study 
region (Nägeli-Örtle, 1986; Wiesmann, 1983). Time series describing the developments in the 
SES during the past decade were derived mostly from official statistical sources: Developments 
in the external setting were modeled using several price indices provided by the Federal Office 
for Statistics ((FSO), 1980-2010). Data that describes the use of the ecological system in terms of 
CPP stocking density was derived from a livestock census provided by a regional agency 
((LANAT), 1980-1990, 2000-2010). Data on land cover changes stems from the areal statistics 
for 1979–1985, 1992–1997, 2004–2009 ((FSO), 1979-2009), and from an additional online 
source that describes the natural characteristics of the seven corporations (Alporama, 2013).
Finally, our quantitative data from a 2010 representative household survey (n = 95) provided the 
values that describe the current state of the actors system and the social-ecological interactions 
(Baur et al., 2014). 
3.4 Model Structure 
3.4.1 Subsystems and interactions 
Operationalization of the SES framework included five subsystems linked through six key 
interactions. The subsystem external settings (S) included the following eight components: 
S1: National direct payments: Includes all payments related to land or animals, which constitute 
the main source of agricultural income and land use incentives and thus feed into the actors 
system.  
S2: National summering payments: This includes summering payments that are paid to the 
corporation, which feed into the governance system and the recently introduced appropriation 
contribution, which is paid to the livestock owner.  
S3: Prices for dairy products: This includes the milk and cheese prices, which affect the market 
returns of the farmers’ agricultural activities. 
S4: Off-farm income opportunities: Represented through the average wage, which farmers could 
achieve in the region when they work outside the agricultural sector. 
S5: Direct costs include the variable costs of keeping a livestock unit such as labor costs, costs of 
animal feed, veterinary costs, and infrastructural investments. 
S6: Tourism development represents the indexed overnight stays, which affect prices for dairy 
products and off-farm income opportunities. 
S7: Climate change affects the growing season and therefore the annual grass production of 
pastures. 
S8: The wood price affects off-farm income opportunities. 
6
Fig. 2. Conceptual framework of the SES model, including the external setting and the four subsystems, their goal-
seeking principles, the regulating dynamics, and the key interactions among the subsystems. 
The actors system shows how the average farmer in Grindelwald reacts to external incentives 
(S1–S5). By reallocating production factors such as labor, land, and livestock, the farm 
households aim to achieve a satisfying household income. Instead of maximizing household 
income, farmers prefer agricultural activities over off-farm activities and try to generate 
satisfactory household income by increasing farm size. Regarding agricultural holdings, farmers 
react to land use incentives shaped by the external setting adapt herd size to maximize 
agricultural income. The extent to which the average farm household achieves its income goal 
determines the process of structural change at the macro level. If the household income goal is 
just achieved, then structural change occurs according to the regular pattern with a generational 
life cycle of thirty years ending with the farmer’s retirement at the age of 65, and a 1 in 3 chance 
that farm holding continues to exist by succession and a 2 in 3 chance that the farm is abandoned 
and the land reallocated by the market. At the macro level, the abandonment and succession rates 
vary with the economic situation of the average farm household. If the income goal is not 
achieved, succession decreases and abandonment increases, and vice versa if the income goal is 
exceeded. Accordingly, the process of structural change regulates the number of farm households 
and their economic endowments such as livestock, which are important links to the resource units 
since they determine the potential for appropriation and thus affect grazing patterns (Fig. 2, I1). 
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In the governance system, corporations attempt to maximize income from summering payments 
paid by the federal government (S2). Since payments are provided per stocked unit and 
incrementally reduced, if the CPP stocking density is above 110% or below 75% of the 
government-defined carrying capacity, the summering payments are maximized, when the 
defined carrying capacity is utilized with a factor of 1.1. To approach the optimal stocking 
density, the local governance system adapts rules that exclude outsiders (Fig. 2, I2) in order to 
steer stocking density close to the carrying capacity (Fig. 2, I4). In addition to regulating 
appropriation activities, the governance system also forces institutions to organize provision 
activities to maintain the resource system (Fig. 2, I5). These activities include defining the 
provision hours to be fulfilled, setting fines for non-compliance, and monitoring and sanctioning 
non-compliance. The amount of provision activities fulfilled in turn affects land cover and the 
state of the resource system, since provision activities include tasks that enhance the productivity 
of the resource system, such as cleaning of overgrown CPP areas. 
In the ecological system, the interaction of resource units is closely linked to the governance 
system’s goal of maximizing summering payments. In doing so, the grazing patterns are 
regulated through exclusion in order to get stocking density in line with the carrying capacity. 
The stocking density produces a certain demand for forage, which affects the resource system 
(Fig. 2, I3). The extent to which demand is met by the resource systems forage production 
determines the process for changing use of the land. If the forage needs are not met, overgrown 
CPPs can be reclaimed through provision activities, and if forage production exceeds the need, 
land is abandoned. How quickly land use adapts to current requirements depends on the fulfilled 
provision hours. As a consequence of the changes in the land use, the land cover changes (for 
example, the CPP area ready for grazing), which in turn changes the forage provision and the 
resulting grazing patterns (Fig. 2, I6).  
8
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3.4.2 Feedback loops and threshold values 
We identified nine feedback loops that drive SES behavior. In the actors system, two types of 
loops were important for factor allocation. First, the two balancing agricultural income loops 
indicate that farmers try to achieve a satisfactory household income by increasing their land and 
livestock holdings, and thus search for the optimal land use intensity to maximize agricultural 
income. Second, dependent on labor productivity, larger farms require more labor input, which 
cannot be allocated to off-farm activities, as indicated by the two reinforcing loops.  
The actors system and the resource units are linked through the farmers’ appropriation decision 
as indicated by the two appropriation loops in Fig. 3. From the appropriation of livestock, farmers 
generate pay-offs in the form of cheese that can be sold. The pay-off per livestock unit is largest 
when stocking density is close to the carrying capacity, since overstock decreases the cheese 
production while understock increases the costs of summering. Furthermore, the pay-off also 
depends on market prices and policy measures that support summering. Appropriations levels in 
turn increase with pay-offs and thus affect the CPP stocking. This feedback mechanism applies to 
local and foreign summered livestock as indicated by the appropriation loops in Fig. 3.  
The governance system regulates the appropriation of foreign livestock through operational rules. 
To maximize income from summering payments, corporations attempt to keep the stocking 
density as close to the carrying capacity as possible. By excluding non-local users, the 
governance system might or might not allow non-locals to summer livestock in order to increase 
stocking density when it is below the carrying capacity, as indicated by the balancing exclusion 
loop.  
For the ecological system, the stocking density is the central link between the social processes 
and consecutive land use and land cover change for two reasons. First, since the stocking density 
determines provision and forage requirements, it is the major driver behind pasture use and
maintenance. As indicated by the land use change loop, the CPP area is adapted to meet the 
animals forage requirements. Accordingly, plots of CPPs are abandoned if forage production 
exceeds needs or reopened if the needs exceed production. Second, as indicated by the change in 
the productivity loop, land use always affects the least productive plots and leads to changes in 
average plot productivity. The average plot productivity therefore increases when the CPP area is 
reduced or decreases when CPP area is increased, as indicated by the reinforcing “change in 
productivity” loop. The changes in land use also affect the forest stands, since the abandoned 
CPP plots are transformed into forest over time.  
3.5  System Dynamics Integration 
The system dynamics model was programmed with Vensim Professional software and consists of 
five views that display the external setting (S), the actors system (A), the governance system 
(GS), and the resource units of the resource system (RS). In total, the model includes 173 
variables: eight levels, 16 look-ups, 102 auxiliaries, and 62 constants. The model’s initial values 
refer to 1980, while the current values refer to 2010. The model was calibrated using the 
historical data available for this time period and runs at 1-year increments in discrete time steps 
to 2040. A detailed description of the model was produced using the System Dynamics 
Documentation and Assessment (SDM) tool (Martinez-Moyano, 2012), which is detailed in 
Appendix A. The key elements of the model are level variables regulated through inflows and 
outflows, formalized as integral and equations (Sterman, 2001):
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(1)
3.6  Model tests and improvement 
To uncover structural flaws and to increase confidence in the validity and parameter values in the 
model, we applied several tests that can be divided into structural, sensitivity, and behavioral tests 
(Barlas, 1989). 
Structural tests examined whether the system structure was consistent with the observed physical 
reality and included a four-step procedure: 
Dimensional consistency was used to ensure that all variables have units with real-world 
meaning. 
Integration error testing was conducted to ensure that the model behavior does not 
depend on the choice of time steps or the integration method.  
Reality check equations were introduced to prove that the model behaves realistically 
and is free of illogical relationships between the variables.  
Extreme condition tests were introduced to investigate whether the model behaves 
realistically when the parameters take extreme values.  
Sensitivity tests showed how the model behavior is affected by parameters for which we had no 
exact data sources available. We used a Monte Carlo simulation with uniform distributions to 
assess how random changes in the following four parameters affected the model behavior.  
Satisfactory household income was randomized with the lower limit set at CHF 55,000 
and the upper limit set at CHF 100,000. 
Initial pasture productivity was randomized with the lower limit of 10 and an upper limit 
of 25 kg DM/day/ha. 
Availability of cattle in the lowlands was randomized with a lower limit of 0.1 and an 
upper limit of 1. 
Forage decay fraction was set with a lower limit of 1 and an upper limit of 4. 
Based on the Monte Carlo simulation parameters, the parameter values were then adapted in 
order to achieve the best possible historical fit of key stocks that refer to available longitudinal 
data. For a more detailed description of the tests applied, see Appendix B.  
Behavioral tests provide insights into the model’s capacity to replicate the dynamics of the real-
world system by assessing the fit between the model and the observed data (Bennett et al., 2013;
Oliva, 2003). We tested the values of the key stocks in the model against the information from 
census data and real statistics for farm households, stocking density on CPP, and livestock in the 
valley, CPPs, and forest stands. We calculated the correlation coefficient (R), absolute relative 
error (ARE), and mean absolute relative error (MARE) for level variables. Where n is the number 
of data, represents the observed and the model data. Standard deviations are depicted by
and .
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The model showed good fit with the historical data. The simulated number of farm households 
was correlated at 0.96 with the historical data and achieved a mean absolute error of 4.51% for 
2000–2010 (Fig. 4a). Predictions for livestock in the valley achieved the lowest R value with 0.22 
and consequently a larger mean absolute error with 7%, because livestock in the valley suddenly 
decreases in census data by 74 livestock units between 2007 and 2008. This decrease does not 
reflect a serious decrease in the livestock present, but instead results from a change in the 
weighting system for livestock units. For 2008–2010, the total livestock in the valley from census 
data had an R value of 0.92 and a MARE of 3%, which shows that livestock in the valley is 
adequately replicated by the model and that the largest part of the deviation between the model 
and census data is explained by change in the weighting of the livestock units. Stocking density 
of CPP had an R value of 0.4 and showed a very moderate deviation from the census data with a 
MARE of 3% (Fig. 4a). 
Fig. 4. Absolute relative error (ARE) and mean absolute relative error (MARE) for assessing the 
historical fit of the model’s key level values. (a) The deviations between actual and simulated 
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development for the number of farm households, the livestock in the valley, and the stocking 
level on CPP. (b) The deviations between actual and simulated development of common property 
pastures and forest area. 
As indicated in Fig. 4b, the historical fit for the CPP and forest area is satisfactory, although only 
three data points were available, one of which was used to initialize the model. Therefore, 
historical fit refers only to two data points (1991 and 2008), but was very high with R values 
above 0.98 and a MARE of 3.2% for CPPs and 0.04% for the forest area. Although the historical 
fit of the model is very high, validation of ecological processes relied only on three time points 
which limits its information value that were available from areal statistics. Furthermore, the areal 
statistics does not differentiate between common and private lands, and we thus relied on 
additional data sources (Alporama, 2013) for calculating land cover change. Combining the data 
sources, we calculated a 0.8% decrease of common property area from 1980 to 1991 and a further 
6% decrease from 1991 to 2008. During the same time, the forested area increased in each period 
by roughly 2%. Since the loss of CPP area does not immediately result in increased forest 
growth, we assume that the loss is first added to overgrown CPPs and is later converted into 
forest stands.  
3.7  Scenario Analysis 
We used formative scenario analysis to identify a consistent set of scenarios for simulating future 
development of the SES. Formative scenario analysis aims at assessing a hypothetical, but 
consistent, combination of events that affects the future state of a system (Scholz and Tietje, 
2002; Wiek et al., 2006). Therefore, we concentrated on developments in the external setting (S), 
which served as input values for the simulation. The parameters were defined with an expert 
assessment as part of a master thesis (Zumstein, 2013). The procedure included the following six 
steps (Scholz and Tietje, 2002; Tietje, 2005) for further details, see Appendix B): 
1 Define the spatial and temporal scales of the scenario parameters. 
2 Define the variables and potential parameter values that describe the external setting. 
3 Have experts validating the chosen variables and values. 
4 Develop an impact matrix.  
5 Complete the impact matrix with experts. 
6 Conduct a consistency analysis of the completed matrices. 
4 Results 
4.1 Simulation of the Historical Development of the SES 
The baseline simulation of the SES reveals a moderate decrease in the use and maintenance of 
CPPs that led to a slight abandonment of CPP from 1980 to 2010. In the external setting, the shift 
in agricultural policies from market prices support to direct payments caused a significant 
decrease in the milk price (Table 1). As a result, farmers’ land rents and their dependence on 
direct payments steadily increased, while revenues from keeping livestock stagnated. 
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Table 1. Baseline simulation for selected variables that describe the past development of the social ecological system 
(rounded values). 
1980 1990 2000 2010
External Setting (S)
Payments tied to land (CHF/ha) 1040.00 1480.00 1840.00 2000.00
Payments tied to animals (CHF/LU) 504.00 717.80 892.00 970.00
Summering payments (CHF/SLU1) 156.00 222.00 276.00 300.00
Direct costs of animals (CHF/LU) 1040.00 1480.00 1840.00 2000.00
Milk price (CHF/kg) 0.92 0.78 0.54 0.51
Cheese price (CHF/kg) 14.42 16.91 17.07 18.00
Potential off-farm income (CHF/year) 41712.00 50876.00 59503.00 63200.00
Wood price (CHF/FMb) 27.50 33.00 34.92 55.00
Tourism index (dmnl) 80.00 87.00 95.00 100.00
Climate change (increase in degrees Celsius) 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60
Actors System (A)
Farm households (hh) 242.00 197.00 158.00 126.00
Livestock per household (LU/hh) 6.30 7.70 8.70 10.80
Land holding per household (ha) 5.60 6.90 8.60 11.30
Workload (Sw3) 0.91 0.98 1.05 1.24
Household income (CHF) 64725.00 75953.00 84234.00 87238.00
Agricultural income (CHF) 19283.00 24363.00 28125.00 39185.00
Resource units (RUs)
Livestock in the valley (LUs) 1525.00 1514.00 1368.00 1358.00
Stocking density of CPP (SLUs) 1448.00 1474.00 1366.00 1393.00
Foreign cattle summered (SLUs) 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.00
Forage requirements (Mio. kg DM4) 5.86 6.36 6.41 6.83
Duration of season (days/year) 95.00 97.40 99.80 102.00
Governance System (GS)
Net provision (hours) 16000.00 14828.00 14272.00 13832.00
Provision not fulfilled (hours) 0.00 0.00 0.00 1260.00
Corporations income from fines (CHF) 0.00 0.00 0.00 31500.00
Provisions bought (hours) 0.00 0.00 0.00 1370.00
Foregone summering payments (CHF) 1373.00 118.00 26127.00 26806.00
Appropriation rules (dmnl) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.84
Resource System (RS)
Common Property Pastures (ha) 4375.00 4294.00 4289.00 4182.00
Average productivity of summer pastures 
(kg DM/ha/day) 15.00 15.14 15.18 15.32
Overgrown Common Property Pastures (ha) 163.00 23.00 14.48 13.00
Forest (ha) 2130.00 2373.00 2374.00 2481.00
Abandoned Common Property Pastures (ha) 142.60 0.00 32.40 0.00
Cleaning of Common Property Pastures (ha) 0.00 6.90 0.00 6.40
1 SLU = summered livestock unit; 2 FM = solid cubic meter; 3 Sw = standardized workforce; 4 DM = dry matter. 
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In the actors system, farmers adapted to the changes in the external setting by using the land less 
intensely and doubling the size of their holdings. Since labor productivity did not keep pace with 
farm growth, labor demand on farms has increased. At the macro level, this resulted in structural 
changes toward fewer but larger farms and reduced the number of farm households from 242 to 
126. Regarding the income situation, due to the farm growth, agricultural income increased in 
nominal and real values. Since farm growth requires more labor input that cannot be allocated to 
off-farm activities, the nominal household income increased only moderately. In fact, the average 
farm household in Grindelwald increased its holdings at the cost of a nominal 5% decrease in 
household income from 2000 to 2010 (Table 1).  
Due to the decreased land use incentives, the livestock present in the valley decreased by 11%, 
which directly affected the stocking density. Since stocking density decreased during the 1990s in 
particular, the corporations’ loss of summering payments increased. In response, the corporations 
changed their appropriation rules in 2005 (when the missed summering payments reached the 
threshold value) and opened the corporations’ pastures to foreign cattle. With the change in 
appropriation rules that reflect the degree or the share of corporations that allow for foreign 
cattle, the stocking density was stabilized after 2005 with an additional 22 summered livestock 
units (SLUs) from non-local farmers. 
The governance system shows a net decrease in provision activities, which is mostly a 
consequence of reduced stocking density. Furthermore, provision duties not fulfilled increased 
between 2000 and 2010 for two reasons: First, the increasing labor demand on the average farm 
compelled farmers to pay the fine instead of fulfilling their provision duties. Second, external 
users had lower provision fulfillment rates. Since provision defections are fined, corporations use 
these fines to buy additional provision hours from users or even employ full-time laborers.  
In the resource system, reduced use and maintenance of CPPs affected land cover through the net 
abandonment of 2% of the overall CPP area. Even though stocking has been steadily decreasing, 
feed requirements increased as a result of advances in the breeding, leading to increased animal 
weight and forage needs. Since the resource system also increased feedstock provision, mainly 
because of the longer growing seasons, the interplay of forage requirements and forage 
production resulted in periods of CPP abandonment and periods of CPP reclaim: From 1980 to 
1983 and again from 1999 to 2005, the model indicates land abandonment phases, while from 
1983 to 1998 and 2006 to 2010, the model simulates phases of cleaning of overgrown pastures by 
provision activities. Overall, the model shows a decrease of 193 ha in CPP that resulted from the 
first decade of the simulation. Between 1990 and 2010, the overgrown pastures, which are a 
surplus area not needed to meet forage demand, ranged between 23 and 13 ha. This indicates that 
the forage needs and requirements were well balanced for the last period of the simulation, and 
very little change in land use occurred. 
4.2 Scenario Definition 
The formative scenario analyses yielded four scenarios as defined by the changes in the following 
parameter values from 2010 to 2040 (Table 2). The scenarios integrate development on different 
spatial scales ranging from global developments (climate) to the regional (e.g., tourism) that can 
be described as follows:  
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Table 2. The four scenarios describing the potential developments in the external setting between 2010 and 2040. 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Rising
prices
Liberalization 
and economic 
growth
Increased 
Government 
support Crisis
Direct payments Normal −50% 50% −50%
Summering payments Normal 50% 50% Normal
Dairy prices 30% −20% −20% 30%
Direct cost 40% −10% 40% −10%
Off-farm income 
opportunities Normal Normal −25% −25%
Tourism development 25% Normal −25% −25%
Climate 1 °C Normal 1 °C 1 °C
Wood price 100% 50% 200% 200%
Scenario 1: Rising prices: This scenario is characterized by a global scarcity of energy sources 
and a price increase in raw and energy materials. As a result, the cost of agricultural production 
increases, which also results in higher food prices, and wood becoming an important energy 
source. At the national level, the economy remains stable, and the federal government continues 
its level of agricultural support. The local labor market offers sufficient off-farm income 
opportunities, and tourism further increases, since ski resorts at higher altitudes such as 
Grindelwald gain additional international attention for consistent snow levels. 
Scenario 2: Trade liberalization and economic growth: The global economy grows steadily and 
becomes increasingly interconnected. As a result of liberalization, direct payments are largely 
cut, and agricultural policies remunerate particular environmental services, such as the use of 
summer pastures. Liberalization also causes national prices in the agricultural sector to approach 
the global price level. At the local level, tourism and off-farm income opportunities show normal 
growth patterns with a slight increase in wood prices.  
Scenario 3: Increased government support: The global economy suffers from the adverse effects 
of climate change and faces a shortage of raw materials and energy sources. As a result, the costs 
of agricultural production rise, and consumers substitute dairy products with cheaper foods. The 
agricultural sector suffers from market developments and government support increases to secure 
the survival of the agricultural sector and to prevent unemployment and depopulation of the 
alpine regions. In Grindelwald, the local economy suffers from global recession and climate 
change, and the tourist sector and thus off-farm income opportunities decrease drastically. 
Scenario 4: Crisis: European economies stagnate and agricultural production struggles to meet 
demand as adaptation to climate change largely fails. World market prices rise, while purchasing 
power decreases all over Europe, including Switzerland. The federal government budget 
decreases and ever-increasing amounts are spent on social security, leaving less for the support 
for the agricultural sector. The agricultural sector, however, profits from lower production and 
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increasing demand leading to higher prices, while the costs of agricultural production decrease. 
At the same time, tourism and off-farm income opportunities decrease in the absence of 
international visitors and investments in tourism infrastructure. As a result, agriculture becomes a 
more attractive option for making a living in the region. 
4.3  Scenario Simulation 
The simulation of the scenarios showed that the use and maintenance of CPPs will further 
decrease in the near future with subsequent loss of CPP area and forest regrowth. Surprisingly, 
this trend was strongest under the government support scenario, while the use and maintenance of 
CPPs is most intense in the crisis scenario. However, changes in the external setting impact land 
use and land cover changes over time. Since the scenarios are simulated as continuous 
developments, the actors and governance system closely follow the patterns produced in the 
baseline simulation until 2018. Since the changes in the social system affect the ecological 
system with delays in land use change and land cover change, changes in the external setting take 
about 10 years to become visible in the resource system. 
In the actor system (A), the trend of structural change toward fewer but larger farm holdings 
persists for all scenarios (Fig. 5a). Under government support, structural change slowed down, as 
the high level of direct payments keeps labor in the sector. In contrast, the liberalization and 
economic growth scenario accelerates structural change with labor leaving the sector in response 
to decreased direct payments and producer prices accompanied by attractive off-farm income 
opportunities. As government support slows the process of structural change, it also impedes 
farm growth in particular regarding livestock keeping. Accordingly, the average holding 
increases to only 16 LUs, and since farmers can survive on the direct payments, there is no need 
to focus production on generating market revenues from livestock keeping (Fig. 5c). This 
development is most contrasted by scenario 4, in which the economic crisis favors agricultural 
production, since the costs of production are low and the prices for dairy products are comparably 
high. Farmers respond to these changes by using land more intensively. In 2040, the average farm 
household in the region keeps 31 LUs, which is about twice the number of animals kept under the 
government support scenario. Thus, land use intensity in the valley will reach 1.35 LU/ha, which 
is more than 35% above the current land use intensity. 
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Fig. 5. Scenario simulation of key variables describing the SES between 2010 and 2040. 
Regarding the actual use and maintenance of CPPs, provision activities remain closely linked to 
stocking density on CPP (Fig. 5b and d). As a result of strong land use incentives in the crisis 
scenario, the stocking levels outnumber current levels between 2020 and 2030. Similarly, 
scenario 1 (rising prices) will lead to stable use and maintenance of CPPs, while the trade 
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liberalization and government support scenarios will lead to a significant decrease in the use and 
maintenance of CPPs. Although the rising prices and trade liberalization scenarios lead to very 
similar developments in the actors system, they result in different stocking and provision levels. 
This is due to differences in producer prices which provide better pay-offs for using CPPs under 
the raising prices scenario compared to the liberalization scenario. In the liberalization scenario, 
even summering payments are not sufficiently increased to compensate for the price decrease in 
dairy products. 
In the ecological system, the decreasing use and maintenance of the CPPs result in afforestation 
for all scenarios. The simulation shows that the system is particularly vulnerable to underuse, 
since stocking is linked to provision. In the case of increased stocking, the negative effects of 
land use intensity below the optimum can potentially be harnessed, as provision hours increase. 
In the case of reduced stocking density, the ecological system will be affected in two ways: by 
lower grazing intensity and the associated lower provision levels. This subtle process of lowered 
use and maintenance of CPPs causes a backlog of surplus CPP area that manifests with a delay of 
about 7–15 years in decreasing the CPP area that first is overgrown and later released as forest 
regrowth (Fig. 5e–g). Since the national law forbids activities that reduce forest areas (Forest Act; 
Chapter 1; Article 4), once the lost CPP area is transformed into forest stands, it becomes 
permanent. Therefore, the potential decrease in stocking and provision levels suggested by the 
simulation results for the near future will have irreversible effects on land cover in terms of forest 
regrowth.  
4.4 Scenario Assessment
The simulation results suggest that regarding the stable use and maintenance of CPP use, scenario 
1 (price increase) and scenario 4 (crisis) produce more desirable outcomes than scenarios 2 and 3 
(liberalization and governmental support), respectively. Nevertheless, SES adaptation to external 
changes often involves trade-offs in different systems functions, which can lead to new 
vulnerabilities (Janssen and Anderies, 2007; Janssen et al., 2007). Therefore, different aspects of 
sustainability must be considered for the evaluation of scenarios (Table 3).
The SES in Grindelwald is robust against structural change. Structural change and the resulting 
labor scarcity are a major cause of afforestation (Gellrich et al., 2007). Our results suggest that 
this is not necessarily the case and that the deviations from the current trend of structural change 
might accelerate rather than mitigate the problem of CPP abandonment. 
A key challenge for avoiding major abandonment of CPPs is to ensure a stable number of local 
livestock as a premise for stable stocking and provision levels. In the crisis scenario, land use 
intensity even increases and ensures the largest number of local livestock in the valley, but 
potentially at the cost of overexploited private plots with adverse ecological effects. Scenarios 1 
and 2 would be preferable for keeping land use intensity in the valley within its current range.  
The model suggests that the average farm in Grindelwald will increasingly rely on hired labor to 
cope with larger farm holdings. Only if government support is significantly increased and farm 
growth is slowed can farming remain a pure family business as in the government support 
scenario. Additionally, the government support scenario allows for sustainable agricultural 
livelihoods, while under the liberalization scenario, only farmers with strong preferences for 
agricultural activities continue farming and need to generate off-farm income to subsidize the 
farm business and finance respective employees. 
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Table 3. Indexed indicators for scenario assessment for 2040 (2010 = 100). 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Rising 
prices
Liberalization 
and economic 
growth
Government 
support Crisis
Number of farm holdings 49.3 39.3 51.1 47.5
Land use intensity in the valley 110.7 91.7 72.7 130.8
Hired labor 
(in absolute numbers of Sw) 27.8 60.4 0.0 58.2
Total household income 139.4 36.0 178.0 130.1
Agricultural income 350.7 167.9 305.4 382.0
Defection on provision hours 240.8 277.0 191.1 272.7
Provision 91.3 70.7 75.8 91.6
Stocking of CPP 86.1 65.6 71.5 86.4
Foreign livestock on CPP 641.4 1287.9 1102.6 631.1
Afforestation 110.8 115.8 131.6 110.5
In the governance system, additional responses to decreasing local livestock and subsequent 
stocking levels by opening the pastures to foreign cattle are inevitable, except under the crisis 
scenario. A continuous shift in governance principles in the use of maintenance of CPPs from 
closed communal organizations to market principles is therefore likely to continue or increase. In 
this case, ever-larger shares of non-local farmers pay for summering services and provision 
activities provided by corporations or local farmers, respectively. This situation, in which the 
group of beneficiaries of the resource is not congruent with the group that maintains and governs 
the resource, might be a potential source of conflict. Furthermore, demand from external users for 
summering, organization, and provision activities involves uncertainties and is difficult to 
predict. In our model, reduced local livestock and appropriation in scenarios 1–3 are not fully 
absorbed by the governance system adaptation, as incentives for external users and the 
corporations are not strong enough to provide a full substitution to match the carrying capacity.  
The use and maintenance of CPPs is most stable when agriculture remains an economically 
feasible activity compared to off-farm opportunities, as in the crisis scenario. Consequently, 
crises might not result in overall welfare gains, but achieve the best outcomes in terms of halting 
CPP abandonment (potentially at the cost of overused private plots). Although the rising prices 
scenario results in larger CPP abandonment compared to the crisis scenario, it will not do so at 
the cost of intensified agriculture in the valley. However, both scenarios have better outcomes 
than liberalization or increasing government support for continuous use and maintenance of 
CPPs. 
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5 Discussion 
Unlike most other common pool resource settings, the current challenge in the Alps is to ensure 
continuous use and maintenance of the resource rather than preventing it from being 
overexploited. It is now widely accepted that such problems of natural resource use are embedded 
in a complex social-ecological system that cannot be steered with simple policy blueprints 
(Ostrom, 2009). This paper attempts to illustrate the current challenges and policy options for 
governing common property pastures (CPPs) through integrated modeling of social-ecological 
systems (SESs). In doing so, we used the SES framework to develop an empirically based 
Systems Dynamics model of CPP use for Grindelwald, Switzerland. The scenario simulations 
showed that the trend of decreased use and maintenance of CPPs continues for all of the four 
scenarios. Nevertheless, the degree and pace at which the CPP plots are abandoned and 
subsequent forest regrowth takes place vary substantially according to the scenario setting. 
Simulation results show that policy blueprints such as trade liberalization or increasing 
government support largely fail to prevent further CPP abandonment. Instead, CPP use remains 
most stable when the agricultural sector benefits from an economic crisis or when commodity 
prices increase. However, scenario assessment revealed no optimal solutions, since the different 
development patterns of the SES involves trade-offs in sustainability and robustness (Janssen and 
Anderies, 2007). In the crisis scenario, for example, CPP use and maintenance is most 
sustainable, although potentially at the cost of overexploited private parcels in the valley. In the 
government support scenario, in contrast, land use in the valley and agricultural livelihoods 
remain sustainable, albeit at the cost of seriously underused CPPs. However, acknowledging the 
trade-offs and uncertainties associated with the different scenarios provides the base for effective 
policies for governing CPPs. 
5.1  Policy Implications for the Sustainable Governance of Common Property Pastures  
Governing CPPs against the trend of underuse remains challenging. Policies should target and 
react to stocking density for two reasons. First, stocking is the major driver for the provision and 
grazed CPP area. As the stocking decreases, the provisions and the grazed area also decrease, and 
the problem of underuse accelerates. These contrasts with overuse, because when stocking 
exceeds the carrying capacity, the adverse effects of overgrazing are eased and not accelerated by 
the consequent increase in provision activities. Second, as the simulation results suggest, 
decreasing use and maintenance of CPPs becomes visible in the resource system as the afforested 
area with a delay of about 6 to 10 years that cannot be transformed back to pasture under current 
federal legislation. Thus, if major forest regrowth is observed, the feedback mechanism of 
underuse is already in play, which shifts the system further away from its sustainable state. 
Therefore, if stocking density decreases further in the near future, as predicted in the government 
support and liberalization scenarios, counteracting interventions must be put in place to prevent 
serious forest regrowth in the long run.  
Such interventions might be most effective when they target two system components: land use
incentives for private plots in mountainous regions and farmers’ pay-offs from summering. Land 
use incentives need to balance direct payments with market prices in order to ensure the 
sustainable use of private plots and at the same time sufficient local stocking potential, which has 
been reported to be a problem in some mountainous regions (Mack et al., 2008). In contrast to 
other study regions (Gellrich et al., 2007),structural change in Grindelwald is not a major driver 
of CPP abandonment. As our simulation results show, deviations from current patterns of 
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structural change accelerate rather than mitigate the problem of underuse. Instead of slowing or 
accelerating structural change through increased or decreased government support, policies 
should target farmers’ pay-off from appropriation. Such policies may include national as well as 
local governance measures. On the national level, polices might include a further increase in 
summering support as recommended (Baur et al., 2006), particularly through appropriation 
contribution or with payments for environmental services (Huber et al., 2013), which specifically 
target the upkeep of CPPs. However, increased marketing activities for alpine dairy products 
might be an effective tool for shaping price incentives for appropriation, which can be organized 
on national and local levels. On the local level, such a focus on centralized marketing activities in 
corporations are reported to have a strong positive impact on the overall functioning of the local 
agricultural sector (Bardsley and Bardsley, 2014). In addition, better labeling and a better 
communication of values associated with consumption of alpine products on the national level 
might raise prices for alpine products and promote incentives for keeping livestock in 
mountainous regions as well as using and maintaining CPPs. 
5.2 Options for Model Improvements and Future Research 
The model presented simulates CPP use at the local level. However, this model does not 
explicitly predict which parts of the CPP plots may potentially be abandoned. Coupling the SD 
model with geographic information systems would identify the areas that are most prone to 
abandonment and their characteristics. Information about the biological value and characteristics 
of these sites might help determine effective payments for environmental services. In addition, 
the model could be improved by refining the interactions of the resource units. Since different 
types of species and breeds might have very different mobility traits and grazing preference, land 
use patterns might vary with the breed types summered, which cannot be simulated with the 
model.
In addition to the limitation, the model might serve other purposes such as investigating the short-
term impacts of changes in the federal agricultural policy framework on CPP use or the 
simulation of the future development of single corporations. Since agricultural policies are often 
designed to target the sustainability problems on a national level, and may focus on agricultural 
holdings in the lowlands, the model might provide insights into the effects of federal policies on 
marginal regions and respective CPP use. Furthermore, running the model at the corporation level 
instead of at the regional level could reveal information about future developments of the single 
cooperation. This could help identify the corporations and their very specific characteristics, 
which account for vulnerability to understocking and land abandonment. Since two scenarios 
predict decrease in stocking density of about 500 units by 2040, such a decrease in stocking 
might concentrate in certain corporations and potentially leads to their collapse, rather than affect 
all corporations equally. Identifying the characteristics that make corporations more vulnerable or 
more robust to underuse could be an important step for adaptation in the local governance 
system. Potential actions might then include financial transfers between corporations, merging of 
corporations and the respective alpine enterprises, or a change in operational rules to ensure that 
livestock is allocated consistently between corporations in the case of serious understocking. In 
addition, simulations at the corporation level would add empirical evidence for identifying social-
ecological links and feedbacks that increase the robustness or vulnerability of the SESs to 
particular external perturbations (Anderies et al., 2004; Janssen et al., 2007). 
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6 Conclusion 
This work provides an example of an integrative analysis of common pool resource use from a 
social-ecological systems perspective. A system dynamics model has been developed to diagnose 
social-ecological interactions and outcomes for the use of common property pastures in the Swiss 
Alps. Using a combination of system dynamics modeling and formative scenario analysis, we 
simulated developments of the SES for several future external settings. However, the simulation 
results are not a precise forecast of future developments of the SES but a tool for assessing the 
SES characteristics and its capacity to deal with upcoming internal and external disturbances. 
Scenario simulation reveals that the sustainability of CPP is threatened by underuse rather than 
overuse and that the process of CPP abandonment is expected to continue. Furthermore, 
simulation results suggest that a panacea such as trade liberalization or an increase in government 
support will accelerate rather than counteract the problem. Since the different scenario settings 
changed the state of the SES and associated robustness and sustainability trade-offs, no single 
best policy setting was identified, but uncertainty in policy design is decreased. Accordingly, 
effective policies for counteracting CPP abandonment must target stocking density of CPP by 
changing the incentive structure for farmers’ appropriation decisions. This can be achieved with 
federal and local governance measures. Promising options include subsidies for appropriation 
paid to farmers, marketing activities such as labels, and a further ease of the exclusion principle 
by the local governance system. 
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Glossary
Common Pool Resources 
(CPRs)
Common pool resources (CPRs) are jointly managed 
resources, for which individuals’ appropriation 
diminishes the resource stock and potential 
beneficiaries of which are difficult to exclude (Berkes 
et al. 1989).  
Common Property 
Pastures
(CPPs)
Common property pastures (also called “Alp”) is 
collectively managed and used for grazing animals 
typically located on the hillsides of valleys. Due to 
their location in higher altitude they are generally less 
productive than the private plots and only used during 
summer. The pastures are generally managed in by 
legal corporate bodies of collective ownership.  
Social-ecological systems 
(SES)
According to Redman et al.2004, a Social-Ecological 
system are interlinked systems of people and nature, 
characterized by: 
1. a coherent system of biophysical and social factors 
that regularly interact in a resilient, sustained
manner; 
2. a system that is defined at several spatial, 
temporal, and organizational scales, which may be 
hierarchically linked; 
3. a set of critical resources (natural, socioeconomic, 
and cultural) whose flow and use is regulated by a 
combination of ecological and social systems; and
4. a perpetually dynamic, complex system with 
continuous adaptation.
Institutions Humanly devised constraints that structure human 
interactions. They are made up of formal constraints 
(rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints 
(norms of behavior, conventions and self-imposed 
codes of conduct), and their enforcement 
characteristics (North 1993)
System Dynamics 
(SD)
System Dynamics deals with interaction of various 
elements of a system in time and captures the 
dynamic aspect by incorporating concepts such as 
stock, flows, feedback and delays, and thereby 
provides an insight into the dynamic behavior of 
system over time (Tang and Vijay 2001) 
Constitution of the local 
governance system
(“Taleinungsbrief”) 
The “Taleinungsbrief” is a local constitution in which 
the seven corporations of Grindelwald write down 
their binding agreements about rules and process 
applied in the governance of their respective common 
property area. It was last amended in 2002.  
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Cooperative 
(“Taleinung”) 
The “Taleinung” of Grindelwald is a legal body and 
functions as an umbrella organization in the interest 
of the corporations, with legislative tasks on the local 
level.  
Corporation 
(“Bergschaft”)
The “Bergschaft” is an operational unit that organizes 
the agricultural use of their respective resource 
system.
Use right 
(“Kuhrecht”) 
Use rights (or usage rights) define the number of 
livestock units that a farmer is allowed to send to the 
CPP. Furthermore, use rights define membership in 
the specific corporation. The rights cannot be sold and 
are tied to private plots in the valley. 
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Supporting Material for Module 4
Model Tests
Description of the four types of structural tests conducted:
1. Dimensional consistency: ensured that all variables have units with real-world 
meaning; automatically conducted with the Vensim software.
2. Integration error testing: This included running the model with different integration 
methods such as Euler and Runge-Kutta and with different time intervals. When the 
integration method was changed, the behavior of the model remained unchanged. A 
change in the time interval had a minor impact on the model behavior, since farmers 
automatically adapt their livestock more frequently to changing land use incentives. 
As a result, the ecological system was also affected by the chosen time interval.
Simulating the model with a time interval of one year resulted in 2,481 ha of forest, 
with a time interval of 0.5 in 2,488 ha forest, and with a time interval of 0.0078 in 
2,501 ha forest. However, this indicates only that changes in time interval would 
require changing the parameters incorporating delays such as “time to adjust herd 
size.” 
3. Reality check equations: We used RC decay functions to force variable values to 0 at 
a certain time to see whether logical consequences arise in the following relationships:
“No farmers no livestock”; CONDITION: Farm households = 0; 
IMPLICATION: Livestock per household = 0 
“No farmers no appropriation of local cattle”; CONDITION: Farm households 
= 0; IMPLICATION: Appropriation of local cattle = 0
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“No monitoring no provision”; CONDITION: Monitoring = 0; 
IMPLICATION: Provision fulfillment = 0
“No appropriation no provision”; CONDITION: Stocking = 0; 
IMPLICATION: Provision = 0
“Conservation of landmass”; CONDITION: Forest = 0; IMPLICATION: 
Forest + Overgrown Summer Pastures + Summer Pastures = 6,663.
4. Extreme condition tests:  
“No government support”: if direct payments tied to private parcels are set to 
0 no matter at which time point, the system collapses within 5 years. Since
farming was no longer feasible, farmers completely gave up agriculture, 
because it no longer generated a satisfying household income. 
“Increasing costs of agricultural production”: if the costs of agricultural 
production were increased in 2000 by 10% annually, the last farmer would 
abandon agriculture in 2019. 
“Increasing productivity of CPP”: A sudden doubling of the animal feed yield 
on CPPs in 2000 as a result of a technological breakthrough would have 
caused a massive abandonment of CPPs followed by an increase in forest 
stands of up to 4,800 ha by 2020. 
Sensitivity tests for parameter assessment:
Outcomes for sensitivity tests when the following parameters are randomized: 
Satisficing household income was randomized with the lower limit set at CHF 55,000 
and the upper limit set at CHF 100,000. 
Initial pasture productivity was randomized with a lower limit of 10 and an upper 
limit of 25 kg DM/day/ha. 
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Availability of cattle in the lowlands was randomized with a lower limit of 0.1 and an 
upper limit of 1. 
Fodder decay fraction with a lower limit of 1 and an upper limit of 4. 
Fig. 1. Outcomes of sensitivity tests for farm households, stock, common property pasture area, and forest stands 
by randomizing parameters. 
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Model Documentation
Documentation of Full model SES Grindelwald
View the 172 variables sorted by type, module, group, variable name, module/group/name, Level Structure, or in a view summary.
Model Assessment Results
Model Information Number
Total Number of Variables 172
Total Number of State Variables
(Level+Smooth+Delay Variables)
8
Total Number of Stocks (Stocks in
Level+Smooth+Delay Variables) †
8
Total Number of Macros 0
Function Sensitivity Parameters 0
Variables with Source Information 0
Data Lookup Tables 0
Time Unit Year
Initial Time 1980
Final Time 2040
Reported Time Interval TIME
STEP
Time Step 1
Model Is Fully Formulated Yes
Modeler-Defined Groups - No -
VPM File Available - No -
Warnings Number
Undocumented Equations 168
Equations with Embedded Data 42
Equations With Unit Errors or Warnings Unavailable
Variables Not in Any View 0
Incompletely Defined Subscripted Variables 0
Nonmonotonic Lookup Functions 1
Cascading (Chained) Lookup Functions 0
Equations with IF...THEN...ELSE 10
Equations with MIN or MAX 0
Potential Omissions Number
Unused Variables 4
Supplementary Variables 0
Supplementary Variables Being Used 0
Complex Variable Formulations (Richardson's
Rule = 3)
1
Complex Stock Formulations 0
Types:
 L : Level (8 / 8) * SM : Smooth (0 /0) *
DE : Delay (0 / 0) * † LI : Level Initial (4) I : Initial (0)
C : Constant (62) F : Flow (15) A : Auxiliary (102) Sub: Subscripts(0) D : Data (0)
G : Game (0) T : Lookup (16 /16) ††
   
* (state variables / total stocks)
† Total stocks do not include fixed delay variables.
†† (lookup variables / lookup tables).
 
Groups:
Control (4)
Simulation Control
Parameters
Full model SES
Grindelwald (168)
(Default)
Modules: Default (172)
Views:
External Setting (61) Actor (A) (58) Governance System(GS) (35)
Resource Units (RU)
(44)
Resource System
(RS) (24)
Levels (8) auxilary (0) Reality checks (0) View 9 (0) View 10 (0)
 
TOP External Setting (61 variables)
Module Group Type Variable Name and Description
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
T,A agricultural price index (dmnl)
= WITH LOOKUP (Time,([(1980,0)-(2040,200)],(1980.37,185.965),(1990,144),(1995,122),
(2000,108),(2005,103),(2010,100),(2040,80) ))
Present in 1 view:
External Setting
Used by:
cheese price
milk price
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
A appropriation contribution (CHF/NST)
= STEP( current appropriation contribution*(consumer price index/100), 2015)*scenario multiplier
summering
Present in 2 views:
External Setting
Resource Units (RU)
Used by:
pay-off appropriation
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
C Change Direct Costs / GVE (1/Year)
= 0.013
Present in 2 views:
External Setting
Levels
Used by:
scenario multiplier costs of agricultural production
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
C Change Direct Payments (1/Year)
= 0
Present in 2 views:
External Setting
Levels
Used by:
scenario multiplier direct payments
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
C Change in climate development (1/Year)
= 0.067
Present in 2 views:
External Setting
Levels
Used by:
scenario multiplier climate
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
C Change off-farm income opportunities (1/Year)
= 0
Present in 2 views:
External Setting
Levels
Used by:
scenario multiplier off-farm income
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
C Change Producer Prices (1/Year)
= 0.01
Present in 2 views:
External Setting
Levels
Used by:
scenario multiplier producer prices
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
C Change Summering payments (1/Year)
= 0
Present in 2 views:
External Setting
Levels
Used by:
scenario multiplier summering
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
C Change Wood Price (1/Year)
= 0.033
Present in 2 views:
External Setting
Levels
Used by:
scenario multplier wood price
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
A cheese price (CHF/kg)
= ((((agricultural price index/100)*(consumer price index/100))*current cheese price)*effec of
tourism on cheese price)*scenario multiplier producer prices
Present in 2 views:
External Setting
Resource Units (RU)
Used by:
pay-off cheese
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
A climate change (degree/Year)
= climate change development*scenario multiplier climate
Present in 1 view:
External Setting
Used by:
effect of climate on tourism
growing season
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
A climate change development (degree/Year)
= RAMP(0.02, 1980, 2040)
Present in 1 view:
External Setting
Used by:
climate change
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
C climate change normal (degree)
= 0.6
Present in 1 view:
External Setting
Used by:
effect of climate on tourism
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
T,A consumer price index (dmnl)
= WITH LOOKUP (Time,([(1980,0)-(2040,200)],(1980,52),(1990,74),(2000,92),(2010,100),
(2040,150) ))
Present in 2 views:
External Setting
Actor (A)
Used by:
appropriation contribution
cheese price
direct costs/GVE
direct payments/GVE
Direct payments/ha
discrepancy ratio
potenital off-farm income
spendings on labor
summering fee
summering payments
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
C current appropriation contribution (CHF/NST)
= 370
Present in 1 view:
External Setting
Used by:
appropriation contribution
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
C current cheese price (CHF/kg)
= 18
Present in 1 view:
External Setting
Used by:
cheese price
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
C current direct costs/GVE (CHF/GVE)
= 2000
Present in 1 view:
External Setting
Used by:
direct costs/GVE
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
C current direct payments/GVE (CHF/GVE)
= 970
Present in 1 view:
External Setting
Used by:
direct payments/GVE
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
C current direct payments/ha (CHF/ha)
= 2000
Present in 1 view:
External Setting
Used by:
Direct payments/ha
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
C current milk price (CHF/kg)
= 0.5
Present in 1 view:
External Setting
Used by:
milk price
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
C current potential off farm income (SFr/person)
= 63200
Present in 1 view:
External Setting
Used by:
potenital off-farm income
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
C current summering costs (CHF/NST)
= 700
Present in 1 view:
External Setting
Used by:
summering fee
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
C current summering payments (CHF/NST)
= 300
Present in 1 view:
External Setting
Used by:
summering payments
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
C current wood price (CHF/FM)
= 55
Present in 1 view:
External Setting
Used by:
wood price
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
A direct costs/GVE (CHF/GVE)
= current direct costs/GVE*(consumer price index/100)*scenario multiplier costs of agricultural
production
Present in 2 views:
External Setting
Actor (A)
Used by:
costs of herd
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
A direct payments/GVE (CHF/GVE)
= (consumer price index/100)*current direct payments/GVE*scenario multiplier direct payments
Present in 2 views:
External Setting
Actor (A)
Used by:
household income direct payments animals
land use incentive direct payments
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
A Direct payments/ha (CHF/ha)
= ((consumer price index/100)*current direct payments/ha)*scenario multiplier direct payments
Present in 2 views:
External Setting
Actor (A)
Used by:
income land use
land use incentive direct payments
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
T,A effec of tourism on cheese price (dmnl)
= WITH LOOKUP (local tourism index,([(0,0)-(110,100)],(0,0),(1,0.1),(100,1),(110,1.1) ))
Present in 1 view:
External Setting
Used by:
cheese price
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
T,A effect of climate on tourism (dmnl)
= WITH LOOKUP (climate change/climate change normal,([(0,0)-(5,5)],(0.6,1),(1,1),
(2.01835,1.18421),(3.30275,1.57895),(4.89297,2.85088) ))
Present in 1 view:
External Setting
Used by:
local tourism index
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
C effect on climate change on growing season (days/degree)
= 12
Present in 1 view:
External Setting
Used by:
growing season
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
A growing season (days/Year)
= Initial summering season+(effect on climate change on growing season*climate change)
Present in 3 views:
External Setting
Resource Units (RU)
Resource System (RS)
Used by:
forgone payoff-milk when summered
local stocking potenital
milk sold per dairy cow
pay-off cheese
plot annual fodder production
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
C Initial summering season (days/Year)
= 95
Present in 1 view:
External Setting
Used by:
growing season
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
A land use incentive direct payments (GVE/ha)
= Direct payments/ha/direct payments/GVE
Present in 1 view:
External Setting
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
A local tourism index (dmnl)
= ((normal tourism development*100)*scenario multiplier tourism)*effect of climate on tourism
Present in 1 view:
External Setting
Used by:
effec of tourism on cheese price
potenital off-farm income
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
A milk price (CHF/kg)
= (agricultural price index/100)*current milk price*scenario multiplier producer prices
Present in 2 views:
External Setting
Resource Units (RU)
Used by:
forgone payoff-milk when summered
pay-off milk
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
C Minimum revenue needed for harvesting (SFr/FM)
= 10
Present in 1 view:
External Setting
Used by:
rentability of wood harvest
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
T,A normal tourism development (dmnl)
= WITH LOOKUP (Time,([(1980,0)-(2040,10)],(1980,0.8),(1990,0.87),(2000,0.95),(2010,1),
(2020,1.1),(2030,1.2),(2040,1.3) ))
Present in 1 view:
External Setting
Used by:
local tourism index
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
A potenital off-farm income (SFr/person)
= (((consumer price index/100)+(local tourism index/100))/2)*current potential off farm
income*scenario multiplier off-farm income*rentability of wood harvest
Present in 2 views:
External Setting
Actor (A)
Used by:
off farm income
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
A rentability of wood harvest (dmnl)
= IF THEN ELSE(wood price-wood harvesting cost>Minimum revenue needed for harvesting, wood
price/wood harvesting cost, 1)
Present in 1 view:
External Setting
Used by:
potenital off-farm income
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
A scenario multiplier climate (dmnl)
= 1+STEP( RAMP(Change in climate development, 2015, 2040), 2015)
Present in 1 view:
External Setting
Used by:
climate change
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
A scenario multiplier costs of agricultural production (dmnl)
= 1+STEP( RAMP(Change Direct Costs / GVE, 2015, 2040), 2015)
Present in 1 view:
External Setting
Used by:
direct costs/GVE
summering fee
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
A scenario multiplier direct payments (dmnl)
= 1+STEP( RAMP(Change Direct Payments, 2010, 2040), 2010)
Present in 1 view:
External Setting
Used by:
direct payments/GVE
Direct payments/ha
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
A scenario multiplier off-farm income (dmnl)
= 1+STEP( RAMP(Change off-farm income opportunities, 2015, 2040), 2015)
Present in 1 view:
External Setting
Used by:
potenital off-farm income
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
A scenario multiplier producer prices (dmnl)
= 1+STEP( RAMP(Change Producer Prices, 2015, 2040), 2015)
Present in 1 view:
External Setting
Used by:
cheese price
milk price
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
A scenario multiplier summering (dmnl)
= 1+STEP( RAMP(Change Summering payments, 2010, 2040), 2010)
Present in 1 view:
External Setting
Used by:
appropriation contribution
summering payments
Default Full model
SES
Grindelwald
(Default)
A scenario multiplier tourism (dmnl)
= 1+STEP( RAMP(Tourism development, 2015, 2040), 2015)
Present in 1 view:
External Setting
Used by:
local tourism index
List of 168 Undocumented Variables
Module Group Type Variable (168)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald F,A abandonment (ha/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald F,A afforestation (ha/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A agricultural income houshold (SFr/household)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald T,A agricultural price index (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A appropriation contribution (CHF/NST)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald F,A appropriation of foreign cattle (NST/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald F,A appropriation of local livestock (NST/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C availability of cattle in the lowlands (1/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C average land holding (ha/household)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A average land holdings per household (ha/household)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A breeding progress (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C Carrying Capacity (NST)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C Change Direct Costs / GVE (1/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C Change Direct Payments (1/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C Change in climate development (1/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C change in milk yield when not summered (Year/NST)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C change in milk yield when summered (Year/NST)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C Change off-farm income opportunities (1/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C Change Producer Prices (1/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C Change Summering payments (1/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C Change Wood Price (1/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A cheese price (CHF/kg)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald F,A clearing (ha/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A climate change (degree/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A climate change development (degree/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C climate change normal (degree)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald L Common Property Pastures (ha)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C compensation for additional provision (SFr/hour)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald T,A consumer price index (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C converter NST (NST/GVE)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C cost of agricultural workforce (CHF/person)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A cost of appropriation (CHF/NST)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A costs of herd (CHF/household)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald T,A cultivated private parcels (ha)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C current appropriation contribution (CHF/NST)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C current cheese price (CHF/kg)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C current direct costs/GVE (CHF/GVE)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C current direct payments/GVE (CHF/GVE)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C current direct payments/ha (CHF/ha)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C current milk price (CHF/kg)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C current potential off farm income (SFr/person)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C current summering costs (CHF/NST)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C current summering payments (CHF/NST)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C current wood price (CHF/FM)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A daily fodder need per NST (kg/NST/day)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A daily milk yield of dairy cow (kg/day)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald F,A defection (hours/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald T,A desired land use intensity (GVE/ha)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A direct costs/GVE (CHF/GVE)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A direct payments/GVE (CHF/GVE)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A Direct payments/ha (CHF/ha)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A discrepancy ratio (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald F,A duty fullfilment (hours/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald T,A effec of tourism on cheese price (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald T,A effect of climate on tourism (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald T,A effect of discrepancy ratio on farm abandonment (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald T,A effect of foregone summering payments on exludability (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald T,A effect of land holding on appropriation (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald T,A effect of land holding on fullfilment rate (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald T,A effect of land holding on herd adjustment (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald T,A effect of open pasture on productivity (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C effect on climate change on growing season (days/degree)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald F,A extra provision bought (hours/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald F,A farm abandonment (household/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald L Farm Household (household)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald F,A farm succession (household/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C fines (SFr/hour)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A fines payed (SFr)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A fodder requirements (kg/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C fooder decay fraction (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald T,A foreign cattle allowance (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald L Forest (ha)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A forgone payoff-milk when summered (CHF/NST)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A forgone summering payments (CHF)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C fraction dairy cow (Year/GVE)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C fraction planed (1/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A fullfilment rate (1/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A growing season (days/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald F,A herd adjustment (GVE/household/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A hired labor (person/household)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A household income (SFr/household)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A household income direct payments animals (SFr/household)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A household income livestock (SFr/household)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A household lifetime (Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A houshold stocking gap (GVE/household)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A in use ratio (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald T,A incentives for summering (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A income land use (SFr/household)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald LI,C INITIAL CPP (ha)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C INITIAL FODDER NEED per NST (kg/NST/day)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald LI,C INITIAL FORREST (ha)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C INITIAL MILK YIELD (kg/day)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald LI,C INITIAL OVERGROWN SUMMER PASTURES (ha)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C INITIAL PRODUCTIVITY (kg/ha/day)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C INITIAL PROVISION POTENTIAL (hours)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald LI,A INITIAL PROVISION POTENTIAL I (hours)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C Initial summering season (days/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C initial time to change land use (Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C labor potenital (person/household)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A labor productivity (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A labor requirements (person/household)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C Lactation phase (day/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A land discrepany (ha)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A land use incentive direct payments (GVE/ha)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A land use incentives (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald L Livestock Per Household (GVE/household)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A local stocking potenital (NST)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A local tourism index (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A milk price (CHF/kg)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A milk sold per dairy cow (kg/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A milk to cheese conversion factor (kg/kg)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C Minimum revenue needed for harvesting (SFr/FM)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C monitoring (1/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C mortality rate (1/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C normal appropriation rate (1/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C normal household lifetime (Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C normal labor requirements livestock (person/GVE)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C normal labor requirments area (person/ha)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A normal land holding (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C normal succession rate (1/fraction [0,1])
Default Full model SES Grindelwald T,A normal tourism development (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A off farm income (SFr/household)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald L Owergrown Common Property Pastures (ha)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A pasture deficit (ha)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A pay-off appropriation (CHF/NST)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A pay-off cheese (CHF/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A pay-off milk (CHF/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald F,A planed provision (hours/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A plot annual fodder production (kg/ha/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A potenital off-farm income (SFr/person)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A productivity of pastures (kg/ha/day)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A profit from livestock (SFr/household)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald L Provision (hours)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald L Provision Capacity (hours)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald F,A provision executed (hours/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A provision level (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C provision requirements (hours/NST)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A rentability of wood harvest (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald F,A reopened (ha/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald F,A return to valley (NST/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C sanctioning (Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C satysificing household income (SFr/household)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A scenario multiplier climate (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A scenario multiplier costs of agricultural production (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A scenario multiplier direct payments (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A scenario multiplier off-farm income (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A scenario multiplier producer prices (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A scenario multiplier summering (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A scenario multiplier tourism (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A scenario multplier wood price (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A search for foreign cattle (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C season normal (day/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A spendings on labor (CHF/household)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald L Stocking (NST)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A stocking gap (NST)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C succession time (Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A summering fee (CHF/NST)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A summering payments (CHF/NST)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A surplus pasture (ha)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C time for provision (Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C time to adjust herd size (Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A time to change land use (Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A total livestock in the Valley (GVE)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C Tourism development (1/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C wood harvesting cost (SFr/FM)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A wood price (CHF/FM)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald T,A wood price index (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A workload (dmnl)
List of 1 Non-Monotonic Lookup Function
Module Group Type Variable (1)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald T,A wood price index (dmnl)
List of 10 Variables Using IF...THEN...ELSE Functions
Module Group Type Variable (0)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald F,A abandonment (ha/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald F,A clearing (ha/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A forgone summering payments (CHF)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A hired labor (person/household)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A off farm income (SFr/household)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A pasture deficit (ha)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A rentability of wood harvest (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald F,A reopened (ha/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A spendings on labor (CHF/household)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A surplus pasture (ha)
Formulation Complexity Summary (Violations of Richardson's Rule)
Module Group Type Variable Complexity Score
Default Full model SES Grindelwald L Common Property Pastures (ha) 4
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A costs of herd (CHF/household) 4
Default Full model SES Grindelwald L Provision Capacity (hours) 4
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A household income livestock (SFr/household) 4
Default Full model SES Grindelwald F,A clearing (ha/Year) 4
Default Full model SES Grindelwald F,A appropriation of foreign cattle (NST/Year) 4
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A fodder requirements (kg/Year) 4
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A forgone payoff-milk when summered (CHF/NST) 4
Default Full model SES Grindelwald L Owergrown Common Property Pastures (ha) 4
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A pay-off cheese (CHF/Year) 4
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A pay-off appropriation (CHF/NST) 4
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A labor requirements (person/household) 5
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A local stocking potenital (NST) 5
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A cheese price (CHF/kg) 5
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A potenital off-farm income (SFr/person) 5
List of 42 Equations with Embedded Data
Module Group Type Variable (42)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A appropriation contribution (CHF/NST)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A breeding progress (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A cheese price (CHF/kg)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald F,A clearing (ha/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A climate change development (degree/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A costs of herd (CHF/household)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald F,A defection (hours/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A direct costs/GVE (CHF/GVE)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A direct payments/GVE (CHF/GVE)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A Direct payments/ha (CHF/ha)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A discrepancy ratio (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald L Farm Household (household)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A forgone summering payments (CHF)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A hired labor (person/household)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald LI,A INITIAL PROVISION POTENTIAL I (hours)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A labor productivity (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald L Livestock Per Household (GVE/household)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A local tourism index (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A milk price (CHF/kg)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A milk to cheese conversion factor (kg/kg)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A off farm income (SFr/household)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A pasture deficit (ha)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A potenital off-farm income (SFr/person)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald L Provision (hours)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A rentability of wood harvest (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald F,A reopened (ha/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald F,A return to valley (NST/Year)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A scenario multiplier climate (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A scenario multiplier costs of agricultural production (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A scenario multiplier direct payments (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A scenario multiplier off-farm income (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A scenario multiplier producer prices (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A scenario multiplier summering (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A scenario multiplier tourism (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A scenario multplier wood price (dmnl)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A spendings on labor (CHF/household)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald L Stocking (NST)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A stocking gap (NST)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A summering fee (CHF/NST)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A summering payments (CHF/NST)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A surplus pasture (ha)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A wood price (CHF/FM)
List of 8 State Variables
Module Group Type Variable
Default Full model SES Grindelwald L Common Property Pastures (ha)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald L Farm Household (household)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald L Forest (ha)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald L Livestock Per Household (GVE/household)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald L Owergrown Common Property Pastures (ha)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald L Provision (hours)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald L Provision Capacity (hours)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald L Stocking (NST)
List of 4 Unused Variables
Module Group Type Variable (4)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald C INITIAL PROVISION POTENTIAL (hours)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A land use incentive direct payments (GVE/ha)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A total livestock in the Valley (GVE)
Default Full model SES Grindelwald A workload (dmnl)
List of 6 Views and Their 173 Variables*
 
External
Setting
Actor
(A)
Governance
System (GS)
Resource
Units (RU)
Resource
System
(RS) Levels
 
Total: 61 58 35 44 24 8 :Total
abandonment (in 1 view)     X  abandonment (in 1 view)
afforestation (in 1 view)     X  afforestation (in 1 view)
agricultural income
houshold (in 1 view)
 X     agricultural income
houshold (in 1 view)
agricultural price index (in
1 view)
X      agricultural price index (in
1 view)
appropriation contribution
(in 2 views)
X   X   appropriation contribution
(in 2 views)
appropriation of foreign
cattle (in 1 view)
   X   appropriation of foreign
cattle (in 1 view)
appropriation of local
livestock (in 2 views)
  X X   appropriation of local
livestock (in 2 views)
availability of cattle in the
lowlands (in 1 view)
   X   availability of cattle in the
lowlands (in 1 view)
average land holding (in 1
view)
 X     average land holding (in 1
view)
average land holdings per
household (in 1 view)
 X     average land holdings per
household (in 1 view)
breeding progress (in 1
view)
   X   breeding progress (in 1
view)
Carrying Capacity (in 1
view)
  X    Carrying Capacity (in 1
view)
Change Direct Costs /
GVE (in 2 views)
X     X Change Direct Costs /
GVE (in 2 views)
Change Direct Payments
(in 2 views)
X     X Change Direct Payments
(in 2 views)
Change in climate
development (in 2 views)
X     X Change in climate
development (in 2 views)
change in milk yield when
not summered (in 1 view)
   X   change in milk yield when
not summered (in 1 view)
change in milk yield when
summered (in 1 view)
   X   change in milk yield when
summered (in 1 view)
Change off-farm income
opportunities (in 2 views)
X     X Change off-farm income
opportunities (in 2 views)
Change Producer Prices
(in 2 views)
X     X Change Producer Prices
(in 2 views)
Change Summering
payments (in 2 views)
X     X Change Summering
payments (in 2 views)
Change Wood Price (in 2
views)
X     X Change Wood Price (in 2
views)
cheese price (in 2 views) X   X   cheese price (in 2 views)
clearing (in 1 view)     X  clearing (in 1 view)
climate change (in 1 view) X      climate change (in 1 view)
climate change
development (in 1 view)
X      climate change
development (in 1 view)
climate change normal (in
1 view)
X      climate change normal (in
1 view)
Common Property
Pastures (in 1 view)
    X  Common Property
Pastures (in 1 view)
compensation for
additional provision (in 1
view)
  X    compensation for
additional provision (in 1
view)
consumer price index (in 2
views)
X X     consumer price index (in 2
views)
converter NST (in 2 views)  X  X   converter NST (in 2 views)
cost of agricultural
workforce (in 1 view)
 X     cost of agricultural
workforce (in 1 view)
cost of appropriation (in 2
views)
 X  X   cost of appropriation (in 2
views)
costs of herd (in 1 view)  X     costs of herd (in 1 view)
cultivated private parcels
(in 1 view)
 X     cultivated private parcels
(in 1 view)
current appropriation
contribution (in 1 view)
X      current appropriation
contribution (in 1 view)
current cheese price (in 1
view)
X      current cheese price (in 1
view)
current direct costs/GVE
(in 1 view)
X      current direct costs/GVE
(in 1 view)
current direct
payments/GVE (in 1 view)
X      current direct
payments/GVE (in 1 view)
current direct payments/ha
(in 1 view)
X      current direct payments/ha
(in 1 view)
current milk price (in 1
view)
X      current milk price (in 1
view)
current potential off farm
income (in 1 view)
X      current potential off farm
income (in 1 view)
current summering costs
(in 1 view)
X      current summering costs
(in 1 view)
current summering
payments (in 1 view)
X      current summering
payments (in 1 view)
current wood price (in 1
view)
X      current wood price (in 1
view)
daily fodder need per NST
(in 1 view)
   X   daily fodder need per NST
(in 1 view)
daily milk yield of dairy
cow (in 1 view)
   X   daily milk yield of dairy
cow (in 1 view)
defection (in 1 view)   X    defection (in 1 view)
desired land use intensity
(in 1 view)
 X     desired land use intensity
(in 1 view)
direct costs/GVE (in 2
views)
X X     direct costs/GVE (in 2
views)
direct payments/GVE (in 2
views)
X X     direct payments/GVE (in 2
views)
Direct payments/ha (in 2
views)
X X     Direct payments/ha (in 2
views)
discrepancy ratio (in 1
view)
 X     discrepancy ratio (in 1
view)
duty fullfilment (in 1 view)   X    duty fullfilment (in 1 view)
effec of tourism on cheese
price (in 1 view)
X      effec of tourism on cheese
price (in 1 view)
effect of climate on
tourism (in 1 view)
X      effect of climate on
tourism (in 1 view)
effect of discrepancy ratio
on farm abandonment (in
1 view)
 X     effect of discrepancy ratio
on farm abandonment (in
1 view)
effect of foregone
summering payments on
exludability (in 1 view)
  X    effect of foregone
summering payments on
exludability (in 1 view)
effect of land holding on
appropriation (in 1 view)
   X   effect of land holding on
appropriation (in 1 view)
effect of land holding on
fullfilment rate (in 1 view)
  X    effect of land holding on
fullfilment rate (in 1 view)
effect of land holding on
herd adjustment (in 1
view)
 X     effect of land holding on
herd adjustment (in 1
view)
effect of open pasture on
productivity (in 1 view)
    X  effect of open pasture on
productivity (in 1 view)
effect on climate change
on growing season (in 1
view)
X      effect on climate change
on growing season (in 1
view)
extra provision bought (in
1 view)
  X    extra provision bought (in
1 view)
farm abandonment (in 1
view)
 X     farm abandonment (in 1
view)
Farm Household (in 2
views)
 X  X   Farm Household (in 2
views)
farm succession (in 1
view)
 X     farm succession (in 1
view)
FINAL TIME (in 0 views)       FINAL TIME (in 0 views)
fines (in 2 views)   X X   fines (in 2 views)
fines payed (in 1 view)   X    fines payed (in 1 view)
fodder requirements (in 2
views)
   X X  fodder requirements (in 2
views)
fooder decay fraction (in 1
view)
   X   fooder decay fraction (in 1
view)
foreign cattle allowance (in
1 view)
  X    foreign cattle allowance (in
1 view)
Forest (in 1 view)     X  Forest (in 1 view)
forgone payoff-milk when
summered (in 1 view)
   X   forgone payoff-milk when
summered (in 1 view)
forgone summering
payments (in 1 view)
  X    forgone summering
payments (in 1 view)
fraction dairy cow (in 1
view)
 X     fraction dairy cow (in 1
view)
fraction planed (in 1 view)   X    fraction planed (in 1 view)
fullfilment rate (in 1 view)   X    fullfilment rate (in 1 view)
growing season (in 3
views)
X   X X  growing season (in 3
views)
herd adjustment (in 1
view)
 X     herd adjustment (in 1
view)
hired labor (in 1 view)  X     hired labor (in 1 view)
household income (in 1
view)
 X     household income (in 1
view)
household income direct
payments animals (in 1
view)
 X     household income direct
payments animals (in 1
view)
household income
livestock (in 1 view)
 X     household income
livestock (in 1 view)
household lifetime (in 1
view)
 X     household lifetime (in 1
view)
houshold stocking gap (in
1 view)
 X     houshold stocking gap (in
1 view)
in use ratio (in 1 view)     X  in use ratio (in 1 view)
incentives for summering
(in 1 view)
   X   incentives for summering
(in 1 view)
income land use (in 1
view)
 X     income land use (in 1
view)
INITIAL CPP (in 1 view)     X  INITIAL CPP (in 1 view)
INITIAL FODDER NEED
per NST (in 1 view)
   X   INITIAL FODDER NEED
per NST (in 1 view)
INITIAL FORREST (in 1
view)
    X  INITIAL FORREST (in 1
view)
INITIAL MILK YIELD (in 1
view)
   X   INITIAL MILK YIELD (in 1
view)
INITIAL OVERGROWN
SUMMER PASTURES (in
1 view)
    X  INITIAL OVERGROWN
SUMMER PASTURES (in
1 view)
INITIAL PRODUCTIVITY
(in 1 view)
    X  INITIAL PRODUCTIVITY
(in 1 view)
INITIAL PROVISION
POTENTIAL (in 1 view)
  X    INITIAL PROVISION
POTENTIAL (in 1 view)
INITIAL PROVISION
POTENTIAL I (in 1 view)
  X    INITIAL PROVISION
POTENTIAL I (in 1 view)
Initial summering season
(in 1 view)
X      Initial summering season
(in 1 view)
INITIAL TIME (in 0 views)       INITIAL TIME (in 0 views)
initial time to change land
use (in 1 view)
    X  initial time to change land
use (in 1 view)
labor potenital (in 1 view)  X     labor potenital (in 1 view)
labor productivity (in 1
view)
 X     labor productivity (in 1
view)
labor requirements (in 1
view)
 X     labor requirements (in 1
view)
Lactation phase (in 1
view)
   X   Lactation phase (in 1
view)
land discrepany (in 1 view)     X  land discrepany (in 1 view)
land use incentive direct
payments (in 1 view)
X      land use incentive direct
payments (in 1 view)
land use incentives (in 1
view)
 X     land use incentives (in 1
view)
Livestock Per Household
(in 2 views)
 X  X   Livestock Per Household
(in 2 views)
local stocking potenital (in
1 view)
   X   local stocking potenital (in
1 view)
local tourism index (in 1
view)
X      local tourism index (in 1
view)
milk price (in 2 views) X   X   milk price (in 2 views)
milk sold per dairy cow (in
1 view)
   X   milk sold per dairy cow (in
1 view)
milk to cheese conversion
factor (in 1 view)
   X   milk to cheese conversion
factor (in 1 view)
Minimum revenue needed
for harvesting (in 1 view)
X      Minimum revenue needed
for harvesting (in 1 view)
monitoring (in 1 view)   X    monitoring (in 1 view)
mortality rate (in 1 view)    X   mortality rate (in 1 view)
normal appropriation rate
(in 2 views)
 X  X   normal appropriation rate
(in 2 views)
normal household lifetime
(in 1 view)
 X     normal household lifetime
(in 1 view)
normal labor requirements
livestock (in 1 view)
 X     normal labor requirements
livestock (in 1 view)
normal labor requirments
area (in 1 view)
 X     normal labor requirments
area (in 1 view)
normal land holding (in 3
views)
 X X X   normal land holding (in 3
views)
normal succession rate (in
1 view)
 X     normal succession rate (in
1 view)
normal tourism
development (in 1 view)
X      normal tourism
development (in 1 view)
off farm income (in 1 view)  X     off farm income (in 1 view)
Owergrown Common
Property Pastures (in 1
view)
    X  Owergrown Common
Property Pastures (in 1
view)
pasture deficit (in 1 view)     X  pasture deficit (in 1 view)
pay-off appropriation (in 1
view)
   X   pay-off appropriation (in 1
view)
pay-off cheese (in 2 views)  X  X   pay-off cheese (in 2 views)
pay-off milk (in 2 views)  X  X   pay-off milk (in 2 views)
planed provision (in 1
view)
  X    planed provision (in 1
view)
plot annual fodder
production (in 1 view)
    X  plot annual fodder
production (in 1 view)
potenital off-farm income
(in 2 views)
X X     potenital off-farm income
(in 2 views)
productivity of pastures (in
1 view)
    X  productivity of pastures (in
1 view)
profit from livestock (in 1
view)
 X     profit from livestock (in 1
view)
Provision (in 1 view)   X    Provision (in 1 view)
Provision Capacity (in 1
view)
  X    Provision Capacity (in 1
view)
provision executed (in 1
view)
  X    provision executed (in 1
view)
provision level (in 2 views)   X  X  provision level (in 2 views)
provision requirements (in
2 views)
  X X   provision requirements (in
2 views)
rentability of wood harvest
(in 1 view)
X      rentability of wood harvest
(in 1 view)
reopened (in 1 view)     X  reopened (in 1 view)
return to valley (in 1 view)    X   return to valley (in 1 view)
sanctioning (in 1 view)   X    sanctioning (in 1 view)
satysificing household
income (in 1 view)
 X     satysificing household
income (in 1 view)
SAVEPER (in 0 views)       SAVEPER (in 0 views)
scenario multiplier climate
(in 1 view)
X      scenario multiplier climate
(in 1 view)
scenario multiplier costs of
agricultural production (in
1 view)
X      scenario multiplier costs of
agricultural production (in
1 view)
scenario multiplier direct
payments (in 1 view)
X      scenario multiplier direct
payments (in 1 view)
scenario multiplier off-farm
income (in 1 view)
X      scenario multiplier off-farm
income (in 1 view)
scenario multiplier
producer prices (in 1 view)
X      scenario multiplier
producer prices (in 1 view)
scenario multiplier
summering (in 1 view)
X      scenario multiplier
summering (in 1 view)
scenario multiplier tourism
(in 1 view)
X      scenario multiplier tourism
(in 1 view)
scenario multplier wood
price (in 1 view)
X      scenario multplier wood
price (in 1 view)
search for foreign cattle (in
2 views)
  X X   search for foreign cattle (in
2 views)
season normal (in 1 view)    X   season normal (in 1 view)
spendings on labor (in 1
view)
 X     spendings on labor (in 1
view)
Stocking (in 2 views)   X X   Stocking (in 2 views)
stocking gap (in 2 views)   X X   stocking gap (in 2 views)
succession time (in 1
view)
    X  succession time (in 1
view)
summering fee (in 3
views)
X X  X   summering fee (in 3
views)
summering payments (in 2
views)
X  X    summering payments (in 2
views)
surplus pasture (in 1 view)     X  surplus pasture (in 1 view)
Time (in 4 views) X X X X   Time (in 4 views)
time for provision (in 1
view)
  X    time for provision (in 1
view)
TIME STEP (in 1 view)   X    TIME STEP (in 1 view)
time to adjust herd size (in
1 view)
 X     time to adjust herd size (in
1 view)
time to change land use
(in 1 view)
    X  time to change land use
(in 1 view)
total livestock in the Valley
(in 1 view)
 X     total livestock in the Valley
(in 1 view)
Tourism development (in 2
views)
X     X Tourism development (in 2
views)
wood harvesting cost (in 1
view)
X      wood harvesting cost (in 1
view)
wood price (in 1 view) X      wood price (in 1 view)
wood price index (in 1
view)
X      wood price index (in 1
view)
workload (in 1 view)  X     workload (in 1 view)
Total: 61 58 35 44 24 8 :Total
 External
Setting
Actor
(A)
Governance
System (GS)
Resource
Units (RU)
Resource
System
(RS)
Levels  
* Includes Time, if used in a view. Excludes variables not present in any view.
Level Structure †
Common Property Pastures = clearing+reopened-abandonment dt + [INITIAL CPP]
INITIAL CPP = 4375
    abandonment = IF THEN ELSE(surplus pasture<Common Property Pastures, surplus pasture/time to change land use, Common
Property Pastures/time to change land use)
    clearing = IF THEN ELSE(Owergrown Common Property Pastures=0, IF THEN ELSE(pasture deficit<Forest, pasture deficit/time
to change land use,Forest/time to change land use), 0)
    reopened = IF THEN ELSE(pasture deficit<Owergrown Common Property Pastures:AND:Owergrown Common Property
Pastures>0, pasture deficit/time to change land use, Owergrown Common Property Pastures/time to change land use)
Farm Household = farm succession-farm abandonment dt + [242]
    farm abandonment = Farm Household/household lifetime
    farm succession = farm abandonment*(normal succession rate*discrepancy ratio)
Forest = afforestation-clearing dt + [INITIAL FORREST]
INITIAL FORREST = 2130
    afforestation = (Owergrown Common Property Pastures)/succession time
Livestock Per Household = herd adjustment dt + [6.3]
    herd adjustment = (houshold stocking gap*effect of land holding on herd adjustment)/time to adjust herd size
Owergrown Common Property Pastures = abandonment-(reopened+afforestation) dt + [INITIAL OVERGROWN SUMMER
PASTURES]
INITIAL OVERGROWN SUMMER PASTURES = 163
Provision = (duty fullfilment+extra provision bought)-provision executed dt + [16000]
    duty fullfilment = Provision Capacity*fullfilment rate
    extra provision bought = (fines payed/compensation for additional provision)/time for provision
    provision executed = Provision/time for provision
Provision Capacity = planed provision-(defection+duty fullfilment) dt + [(INITIAL PROVISION POTENTIAL I)]
INITIAL PROVISION POTENTIAL I = (Carrying Capacity*1.1)*provision requirements
    defection = Provision Capacity*(1-fullfilment rate)
    planed provision = (provision requirements*Stocking)*fraction planed
Stocking = (appropriation of local livestock+appropriation of foreign cattle)-return to valley dt + [1474]
    appropriation of foreign cattle = stocking gap*(search for foreign cattle*availability of cattle in the lowlands*incentives for
summering)
    appropriation of local livestock = local stocking potenital*(normal appropriation rate*effect of land holding on appropriation)
    return to valley = Stocking*(1-mortality rate)
†  Level Structure Report still under development.
Source file: Full model SES Grindelwald.mdl (7/21/14 - 12:04 PM)
SDM-Doc Tool Version 4.9.6
Decision and Information Sciences Division
Argonne National Laboratory
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Formative Scenario Analysis 
We selected eight variables of the external setting and respective potential values of variables 
based on the literature review and previous work conducted in the study region (Baur, Liechti, 
and Binder unpublished manuscript). The variable set and hypothetical values were then 
validated in expert interviews and refined afterwards. Based on the validated impact factors 
and potential future levels, we constructed the impact matrix. 
 
Fig. 8. Completed consistency matrix with consistency scale from –1 to 2: –1 = Parameter value x does not 
occur in conjunction with parameter value y; 0 = Parameter value x possibly occurs in conjunction with 
parameter value y; 1 = Parameter value x supports occurrence of parameter value y; 2 = Parameter value x 
induces parameter value y. 
The impact matrix was completed four times in total by 10 experts, including agronomists, 
farmers, and tourist officials. Each expert filled in only the parts of the matrix that 
corresponded to his or her field of expertise. The completed matrices were then computed 
using KD software provided by Systaim. The program is analogously developed to the impact 
matrix shown in Fig. 8. Computing reduced the set of scenarios to the most consistent but also 
differentiated the parameter combination to cover a wide range of possible developments. 
Consistency indicators for scenario selection included (i) additive consistency, which is the 
sum of all coefficients, (ii) multiplicative consistency, which is the average rate of additive 
consistency, (iii) the number of inconsistencies in a scenario, (iv) and the minimum number of 
normal -50% 50% 25% 50% -50% -20% 30% -10% 40% normal -25%
 boom 
+25% normal -40% normal
 
increa
se (2° 50% 200%
normal 
-50%
50%
25% 0 0 0
50% 0 -1 0
-50% -1 0 -1
-20% 0 -1 1 0 1 -1
30% 0 0 -1 0 -1 0
-10% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
40% 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
equal 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 1
-25% 0 1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 -1
 boom +25% 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 1 0 0 1 -1
normal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 -1 1 -1
-40% 0 0 0 0 1 -1 0 -1 0 0 -1 1
normal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 increase (2° Celsius) 0 0 1 0 0 -1 -1 0 1 0 1 0 1 -1 -1
50% 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 -1
200% 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 1 -1 0 1 -1 0 0 0 -1 1
Direct payments
Summering 
payments
Prices dairy 
products
Direct cost
Off-farm income 
opportunities
Tourism 
development
Off-farm 
income 
opportunities
Tourism 
development
Climate Wood price
Climate
Wood price
Direct payments Summering payments
Prices for 
dairy 
products
Direct cost
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of inconsistencies in a scenario, (iv) and the minimum number of consistencies (Tietje 2005). 
Out of the 864 possible scenarios, we identified 21 scenarios that had a multiplicative 
consistency between 0 and 9.5, an additive consistency value ranging from 4 to 8, and an 
inconsistency value ranging from 0 to 3, a minimum number of consistencies of 0. To further 
decrease the number of the scenarios, we calculated the distance between scenarios that is 
described by the number of different parameter values characterizing a scenario (Tietje 2005). 
This last step ensures that the analysis covers the widest possible development of the external 
setting among the consistent scenarios. Finally, the four most different of the 21 scenarios 
with the highest consistency were selected for simulation.
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